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 My dissertation focuses on an ecocritical evaluation of environmental 
representation in contemporary comics and graphic novels. Ecocriticism and the graphic 
narrative share disciplinary similarities; both are hybrid forms that commingle seemingly 
incommensurable components (literature and the land, text and image), and both continue 
to evolve in complex and exciting ways. Using the familiar rubric of animal, vegetable, 
and mineral, my dissertation explores the theoretical underpinnings of ecocriticism’s 
contemporary moment as it is illustrated in the graphic environment. 
 Ecocriticism today is marked by an increased interest in postcolonial theory and 
by a posthumanist turn that has culminated in various species of speculative realism and 
new materialist theory. Following an introduction designed to juxtapose the development 
of ecocriticism with the evolving graphic and narrative conventions of comics and 
graphic novels, I turn in my first chapter to a postcolonial ecocritical analysis of the 
graphic novel. Given the confluence of aesthetics and politics in a postcolonial theory, I 
invoke the work of French theorist Jacques Rancière as a necessary component of my 
ecocritical analysis of three graphic narratives featuring animal protagonists. My second 
chapter provides close textual and visual readings of two graphic novels whose 
vegetable-human hybrid characters provide models for applying Deleuze’s theory of the 
rhizome and Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory to environmental representation. This 
iv 
chapter introduces key concepts that ground much of new materialism and serves as a 
bridge to my third chapter. Here, I weave together the threads of feminist materialism and 
object-oriented ontology in an ecocritical reading of three graphic novels that consider 
things from a thing’s point of view. 
 My conclusion shifts forward to an ecocritical reading of two graphic novels that 
provide global and local perspectives on the critical issues concerning environmental 
writers and theorists today, the ecological, social, and economic consequences of 
hyperobjects like global climate change and global financial collapse. Graphic narratives 
provide a uniquely effective representational medium for locating the contemporary 
environmental imagination and for illustrating the theoretical complexities beneath its 
surface. I argue that there is much work to be done at the confluence of image and text in 
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INTRODUCTION: GRAPHIC ENVIRONMENTS 
 
 
 Ecocriticism and the graphic novel share an overlapping (and little noted) 
coincidence of attributes and arguments. Both are what Bruno Latour designated as 
quasi-objects, hybrid combinations assembled in the middle ground between well-
established polarities: nature and culture, image and text (We Have Never Been Modern 
77). Broadly sketching the outlines of ecocriticism as “the study of the relationship 
between literature and the physical environment,” Cheryll Glotfelty envisioned a 
chimerical blend of literary criticism and scientific theory, an interdisciplinary superhero 
with “one foot in literature and the other on land,” able to “negotiate between the human 
and the nonhuman” while exploring the nuances of their intersection as represented in 
literature (Glotfelty and Fromm xix). The graphic novel is likewise a shifting 
combination of authorial text and artistic image—“more alchemy than science” according 
to Scott McCloud—another kind of assemblage that relies on the tensions and affinities 
between its constituent arts to animate its content (161). Both are primarily concerned 
with representation; the graphic novel provides its creators with a medium for conceptual 
expression, while ecocriticism critically analyzes and evaluates the representational 
strategies of multiple media. In yet another display of similarity, the respective 
practitioners of each discipline appear to agree to disagree about preferred nomenclature. 
While yielding to the widespread and conventional use of the phrase ecocriticism by 
other ecocritics, Lawrence Buell argued that the description “environmental” criticism 
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“approximates better than ‘eco’ the hybridity of the subject at issue...as well as the 
movement’s increasingly heterogeneous foci” on a variety of environments represented 
within a far more interdisciplinary matrix (The Future of Environmental Criticism viii). 
Patrick D. Murphy also elaborates on the notion of disciplinary diversity, pointing out 
that there is an equal need to “distinguish between the terrain of ecological criticism...and 
the distinct terrain of the literature itself,” between Glotfelty’s ground rules and the 
multiplicity of texts and genres in which the representation of the human/nature 
relationship is centrifugally or centripetally present (Farther Afield in the Study of 
Nature-Oriented Literature 1). The descriptor “graphic novel” is a similarly slippery 
term: when does a “graphic narrative” (Will Eisner’s term for “any story that employs 
image to transmit an idea”) become a graphic “novel” (Graphic Storytelling and Visual 
Narrative xvii)? Hillary Chute and Marianne DeKoven express a preference for Eisner’s 
terminology because of its broader application: “We understand graphic narrative to 
encompass a range of types of narrative work in comics,” they explain, and their interest 
is aimed squarely at the medium’s visual and verbal narrative practices (767). Alan 
Moore suggests that “comic work of more than 40 pages is automatically equated with a 
novel,” and Roger Sabin seems to concur that “lengthy comics in book form with a 
thematic unity” is an adequate description, yet Sabin and other authors also point to 
industry binding techniques as the defining characteristic distinguishing the graphic novel 
from comics (Moore, Writing for Comics 3; Sabin, Comics, Comix & Graphic Novels 
165).1  
Both ecocriticism and the graphic novel suffer from (or benefit from, depending 
upon your perspective) the competing demands of their practitioners regarding the 
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adequacy of their respective representational strategies: the challenges inherent in trying 
to image the so-called natural world in terms of both its human and other-than-human 
participants, the relative predominance of image and/or text as the engine driving the 
graphic novel machine, and the questionable question of anthropomorphism in any form 
of environmental representation. And yet despite these and other similarities, to date there 
has been no sustained ecocritical exploration of the graphic novel as one of what Patrick 
Murphy notes are the “many ways of representing human engagement with the rest of 
nature in literary forms that do not descend from natural history, that are not written in 
prose, that are not nonfiction [and] that are not rhetorically structured as essays” (Farther 
Afield 2). When Buell makes his distinction between the terms “ecocriticism” and 
“environmental criticism,” he actually suggests that the “eco” prefix “still invokes in 
some quarters the cartoon image of a club of intellectually shallow nature worshippers,” 
conflating an overly simplistic definition of ecocriticism with what he clearly perceives 
as an equally unsophisticated representational medium not likely to be included in 
Murphy’s “literary forms” (Future of Environmental Criticism viii, emphasis added). 
Douglas Wolk suggests that comics “are sort of literary. But that’s not all they are...They 
are their own thing: a medium with its own devices, its own innovators, its own clichés, 
its own genres and traps and liberties” (14). Wolk offers this qualified description in 
order to suggest that comics criticism cannot rely solely on the language of literary or 
film criticism to adequately evaluate a medium that is neither wholly one nor the other. 
His caveat echoes Murphy’s, whose claim that “ecocriticism is very much a movement, 
however, rather than a method” celebrates the diversity inherent in an evolving critical 
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discipline that relies on multiple theoretical perspectives (and not a single prescribed and 
proscriptive stance) to respond to an equally multiple and heterogeneous mix of texts (17). 
 Wolk also wants to distance himself from Eisner’s use of the term “graphic 
narrative,” noting that “graphic” has unfortunate ties to “sexuality” and “violence” (60-
62). Yet it is precisely these bodily (and embodied) graphic elements that I would argue 
make graphic novels more valuable to ecocriticism’s purported study of the relationships 
between matters human and nonhuman, cultural and natural. Sex and violence are as 
materially present in ecosystems and in environmental writing as they are in the most 
graphic artifacts of popular culture. Leslie Fiedler, in an often-quoted article first 
published in 1955, suggested that for all their crudeness, comics “touch archetypal 
material...they remain close to the impulsive, subliminal life,” and he readily concurs 
with critics who label comics and other “vulgar art” as “sadistic, fetishistic, brutal [and] 
full of terror” (126-127). Edward Abbey writes with avid detail about his encounter with 
mating gopher snakes in the (then) Arches National Monument; he describes himself as 
“a shameless voyeur” who crawls on his hands and knees to “to get a closer view” 
(Desert Solitaire 20). In The Anthropology of Turquoise, Ellen Meloy’s chapter “A Field 
Guide to Brazen Harlotry” celebrates the pulsing colors and sinuous shapes of desert 
plant life—“slickrotica” is her evocative neologism for the vibrant red flowers she 
describes as “visual aphrodisiacs” (224, 226). In Desert Quartet: An Erotic Landscape, 
author Terry Tempest Williams and artist Mary Frank explore the erotics of an elemental 
embeddedness in an unexpectedly lush desert space. Frank’s suggestive line drawings 
and color panels provide visual stimulation as Williams exposes herself to the mind’s eye.  
I dissolve. I am water. Only my face is exposed like an apparition over 
ripples. Playing with water. Do I dare? My legs open. The rushing water 
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turns my body and touches me with a fast finger that does not tire. I 
receive without apology. Time. Nothing to rush, only to feel. I feel time in 
me. It is endless pleasure in the current. No control. No thought. Simply 
here. (23-24) 
 
Whether recording the first acts or the final ones of the cycle of life and death, 
both ecocriticism and comics do something—Glotfelty’s imagined ecocritic “negotiates” 
between literature and land; McCloud’s words and images “go hand in hand...like 
partners in a dance” (155-156). Like Abbey’s “living caduceus,” ecocriticism and the 
graphic novel “intertwine and separate, glide side by side in perfect congruence, turn like 
mirror images of each other and glide back again, wind and unwind again” (Desert 
Solitaire 20). In a passage that has considerable strength for my approach to an 
ecocritical analysis of graphic novels, Bruno Latour emphasizes the power of a quasi-
object to act as a creative mediator, functioning between terms to produce something new 
even as it also re-presents its constituents—the hybrid’s transforming ability to make us 
see or hear or think about something we have not before (We Have Never Been Modern 
77-78). Critical analysis that insists on teasing this partnership apart, that wants to 
evaluate each part using the conventions of either one or the other, runs the risk of 
neutering the power generated by their interweaving. “In this way,” Latour notes, “the 
middle was simultaneously maintained and abolished, recognized and denied, specified 
and silenced” (78). Subordinated to its individual components, the hybrid’s unique 
identity and powerful performance is cancelled out. Latour advocates instead that “we 
start from the middle,” focus our analysis on the hybrid quasi-object and how its 
resonating complexity enhances its constituents’ capacities as well as its own (81). His 
solution is to eliminate the borders or boundary markers between those dialectical poles, 
to identify the quasi-object in the fullness of its constituents: to abandon the impulse to 
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bracket off Nature from Culture because “[c]ultures—different or universal—do not exist, 
any more than Nature does. There are only natures-cultures, and these offer the only 
possible basis for comparison” (104). An ecocritical approach to the graphic novel should 
not begin by separating literature from land, human from nonhuman, image from text. 
Instead, the potential for each lies in the boundary blurring performance of these 
polyform, transgressive, mediating chimera. Where the graphic novel draws on the 
polysemic and heteroglossic synergies of image and text, ecocriticism, imagined as riding 
the gap between culture and nature, mediating between the represented and the real, 
likewise feeds on the productive dissensus among its assembled parts.     
 
Ecocriticism: An Evolving Discipline 
 
The time should come when we ask of any text, “What does this say about the 
environment?” (Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature 5) 
 
In their foundational 1996 collection, The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in 
Literary Ecology, Glotfelty and her co-editor, Harold Fromm, prompted by increasing 
concerns about the negative impacts of human activity on the natural world, assembled a 
montage of scholarly essays on fictional and dramatic literature to celebrate critical 
engagement with environmental representation. This early anthology was soon followed 
by other likeminded and increasingly heterogeneous collections. In 1998, Richard 
Kerridge and Neil Sammells published Writing the Environment: Ecocriticism & 
Literature, a transatlantic anthology emphasizing the dialogic commingling of British and 
American authors “to see what old narrative forms made of environmentalism, and 
whether new ones are emerging” and valorizing boundary crossing between theoretical 
and textual practices (“Introduction” 5). Laurence Coupe’s The Green Studies Reader: 
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From Romanticism to Ecocriticism, published in 2000, combined traditional literary 
critique with Marxist, structuralist, and cultural theory, while broadening the array of 
ecocritical textual objects under consideration to include fantasy fiction and film. Karla 
Armbruster and Kathleen R. Wallace’s Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Ecocriticism (2001) explicitly challenged ecocriticism to increase its 
textual sampling to include “texts that might seem unlikely subjects because they do not 
foreground the natural world or wilderness,” texts from multiple genres set in urban 
environments and degraded landscapes (“Introduction” 5).  
At the same time, other ecocritical anthologies began to display a kind of 
specialized evolution; 1998 also saw the publication of Greta Gaard and Patrick D. 
Murphy’s edited collection, Ecofeminist Literary Criticism: Theory, Interpretation, 
Pedagogy, and the next decade would see an invasion of anthologies that similarly 
exploited a more specific theoretical or thematic niche. Murphy’s Farther Afield in the 
Study of Nature-Oriented Literature (2000) brought narrative theory to bear on both 
multicultural and postmodern literatures. The Environmental Justice Reader: Politics, 
Poetics, & Pedagogy (2002) was a watershed collection, in which editors Joni Adamson, 
Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein engaged with a wide range of authors and texts “to 
examine the issues, events, cultural productions, and educational initiatives emerging 
from the environmental justice movement worldwide” (“Introduction” 4-5). Ursula 
Heise’s Sense of Place and Sense of Planet: The Environmental Imagination of the 
Global (2008) expanded the outer limits of ecocriticism, using prose fiction and science 
fiction to “point to ways of imagining the global that frame localism from a globalist 
environmental perspective” (9). In 2010, Graham Huggan and Helen Tiffin followed with 
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Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, Animals, Environment, a conjoining of 
postcolonial theory and ecocriticism designed to “demonstrate the knowledge of non-
western (non-European) societies and cultures” by “reaching out across languages and 
cultures” to address global exploitation of human and nonhuman peoples and 
environments (“Introduction” 16). 2011’s Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire, 
edited by Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, added another dimension to 
ecocriticism’s polyvocal and multihued aspect. With its examination of such disparate 
textual species as novels, television shows, political movements, and community parks, 
this anthology exemplifies the kinds of boundary-crossing and genre-blending only 
imagined in those early visions of ecocriticism as a manifestly hybrid discipline. 
Yet despite this optimistic portrait, ecocriticism’s evolution has not followed a 
smoothly linear (and vertical) trajectory. Much like comics’ Gold and Silver Ages, 
ecocriticism’s evolution can be thought of in terms of thematic iterations or, as Lawrence 
Buell notes in his 2011 article, “Ecocriticism: Some Emerging Trends,” imagined as a 
series of consecutive and yet overlapping waves. It is perhaps ironic that Buell, whose 
preference for the term “environmental criticism” over that of “ecocriticism” on the 
grounds that the “eco” prefix suggests a homogeneity of both content and intent not really 
in keeping with the diverse representational environments it critiques, would select such a 
monistic metaphor for his discussion of ecocriticism’s thematic stages. The difficulty 
with using organic metaphors is precisely their tendency to smooth over the centripetal 
and centrifugal tensions that continuously animate (and agitate) ecocritical discussion; 
Grant Morrison’s discussion of the various “ages” of the superhero comic recognizes 
more adequately the interpenetration of each aspect with those before and after it.  
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In its first flowering, ecocritical literary criticism (produced largely by Western 
authors and taking Western literature as its subject matter) focused on (predominantly 
nonfiction) texts in which nonhuman nature shared (and in some cases, overshadowed) 
the stage with human actors.2 Ecocritics utilized the tools of literary criticism to evaluate 
those representational strategies and worked to expand the literary canon to include 
neglected/overlooked works of nonfiction nature writing. At the same time, some 
practitioners demanded that ecocritics demonstrate an increased environmental literacy, 
turning to evolutionary biology and ecological science to help shape a more scientifically 
informed critique of the adequacy of literary representations of local and regional 
ecosystems. Second-wave ecocriticism reflected the impact of the theoretical turn in 
gender studies, critical race theory, and cultural studies on literary theory in general and 
on environmental representation in particular, as theoretically inclined ecocritics called 
attention to the social and cultural construction of a Nature too often concealed beneath 
Baroque layers of mimetic representation. This heightened awareness of social 
construction also prompted some ecocritics to engage more fully with the political 
implications of issues of environmental pollution, political policies, and potential social 
injustice. Buell’s overview concludes with a speculative discussion of what he anticipates 
as ecocriticism’s third wave, which he bifurcates into two trajectories: an extension of 
Western environmental justice initiatives into a more global postcolonial 
environmentalism, and the simultaneous growth of interest in a more materialist 
engagement with transgressive environmental pollution, as exemplified in ecofeminist 
Stacy Alaimo’s work with “trans-corporeality” (Buell, “Ecocriticism” 88-97). More 
recently, in the January 2013 online issue of The Journal of Ecocriticism, Scott Slovic, 
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editor of ISLE, heralded “a new fourth wave of ecocriticism” that has emerged around 
“the theoretical and practical aspects” of “material ecocriticism” (“The Roots and 
Branches of ASLE” 5).  
Although Buell confidently asserts that from its inception, “most [ecocritics] 
would have granted readily enough that ecocritical work might comprehend any and all 
expressive media,” collections of environmental representation only gradually diversified 
their content (“Ecocriticism: Some Emerging Trends” 89). Early anthologies of nature 
writing reflected a sort of local homogeneity, predominately featuring the work of mostly 
Western-male-authored nature-oriented fiction and nonfiction. The 1990 Norton Book of 
Nature Writing was edited in 2002 to include a wider range of gender and ethnicity in its 
authors, but featured only prose texts. Lorraine Anderson’s Sisters of the Earth: Women’s 
Prose & Poetry About Nature (1991) attempted to balance this trend by featuring only 
female authors and by including poetry along with more traditional prose selections. 
Anderson, Scott Slovic, and John P. O’Grady’s Literature and the Environment: A 
Reader on Nature and Culture (1999) attempted a more diverse collection, using prose, 
poetry, personal narrative, essays, and cultural commentary to flesh out a thematic array 
of nature-oriented and environmental writing. Volumes of ecocriticism have followed 
along similar lines, concentrating first on explicitly nature-themed or oriented prose 
fiction, then expanding the field’s coverage to embrace poetry, nonfiction, and a wider 
array of cultural voices and critical objects. Armbruster and Wallace’s Beyond Nature 
Writing concluded with critical essays under the heading “Expanding Ecocriticism across 
Genres and Disciplines,” evaluating works of science fiction, film, educational 
programming in our National Parks, and the virtual landscapes of online gaming. Ursula 
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Heise’s Sense of Place and Sense of Planet specifically challenges “current U.S. 
environmentalist discourse, ecocriticism included” to adopt a more eco-cosmopolitan 
perspective (59). 2011’s Environmental Criticism for the Twenty-First Century is, in this 
respect, a far more ambitious attempt to address a much broader array of  “missing links” 
in its coverage of expressive media and materials. 
 Noticeably absent from the contemporary ecocritical scene, however, is a 
sustained engagement with the graphic novel as a platform for environmental 
representation, as an avatar of the various waves of ecocritical evolution, and as a 
compelling pedagogical vehicle. This is particularly surprising because comics seem to 
have responded to public concerns about environmental issues far sooner than 
ecocriticism’s somewhat belated appearance in the 1990s. In Supergods, comics writer 
Grant Morrison points out that by the 1970s, “stories about Indian land rights, pollution, 
overcrowding, and women’s lib...[t]he new anxieties of America and the West at the end 
of the sixties were stamped directly onto the pages of the comics” (152). By the 1980s, 
titles like Larry Marder’s Tales of the Beanworld and Bob Burden’s Flaming Carrot set 
the stage for Alan Moore’s reboot of Swamp Thing, “an ecological fable” that resurrected 
its literally green hero as “a sort of ‘god of vegetation’” and “used the comic to comment 
upon US gun laws, feminism and multinational economics” (Roger Sabin, Adult Comics 
76-77). Raymond Briggs’s When the Wind Blows, a 1982 graphic novel that poignantly 
depicts the insufficiency of an elderly British couple’s dutiful (and doomed) response to a 
nuclear attack (“Well, we survived the last one. We can do it again...Yes, we must always 
look on the bright side, ducks”), is as viscerally compelling as Rachel Carson’s “Fable for 
Tomorrow” in 1962’s Silent Spring. Patrick Murphy notes that “postmodernist forms and 
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media technology have also increased the frequency of the appearance of hybrid forms, 
such as mixed-genre books and combination art and text works, as well as video, film, 
and mixed-media presentations,” and he urges ecocritics “to have a concept of aesthetic 
representations inclusive enough to be able to comment intelligently and critically on 
such works” (Farther Afield 54-55). Tim Morton, whose Ecology Without Nature is 
subtitled “Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics,” points towards art’s value as a critical 
environmental resource in his more recent book, The Ecological Thought: 
Ecocriticism has overlooked the way in which all art—not just explicitly 
ecological art—hardwires the environment into its form. Ecological art, 
and the ecological-ness of all art, isn’t just about something (trees, 
mountains, animals, pollution, and so forth). Ecological art is something, 
or maybe it does something. Art is ecological insofar as it is made from 
materials and exists in the world...But there is more to its ecological 
quality than that...Ecology permeates all forms. (11) 
 
 As a literal and material “combination of art and text,” the graphic novel offers a 
doubled capacity for environmental representation and engagement. It can afford us a 
profoundly hybrid perspective on the world we share with multiple others. “What the 
mixing of the text and image often does,” Linda Hutcheon notes, “is to underline, through 
the use of direct verbal address to a viewer, the fact that, as a signifying system, pictures 
too represent both a scene and the look of a viewer, both an object and a subject” (131). It 
is time, then, that we move on to explore more precisely how the graphic novel performs 
to engage us more intimately with what Morton would claim is our always already 
interdependence in an ecology that is “profoundly about coexistence” (The Ecological 






The Graphic Novel: At the Confluence of Image and Text 
 
Put simply, art involves a new combination. 
(Simon O’Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari 146) 
 
 The graphic novel combines images and text to tell a story. Graphic novels come 
in a variety of lengths, formats, and genres, and, like ecocriticism, suffer from critical 
dissent over descriptions of precisely what constitutes this textual format.3 They are 
written for a variety of audiences, from juveniles to adults to “mature audiences only,” 
and their content ranges from original stories to adaptations of other primary texts, 
movies, television programs, and video games. Graphic novels evolved from traditional 
comics, and their aesthetic structure combines the artistry of cartoon art with the narrative 
strategies of the novel. Where ecocriticism concerns itself with the representation of the 
intersection of human and nonhuman in a range of different environments, the emerging 
discipline of comics criticism focuses on comics “as a site where words and images 
intersect” (Varnum and Gibbons x). Scott McCloud, whose Understanding Comics 
represents a landmark in American comics criticism (much like the Glotfelty and Fromm 
anthology of ecocriticism), mounts an argument that echoes Latour’s. McCloud lauds 
what he describes as comics’ “silent dance of the seen and the unseen,” their ability to 
“go hand in hand to convey an idea that neither could convey alone” (92 italics original, 
155-156). McCloud focuses his critical attention on the power of this assemblage of word 
and image as both a combination of distinct elements and as a functioning system in its 
own right; his impulse is to explore the power of this hybrid by emphasizing its collective 
functionality, rather than by redefining it in terms of its elemental constituents (92). Not 
all comics critics agree with McCloud’s sentiments: Robin Varnum and Christina 
Gibbons, in their introduction to the edited collection The Language of Comics: Word 
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and Image, specifically take issue with McCloud’s both/and approach. They find his 
argument contradictory, and they suggest instead that comics must be viewed “either as a 
single, integral system of signification or as a hybrid (whether freakish or not) made up 
of the separate elements of painting and writing,” and their useful collection presents 
essays that support each side (xi, my italics). I prefer McCloud’s willingness to begin, as 
Latour does, “in the middle.” His contention, that “no other artform gives so much to its 
audience while asking so much from them as well,” suggests one of the reasons why 
graphic novels, as a representational medium, might well serve as a productive and 
provocative source for ecocritical analysis (92).   
 Ecocriticism cannot evaluate the mere adequacy of environmental representation 
in the texts under its consideration, particularly now in the face of accelerating global 
warming, demands for corporate environmental stewardship and accountability, and 
dwindling nonrenewable resources. Ecocriticism also needs to consider how some texts 
reignite our environmental imagination, providing us with creative scenarios in which we 
actively rise to meet those challenges. Graphic novels do not simply invite their readers 
to observe their intricate dance of text and image, word and thing; comics readers become 
active participants, supplying what Will Eisner describes as “both visual and verbal 
interpretive skills” to connect multiple images and bits of text into a comprehensive 
whole (Eisner, Comics and Sequential Art 2). I have argued elsewhere that ecocriticism 
should incorporate some aspects of performance theory in its reading of textual artifacts 
in order to explore more fully the performances represented therein and to deconstruct the 
performative consequences of those representations.4 McCloud stresses that closure, the 
reader’s compulsion to construct a whole from an observed series of fragments, to grasp 
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the narrative from a comic’s juxtaposed sequences of pictorial panels and word balloons, 
is a critical component of comics’ aesthetic experience. He believes that our capacity for 
closure is an evolved response to our embedding in an “incomplete world” where our 
survival (and that of our environment) is dependent upon our ability to make connections 
between actions and consequences—a kind of Darwinian instinct that demands that we 
actually get the picture rather than simply consume it passively (63). Douglas Wolk 
points to the “immersive experience of comics” as a key factor in the pleasure offered by 
this particular medium; comics readers actively enjoy “filling in all the blank spaces 
beyond each panel”—a kind of readerly wayfinding that maps performance onto text 
(132).  
 Wolk provocatively offers walking as a metaphor for readers’ engagement with 
the distinctive progression of comics’ sequential panels: “each step is a fall that’s caught 
by the next” (131). The potential for one panel’s content to arrest the assumptions we 
read into the panel adjacent to it (clearly, unlike film projection, comics panels can be 
read in or out of sequence—but more about that later) is a critical component of this 
metaphor. Thoreau devotes the opening paragraphs of his essay “Walking” to a 
discussion of “the genius” (and the genus) “for sauntering,” for “the art of Walking, that 
is, of taking walks” (Emerson and Thoreau 71). Thoreau prefers as the likely origin of the 
term the French expression for medieval pilgrims walking towards the Holy Land, “à la 
Sainte Terre,” over the phrase “sans terre, without land or a home”—he emphasizes the 
grounded performance captured in the former over the unanchored aimlessness suggested 
by the latter (71-72).  Thoreau’s Saunterer is no Everyman with no particular place to go, 
always already at home regardless of his surroundings. “Every walk is a sort of crusade,” 
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he argues, motivated by a need to “go forth and reconquer” the very specific and Holy 
ground beneath his feet: to renew and to re-know the environment as it reveals itself in 
the actual performance of walking (72). Readers of graphic novels find themselves in 
similar territory. Comics are “full of enticing blank spaces, in both space and time, for 
readers to decorate...but what they look and feel like when we flesh them out isn’t the 
same way we perceive our own environments” (Wolk 133). The realistic specificity of 
some pictorial panels can be interrupted by the words that precede or follow them; the 
seemingly straightforward claim in a word balloon can be belied by the image it 
accompanies. What we see on the comics page is not our own immediate (and notice that 
I do not mean here “unmediated”) perception of the world around us, but rather an 
overtly mediated representation of some world by some person or persons other than 
ourselves. We are not merely vagrants wandering a fully rendered imaginative world 
whose premises we accept without question, whose environment we fall into without 
pause. Instead, we are what French political, literary, and aesthetic theorist Jacques 
Rancière calls an emancipated spectator, able to “translate what she perceives in her own 
way” (The Emancipated Spectator 16). Comics readers go forth into these graphic 
environments and make them their own in an aesthetic and intellectual sense through 
their performance of closure; as a result of comics’ specific representational tactics, we 
renew our acquaintance with what Wolk describes as “a metaphorical representation” of 
our own “image-world,” one that can sometimes be more transformative than a more 
realistic, but perhaps more restrictive, presentation (134). “Images,” Rancière notes, are 
“operations: relations between a whole and parts; between a visibility and a power of 
signification and affect associated with it; between expectations and what happens to 
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meet them” (The Future of the Image 3). Rancière’s aesthetic theory discloses how 
images and text sometimes produce moments of destabilizing dissemblance, engaging the 
viewer in a suddenly unfamiliar experience that opens the door for a productive 
reimaging of relationships, a suggestion of alternative futures. 
 Take, for example, the graphic short story, “A Billion Conscious Acts,” included 
in the fifth collected volume of writer/artist Paul Chadwick’s long running series, 
Concrete (Think Like a Mountain 151-156). Chadwick’s half-ton hybrid hero has a 
mortal mind inside an alien (in both senses: utterly unfamiliar and constructed by 
interplanetary visitors) body. As the series develops, Concrete presents an evolving eco-
consciousness that makes him an appealing subject for my interest (he will be a feature 
attraction in Chapter 3, “Mineral”). Also useful here is the fact that Chadwick is both 
author and artist of this comics series; image and text go hand-in-hand, proceeding from 
the same hand, and Chadwick’s comments on his own process and practice are often 
instructive. Concrete is an attentive and emancipated saunterer, whose alien-enhanced 
eyesight (he can see with extraordinary clarity, even from a great distance and at night) 
compensates for the sensory disabilities that come with his mineral-like exterior. Thoreau 
“would fain return to my senses” when he walks, but Concrete has no senses of taste, 
touch, or smell—along with great strength and endurance, his acute vision is his most 
valued almost-super power (Walking 78-79). Dislocated from his original human body, 
he sees everything anew...and we are invited to do so as well. In “A Billion Conscious 
Acts,” we take a walk in Concrete’s enormous shoes, seeing his oversized footprint on 
the ecological macro- and microverses in which we all coexist. Chadwick’s opening 
panels deftly juxtapose the irony of our inadvertent impact on the natural world (in the 
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unconscious consequences of our billion conscious acts) with the billion interactions that 
go on beneath our notice (Think Like a Mountain 151). Directly beneath his enormous 
descending foot, Chadwick strategically positions a tiny Concrete on the gutter between 
two panels, one where we look down on the footprint to come and one at ground level, 
where we are suddenly inside that same footprint. Concrete’s now tiny legs cross from 
the macro view to the micro perspective, and we are invited to consider ourselves as 
simultaneously having an enormous impact on the world and as being influenced by it; 
little Concrete is on equal footing with the acorn in the second panel. In the next series of 
panels, Concrete walks unheedingly away while Chadwick’s graphic eye takes us deep 
inside the billion intersections and intra-actions that pay Concrete (and us) no attention 
whatsoever. Chadwick also calls attention to the very constructed nature of this 
representation; wasp larvae are growing inside that acorn, “springtails...as small as the 
crossbar of the ‘h’ in this line,” which “you will probably never see” (Think Like a 
Mountain 153). “Concrete walks on,” Chadwick narrates, and steps into a puddle, an 
image poised at the lower right corner of the right-hand page, the point at which we will 
turn the page...and the point at which our ready anticipation that we will zoom into that 
puddle’s ecosystem is fully arrested by the text and image of the succeeding panel. “But 
that’s another story,” the narrative cautions us, and the image is of some indistinguishable 
landscape, one where felled trees are burning and we can just make out tiny humans and 
tiny vehicles on tiny roadways (Think Like a Mountain 156).   
 Chadwick artfully uses this moment to segue into an argument about the 
vanishing tropical rainforest, and the ultimate consequences to the global ecosystem from 
a billion conscious acts of deforestation and resource extraction. “Perspective is 
 19 
everything,” Concrete advises us elsewhere, because “we make decisions based on what 
we see around us” (The Human Dilemma 9). Perspective is an artistic choice, not a given; 
in a visual medium, it can shift quickly and radically as panel focus changes from the 
distanced third-person perspective of the traditional anonymous observer to close-up 
shots only available to one character’s point of view. Illustrators Steve and John Totleben 
repeatedly interrupt and overlay individual panels in Alan Moore’s The Saga of the 
Swamp Thing, embedding one character’s viewpoint in that of another. They also 
experiment with the affective qualities of form, using diagonal panels rather than the 
linear and horizontal arrangements of traditional comics, to convey a sense of urgency 
and movement to reader consciousness and to the narrative situation.5  Constantly 
shifting points of view can produce a sensation of double consciousness in the reader, 
who must negotiate between seeing (and reading) a character as a subject in one panel, as 
an object in the next. Recall again Chadwick’s deliberate perspective shifts, from above 
and below, from within and without, from the local viewpoint to the global perspective in 
“A Billion Conscious Acts.” The reader sees the graphic environment in two different 
ways, as a participant and as a spectator, as a contributor to its ecological state of being 
and as the beneficiary (or victim) of those actions. In the briefest of spaces, only six 
pages, Chadwick has made the local unfamiliar, the global unsettlingly nearby. Using the 
power of image and text, he renders our consciousness a springboard for rethinking our 
relationships with the environment, and suggests that while saving the rainforests will not 
be a walk in the park, “it will be worth it”...for the environment’s sake and for our own 
(Think Like a Mountain 156). This is the hybrid power that an ecocritical consciousness 
can locate in the environmental imagination of the graphic novel.    
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 Graphic novels, like their more abbreviated progenitors, comics, rely not on 
photorealism but on drawn images to suggest (rather than to “capture”) not “a direct 
representation of the world” but rather “an interpretation or transformation of the world, 
with aspects that are exaggerated, adapted, or invented” (Wolk 20). Tim Morton, writing 
specifically about environmental aesthetics and about ecocriticism’s limited engagement 
with artistic practices, proposes that “art forms have something to tell us about the 
environment, because they can make us question reality” (The Ecological Thought 8).  I 
believe that graphic narratives are an ideal art form for showing and telling us something 
more about our perceptions of our environments, our engagement with them and the 
extent of our impact on them—more, perhaps, than we consciously intuit from our actual 
day-to-day experiences. They would fain return us to consciousness; they invite us to pay 
attention to the billion tiny experiences we pass by unaware. They animate the very 
issues that Ursula Heise suggests must be interrogated in an ecocritical exploration of the 
“natural, urban [and] virtual” environments we encounter every day (“Unnatural 
Ecologies” 166). They vibrate with what Marion D. Perret identifies as “graphic 
liveliness”—that compelling urgency that flows out of graphic images set in motion by 
“the dialectic between word and image” when an artist “draws for the mind as well as the 
eye” (123).  
Like any pictorial medium, graphic novels are subject to the hazards often 
associated with images: the reductive consequences of using stereotypes, the naturalizing 
effect of deploying myth to convey meaning, and the depoliticizing result of relying on 
“recognizable reproductions of human conduct” that assume a common readership with a 
shared pictorial vocabulary and a common sense of the world reproduced in the 
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visual/textual environment (Eisner, Graphic Storytelling and Visual Narrative 11). At the 
same time, however, some graphic novels attempt a more nuanced negotiation of the 
interstices between the image and the text, exploring the genre’s capacity for 
transgressing its apparent limitations. These texts embrace the immanent ambiguity 
necessary to produce an aesthetic experience that promotes the play of disparate identities, 
active self-reflexivity, and heteroglossic dissensus—an experience where politics might 
flourish. The graphic novel’s capacity for germinating this aesthetic and political ecology 
deserves ecocritical attention. Globalization’s long reach and monologic narratives 
produce the appearance of a discursive unity that occludes multiple persons, places, and 
things in the rush to represent a world consensus. Graphic novels invite their readers to 
experience the world through not only other, but Other senses, a repositioning that 
radically destabilizes assumptions, re-presents a virtual present, and gestures towards an 
alternative future. This creative web of words and images affords a lively zone of 
continuous play for imaginative anthropomorphism that invites new voices to the 
contemporary global stage.6 “Art’s ambiguous, vague qualities will help us think things 
that remain difficult to put into words,” Morton claims, and “art can allow us to glimpse 
beings that exist beyond or between our normal categories” (The Ecological Thought 60). 
Part of ecocriticism’s engagement with the graphic novel’s particular power will be to 
consider more closely its aesthetic performance.  
 
GRAPHIC Novels: The Aesthetics of Cartoon Art 
 
Artistic form, correctly understood, does not shape already prepared and found content, 
but rather permits content to be found and seen for the first time. 
(Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 43) 
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 Scott McCloud’s classic exploration of the aesthetics of “sequential art,” 
Understanding Comics: The Invisible Art, uses the comic book format to conduct an 
“examination of the art-form of comics, what it’s capable of, how it works” (i). 
McCloud’s text provides a useful starting point for an exploration of the graphic milieu 
with and against which the narrative is read. As the precursor to the graphic novel, 
comics provide “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to 
convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer” (9). Cartoon 
art’s production of an aesthetic response depends in part on the degree of realism used in 
iconic resemblance; the more abstract an icon becomes, the less specific is its referent 
and vice versa (McCloud 27). McCloud suggests that the simplicity of comic characters 
is the source of their aesthetic power and that “the cartoon is a vacuum into which our 
identity and awareness are pulled” (36). This masking effect entices the reader to enter 
the comic story and to engage with the other elements represented in the sequential 
frames that depict the environment of the text. McCloud also contends that the 
juxtaposition of simplified cartoon characters with elaborate and realistic backgrounds 
creates an opportunity for identity, understood as self-awareness, to flow outward from 
the mind through the senses, extending that awareness to the body and to the enveloping 
environment (38-41). This somewhat simplified layering of Marshall McLuhan on 
Descartes nevertheless persuasively underpins McCloud’s provocative notion that comics 
invite readers to inhabit a character-as-mask while “safely entering a sensually 
stimulating world” (43). Engaged both intellectually and sensually, we literally and 
physically experience the world of the graphic novel. 
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 McCloud argues that cartooning is not “just a way of drawing, it’s a way of 
seeing,” a critical argument that I will return to repeatedly in my arguments (31). The 
graphic novel integrates the visual conventions of cartooning with its narrative forms to 
explore alternative ways of seeing and saying, surely a productive combination for 
environmental representation. Advocating the need for art forms that do more than 
simply re-present their subject matter, art theorist Simon O’Sullivan suggests, “We see 
only that which we are interested in. At stake with art might be an altering—a 
switching—of this register,” and he goes on to reimagine an art that accomplishes more 
than simple reproduction, an “art [that] operates as a form of play,” one “that takes the 
participant out of mundane consciousness” (47-48).  The reader’s immersion in the 
sensory world of the graphic novel can produce something like the transgressive 
experience of virtual identity, the performance of what Walter Benjamin considered “the 
powerful compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else” (qtd. in 
Taussig 19). Graphic novels depend upon our “mimetic faculty...the faculty to copy, 
imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other,” and the 
writer/illustrator team provides the vehicles that accommodate these “Othering impulses” 
(Taussig xiii). The illustrator makes some characters available for role-play while 
denying that option for others; in the same way, some settings may be richly detailed, 
vital elements of the narrative, while others are merely sketches, reduced to backdrops 
foregrounding the actions of the graphic novel’s protagonists. Some characters 
immediately offer themselves as avatars, while others are more realistically drawn, 
foreclosing viewer identification because of their specificity; it is also possible to use a 
greater degree of detail to suspend the reader between empathetic assimilation and 
 24 
disidentification, to interrupt our seamless desire to inhabit a character by making that 
character both inviting and disturbing, both welcoming and uninhabitable. In Paul 
Chadwick’s Concrete series, the title character is an anomalous hybrid, “one hapless 
rock-coated fellow,” with whom the author (and the reader) wants to ask, “What might 
really happen to someone whose life was so changed...What would I do in his shoes?” 
(Depths 4). Chadwick’s title character is rendered with deceptive simplicity and 
surprisingly rounded contours, given his rocky exterior. In a sense, Concrete is colorless, 
odorless, and tasteless; if he is not without gender, he is decidedly without genitalia. This 
is not realism—Concrete’s appearance and carefully crafted origin story make him the 
perfect Everyman. Instead of being repelled by his alien exterior, we are drawn into the 
seeming openness of his black-and-white outlines—Chadwick invites us to enter his 
experience, to share his point of view, and frequently to find ourselves, like Concrete, the 
brunt of a gentle irony that challenges his (and our) habitual assumptions. 
 Consider Chadwick’s 1986 short story, “Under the Desert Stars” (Killer Smile 
109-116). Concrete plans an overnight stay in a remote desert location, planning to use 
this time for contemplation (he is reinventing himself as an environmental writer and 
memoirist). In the opening panels we look over Concrete’s shoulder (adopting at once his 
perspective) and then immediately shift perspectives to see him from a distance, waving 
goodbye to his human companions disappearing with the vanishing point. In the large 
title panel immediately below, however, Chadwick thrusts us outside of Concrete’s 
consciousness. His diminished shape, too small for us to enter, approaches; he is wholly 
self-absorbed while we are invited to see in some detail the California desert. A condor 
soars overhead, and an iconic saguaro cactus anchors the panel, and if we look closely, 
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we can identify other iconic desert flora and fauna (the distinctive silhouette of the Joshua 
tree, rocky outcroppings, a road runner, a lizard, and a scorpion). One minute we see with 
Concrete, the next we look at him; Chadwick’s drawings actively move us inside and 
outside the character, and we step into his body even as we remain aware of it. This is 
performance; like an actor donning a role, we are conscious that we are imaginatively 
performing as Concrete without actually becoming Concrete (Carlson 3). In this story, 
Concrete is consciously trying to perform as a writer, and much of his dialogue is 
concerned with thinking about himself performing a role he is not altogether successful in 
inhabiting. We do the same here—we are not Concrete, and yet again sometimes we are; 
sometimes we see through his eyes and at other times, we see with our own—and that 
sort of switching of perspectives performatively reinforces the graphic novel’s value for 
thinking both ecocritically and environmentally. Concrete describes his trip to the desert 
as “transplantation to nowhere,” immersion in an environment where he thinks there will 
be little to distract him from his writing (111). Chadwick deliberately juxtaposes 
perspectives; Concrete’s alien eyesight may be superior to ours, but the irony is that we 
see what he fails to notice, the others populating this anything-but-empty space (111-112). 
Concrete’s imagination runs away with him (and ultimately with us) in this story. He sees 
someone dump a large bag on the side of the distant highway, and we are carried away 
with his speculations. When his trembling hands reach towards what surely is a body bag, 
we are Concrete, inside his massive body, seeing with those piercing eyes. We turn the 
page...and we are again looking over his shoulder, seeing something neither of us 
expected. Chadwick’s tour de force here demonstrates the ability of image and text to 
entangle us in role-play that is both conscious and unconscious, challenging our 
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assumptions and yet making us aware of them at the same time. “I find the desert 
stimulates my imagination,” Concrete says self-consciously at the end of this story, and 
we know intimately what he means and how he feels. 
 Contrast this approach with the hyperrealism of Grant Calof and Eric Eisner’s 
H2O, a cautionary environmental graphic novel intended to dramatize the ultimate 
desertification of the Earth after years of global drought. Jeevan J. Kang’s meticulously 
rendered color illustrations provide little more than scenery for an on-location action-hero 
story whose muscular-but-sensitive heroes and busty-but-brainy women enact “a new 
chapter, a new evolution—a new consciousness.” One character offers a radical solution 
to the planetary water shortage whose potential side effects include planet-wide “volcanic 
winter.” His proposal is appealing only because, as he says, “Our way of life is already 
finished.” There’s no deliberation, no hesitation: in the next panel, the deal is done. The 
reader experience here is cinematic: we watch these characters but do not enter into their 
consciousness; we empathize with their dilemma, but in the end it’s their “new 
consciousness,” not ours, and what counts is decisive action, not deliberation. At issue 
here, I think, is also something Chadwick says about the intra-action between image and 
text. In his introduction to the 2006 reissued Think Like a Mountain, he talks about his 
frequent use of what he calls “occasional silent panels,” panels that achieve what he 
describes as “the quality of unique moments” in fiction, moments I would argue that 
invite that deductive and productive role-play. “Words tend to tie up the package with a 
neat bow,” he argues. “You ‘get it,’ so you don’t contemplate it, as you would a painting” 
(5). In their zeal to convey a message about the need for changing consumption patterns 
to avert the kind of global crisis that motivates H2O, Calof and Eisner resort to didactic 
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dialogue that tells us exhaustively what their characters think, but leave us little room to 
let our own environmental imaginations flow out of their actions. Their chatty hero cites 
his own authority (“Like I said...”), abruptly ending further discussion and engaged 
consideration. Chadwick, on the other hand, is a master of using simple line drawings 
whose lack of detailed realism gives us room to think. At the conclusion of “Objects of 
Value,” another Concrete short story included in the 2006 Think Like a Mountain, 
Concrete finds himself questioning the effectiveness of individual local recycling against 
the larger global scale of wasteful practices. In an image that is frequently repeated in 
Chadwick’s various stories, Concrete reacts in exasperated despair and is then depicted 
sitting motionless on a hillside, carefully considering his own response in a series of 
silent panels. He sees someone else picking up discarded cans; he thinks to himself, 
“You’re swimming upstream kid” (Think Like a Mountain 164). In the next panel, we see 
an aluminum can in the foreground, Concrete dragging a large sack in the background. 
Again, no dialogue, no narrative...he is thinking for himself, just as we are. In the final 
half panel, we see a hand (Concrete’s? Ours?) reaching for that can. The text signals “The 
End,” but the partial panel suggests that this is only a fraction of what must necessarily be 
a larger effort. No decision is made for us, but we certainly are invited to do our part.    
 These “artistic practices” perform what Rancière names a “distribution of the 
sensible,” the partitioning of what is seen and what is said, of who is included and who is 
excluded, in a specific time and space (Politics of Aesthetics 12 – 13). Rancière, whose 
aesthetic theory will animate much of my analysis in Chapter 1, implicitly distrusts 
consensus, which he defines as a mono-vocal overstatement (“Like I said”) that silences 
multiple dissenting voices, and his topographical approach to aesthetic analysis focuses 
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on identifying the ways in which representations are designed to present either 
consensual or dissensual voices. One of the weaknesses, I think, of Calof and Eisner’s 
artistic practice, is to imagine that an environmental problem, no matter how pressing, 
could be so easily dealt with by consensus, by a single, authoritative voice that presumes 
to speak for all. The effect of Kang’s illustrations in H2O is to show perspective without 
giving voice to it. One of the strengths of Chadwick’s imaginary is his frequent 
representation of Concrete dwelling in the middle of some contradictory moment. 
Concrete tends to approach environmental issues like recycling or consumer choices or 
issues of population growth from a position of uncertainty, and Chadwick illustrates these 
issues as difficult problems composed of multiple factors that demand multiple 
perspectives. The power of comics comes from the intra-action of word and image: in the 
interplay between their unique strengths and weaknesses and in their collectively 
dynamic capacity. An over-reliance on realistic character depiction closes off our access 
to that sort of dynamism, and places us on the sidelines in the graphic environment—a 
stance we may too often inhabit in the material environment of our actual world. 
Aesthetic practices that do more to exploit that ambivalent openness in the heart of the 
icon, to access the vacuum at its core (instead of prematurely foreclosing it at its outlines), 
invite us to cross character boundaries and to both see and speak from subject positions 
which were previously unavailable to us. We may even find ourselves seeing and hearing 
others whose presence we never expected.  
  Michael Taussig suggests that there is yet another potential consequence of 
mimetic identification, an invitation to a further doubling. If I can inhabit the character as 
icon, it has also taken hold of me, and “now I too am part of the object of study” (Taussig 
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8).  As the reader’s gaze flickers from the level of participant to the level of observer, she 
experiences a kind of becoming-icon; she discovers that she is the object of her own gaze, 
an Other to herself. In moments like these, the graphic novel interpellates a subject 
position that is both co-performed and co-performative: neither one nor the other, the 
comics reader becomes hybrid, is chimera. Rancière notes the political and theatrical 
effect of this doubled framing of fictional subjectivities. He describes this recursive, 
twinned perspective as the “introduction of a visible into the field of experience, which 
then modifies the regime of the visible” (Disagreement 99). If politics emerges out of this 
startling visibility and audibility, what might this mean for readers who are made visible 
to themselves simultaneously as environmental object-subjects, as entangled subject-
objects? I should point out here that Tim Morton, in Ecology Without Nature, mounts a 
very different argument about the ultimate failure of “ambience,” an argument that seems 
to contradict Rancière’s valorization of an artistic practice that confers visibility on the 
previously unseen. “Ambient poetics is about making the imperceptible perceptible, 
while retaining the form of its imperceptibility,” he describes, “to make the invisible 
visible, the inaudible audible” (Ecology Without Nature 96). Discouraging the use of 
ambient poetics is part of Morton’s larger aesthetic argument. His emphasis is on the idea 
of retention, on an artistic practice that brings something into the foreground while 
ensuring that we never forget that it is really always in the background. His argument is 
that ambient poetics is doomed to fail because even as it works so diligently “for a 
dissolving of difference between subject and object,” it cannot help but reinforce it 
(Ecology Without Nature 63-64). I would argue that Rancière’s interest in the political 
valence of aesthetic practice accomplishes something quite different. Rancière is not 
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invoking the materialization of a ghostly presence in order to posit some future equality 
of shared being; he is pointing to aesthetic practices that recall to our attention the visible 
we do not see, whose coexistence and ontological equality we have actively suppressed or 
unconsciously overlooked, the disappeared. Environmental aesthetics must restore our 
sense of the more-than-human collective of which we are a part and with whom our 
coexistence is inextricably entangled.  
 The aesthetic vitality of graphic novels is also derived from the performative 
demands that their artistic practices make on their readers. Reader literacy affects 
interpretation and requires a material investment from those readers; we have to learn 
how to read the graphic text. Panel borders often challenge traditional Western left-to-
right reading priorities, and the overarching demand is that readers find ways to read 
images and texts together rather than prioritizing one over the other (Gravett 11). Hegel 
advocated art that demanded observer participation, noting that “interest only occurs as a 
result of fresh activity” that continued to “work away on an object so long as it still 
contains something hidden, not manifest” (qtd. in Potts 56). Engagement with the graphic 
novel involves effort at both the intellectual and the sensual level; dramatic shifts in 
perspective challenge reader participation—sometimes, our eyes deceive us, and 
sometimes, that is precisely the effect that is intended. On multiple occasions, Chadwick 
shifts perspectives on Concrete’s rough exterior to emphasize how easily we can be 
mislead artistically: up close, we see a boulder or the surface of the moon—look again, 
and we see his familiar stone face. 
 Graphic art forms resemble film in this manipulation of perspectives from varying 
angles and standpoints, but they also differ from film in a key respect. Film relies on the 
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phenomenon of “the persistence of vision” to enable the viewer to read a series of 
discrete images as an uninterrupted “story of continuous motion” (McCloud 65). We 
apprehend film unfolding as a linear forward stream, unaware of our vision’s contribution 
to its apparent seamlessness. Sequential art, on the other hand, by virtue of its aesthetic 
structure, allows us to read its images bidirectionally and assumes our active connection 
of those separate panels; while the narrative may incline us to a linear reading, our eyes 
move more selectively through the panels on a page. Because comics’ sequential panels 
are all visible simultaneously, as McCloud points out, in comics the present, past, and 
future coexist on every page—a juxtaposition that can interrupt our assumptions about 
simple chains of cause and effect, or at least bring them more visibly to our attention 
(McCloud 104). On page after page, the graphic novel artist gives us a series of image 
panels separated by what is called “the gutter,” the space between those panels (McCloud 
66). The gutter marks an interval between the dramatic action depicted in one panel and 
that of the next, an apparently uncoded and unstructured gap that our imagination must 
either complete or cross over. Comics theorists do not agree on the gutter’s functionality 
or its importance to the medium. McCloud suggests that there is “a kind of alchemy at 
work” in this empty space between panels, where our natural impulse towards closure 
prompts us to fill up the gutter with a kind of conceptual adhesive; closure refers to our 
almost irresistible impulse to sequence, to close the gap between sequential images, 
“endowing them with a single overriding identity” (73). Comics artists exploit our need 
for connection; they place possible disparate, random images side-by-side, clearly 
separated by this visual chasm, and  “force the viewer to consider them as a whole. 
However different they had been, they now belong to a single organism” (McCloud 73). 
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Comics theorist Thierry Groensteen views the gutter as predominately a formal device 
that serves a separative function; he does not share McCloud’s insistence that it “plays 
host to much of the magic and mystery that are at the very heart of comics” (McCloud 
66). Groensteen argues instead that the gutter is merely a boundary line that indicates 
where one panel ends and another begins, a line of demarcation that can be literally just a 
line (112). McCloud argues that closure, “the agent of change, time and motion,” can 
only occur in the invisible empty space between the panels, performed by the reading 
audience; his emphasis throughout is on the local effects of reader collaboration (65-73). 
In Groensteen’s comics system, “the ultimate signification of a comics panel does not 
reside in itself but in the totality of relations in the network that it maintains with the 
interdependent panels” that make up the comic as a whole (53). The agency McCloud 
perceives in the juxtaposition of images, Groensteen attributes to what we might call the 
persistence of narrative. It is not the adjacency of images that engages my need for 
closure; instead, “it is the continuity attributed to the fictional world that allows me to 
effortlessly fill in the gaps of the narration” (11). My reading of the power that circulates 
at the heart of a hybrid suggests that they are both right; closure flows from (and is often 
interrupted by) both the graphic and the textual narratives. 
 Groensteen also imagines another kind of continuity flowing across the comics 
system he has elaborately analyzed. Included in that totality of relations is what he calls 
“iconic solidarity...the central element of comics,” a multiplicity of relationships between 
independent images that he terms “arthrology,” from the Greek word for articulation (18-
21). In Groensteen’s The System of Comics, comics “is not only an art of fragments, of 
scattering, of distribution; it is also an art of conjunction, of repetition, of linking together” 
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(22). Repetition of iconic motifs across a graphic novel is, for Groensteen, the foundation 
for the phenomenon of “braiding,” which “manifests into consciousness the notion that 
the panels of a comic constitute a network, and even a system”; the effect of this 
repetition is that “images that the breakdown holds at a distance, physically and 
contextually independent, are suddenly revealed as communicating closely, in debt to one 
another” (Groensteen 158). He imagines comics as a kind of graphic ecosystem whose 
seemingly distinct and disparate fragments coexist in a complexly entangled mesh, 
dependent upon and impacted by each other’s actions. Comics are made up of images, 
images whose first relationship is “the sharing of space” (Groensteen 28). Comics use 
space to convey the notion of change, to deploy memory in the service of time, to 
represent motion in an intrinsically static art (McCloud 115). When we read a series of 
comics panels, changes in environmental details can subtly convey to us the passage of 
time; when Chadwick shows us Concrete mulling over the recycling problem, he also 
gives us clues about the duration of his thinking time. In the four relevant panels, the 
background shading progressively darkens, and in the two central panels we see the sun 
dropping in the sky behind him. Concrete is immobile, but we know that time has passed 
(Think Like a Mountain 164).  
 At the same time, there is something else present in this series of four small 
panels. Chadwick has woven into this specific and local story an image that resonates 
throughout his Concrete series. Look closely at Concrete’s body here, and you will see in 
his immobility the repetition of a familiar position. His hunched, seated figure graphically 
recalls Rodin’s “Thinker.” Concrete’s immobile mineral body could be read here as a 
metaphor for the mind/body dualism that has haunted our engagement with the natural 
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world since at least the time of Descartes. His body is alien-made; Concrete is an alien to 
himself. His mind is the only “human” thing left of his identity—it is only when he thinks 
that he therefore is still human. In this specific series of panels, Concrete is deliberating 
over his response to a very local problem, but I can argue that Chadwick is also 
deliberately linking us intertextually and intergraphically to multiple moments in the 
Concrete system; he uses the power of iconic solidarity to braid many discrete moments 
into a more global network of representation. “Braiding” can only occur if meaning does 
not stop at the borders of isolated panels (Groensteen 147). Groensteen’s meticulously 
enumerated dissection of the components of this comics ecosystem begins with the panel 
(as a specific local site) and widens outward to the relations between framed panels on 
the page (which can be thought of as a larger frame or region), and finally to a broadly 
global view of the comic as a whole. At the same time, he argues that graphic motifs are 
both local (viewed independently in their individual panels and on a single page) and 
global (repeated iteratively or perhaps with significant differences across multiple panels 
on different nonadjacent pages). His arguments harness the local/global tension that 
animates much of contemporary environmental writing. In Sense of Place and Sense of 
Planet, Ursula Heise challenges ecocritics to embrace an environmental imagination that 
rethinks the global as “a kind of collage in which all the parts are connected but also lead 
lives of their own” (Sense of Place and Sense of Planet 64). Groensteen’s braiding is both 
a visual aesthetic practice and “an essential dimension of the narrative project,” one that 
“incites translinear and plurivectoral readings” (Groensteen 155). Graphic novels do not 
survive on image alone; their vitality depends on the work of a collage made possible by 
its distinctive components. “Graphic liveliness,” Marion Perret argues, “does not come 
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solely from physicality, but is intrinsic to the dialectic between word and image” (123). 
In the graphic environment, it is the confluence of image and text that matters. 
 
Graphic NOVELS: Narrative as Aesthetic 
 
Images and text arrive together, work together, and should be read together. 
(Paul Gravett, Graphic Novels: Everything You Need to Know 11) 
  
 Graphic novel theorists expressly acknowledge the importance of narrative to this 
particular medium of sequential art, many citing the cohesiveness of the story line and the 
unity of its plot structures as the features that most distinguish the graphic novel from its 
comic book cousins.7 I should stress, however, that while graphic novels may rely more 
heavily on narrative to generate “a composite, well-organized structure whose 
construction implies careful textual design on the part of the author(s),” the increased 
proportion of text to image does not necessarily translate into linear plot structure or a 
single perspective (Di Liddo 20). Textual design works with and against the artistic 
design of the graphic novel to produce a structure that is both contradictory and 
complimentary, one that encourages a playful ambiguity to circulate through its narrative 
environment. Narrative in this context is truly hybrid, at once visual and verbal. Tim 
Morton argues, “Art’s ambiguous, vague qualities will help us think things that remain 
difficult to put into words,” while Rancière speaks to the other half of my equation, 
asserting that “words deploy a visibility that can be blinding” (Morton, The Ecological 
Thought 60; Rancière, The Future of the Image 7). Words can, as we have already seen, 
foreclose the multiple potential that flowers in the heart of the icon. Rancière, however, 
also emphasizes the aesthetic power of what he calls “the sentence-image.” Sentence and 
image together can also “undo the representative relationship” between the two, upsetting 
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our traditional assumptions about the power of the sentence to make visible the 
connections between actions, the power of the image to give “flesh and substance” to the 
actors (The Future of the Image 45-46). “When mute images begin to speak,” W. J. T. 
Mitchell speculates, “words seem to become visible” and “media boundaries dissolve” 
(“Word and Image” 60). The hybrid graphic narrative captures this ambivalent power and 
uses it to give a new twist to the novel’s heteroglossic potential.  
 Heteroglossia (the term is Bakhtin’s) often becomes visible in the graphic novel in 
narratives that are as historically and fictionally referential as the images that they 
accompany. Using intertextual references that link contemporary storylines with other 
graphic novels as well as with other texts, and with actual cultural and historic events, 
graphic narratives resonate with multiple voices. Grant Morrison’s Animal Man is based 
on a little-known superhero from the 1960s, a character he chose to reinvent “as a 
mouthpiece against cruelty to animals and the general degradation of the environment”; 
the character is now undergoing yet another iteration in the Jeff Lemire/Travel Foreman 
contribution to DC Comics’ “New 52” series of superhero reboots (Supergods 217). Alan 
Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing had its genesis in a much earlier text, the original 
Swamp Thing series that first appeared in 1971, and Moore consciously deploys and 
distorts the earlier storyline in his reimagining of the classic monster comic (Di Liddo 50). 
Paul Chadwick’s Concrete series is purposively referential, interweaving the voices of 
canonical nonfiction nature writers (most notably Edward Abbey and Aldo Leopold) with 
his fictional hero’s budding environmental activism. Many graphic novels feature a mix 
of human and nonhuman characters, commingling the images of their respective actions 
and perceptions with anthropomorphic voices that compel/repel reader identification—I 
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will explore both aspects of this graphic heteroglossia in Richard Starkings’s Wounded 
Animals, one of the graphic novels featured in Chapter 1. In the uniquely blurred space 
occupied by animal protagonists, the human voice emanating from a nonhuman character 
is doubled; as Bakhtinian translator/scholar Michael Holquist points out, a human voice 
ostensibly “gives the illusion of unity” to what it says, but in reality it expresses “a 
plenitude of meanings, some intended, others of which [the speaker] is unaware” (xx). 
Readers may read this species discourse as “a ready-made symbolic economy” that is 
deployed in narrative to stand in for human issues like gender and race, but the same 
double consciousness that impacts our response to the graphic novel’s visual shifts also 
plays with our participation in the narrative (Wolfe 8). A heteroglossic narrative structure 
allows species discourse to both function as metaphor and to stand on its own, both as 
our human voice and as a posthuman voice that can “serve to generate and keep open 
those very possibilities of difference” that a purely metaphoric reading might conceal 
(Wolfe 13). 
 “Seeing yourself from another point of view is the beginning of ethics and 
politics,” Morton asserts, and the graphic novel’s play of images and texts simultaneously 
produces a heterogeneous focalization while keeping the reader aware of that very tactic 
(The Ecological Thought 14). Narrative theorist H. Porter Abbott’s statement that 
“narrative, with all its powerful and distorting rhetoric, comes between us and the world” 
is not merely descriptive (154). Narrative organizes and directs our understanding of the 
actions and events in the world we inhabit: narrative is, by its nature, sequential. “All but 
the simplest narratives have some fairly complicated relationship between two kinds of 
sequentiality: the sequence of events happening (chronology) and the sequence in which 
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they are narrated (narrative line)”; yet the power of narrative is such that it can blind us to 
its construction of consequence as the “natural” outcome of some causal trigger 
(Bredehoft 872). It is narrative’s conveyance of “blinding visibility” that Rancière has in 
mind when he warns against the complicity of consensus; it is why Barthes argues that 
narrative’s “confusion of consecution and consequence” renders it no more than the 
“language” of Destiny (Image-Music-Text 94). Ecocritics in particular must be conscious 
of narrative’s tendency to create seemingly “natural” networks of cause and effect, agent 
and object, when assessing the limitations (as well as the possibilities) structuring a text. 
The value of the graphic novel’s particular aesthetics here is twofold: first, graphic novels 
make no secret of their representational strategies. “Graphic narratives...have the 
potential to be powerful precisely because they intervene against a culture of invisibility 
[or blinding visibility] by taking the risk of representation” (Chute and DeKoven 772). 
Secondly, graphic narratives disrupt the forward progress of the narrative by the 
simultaneous presence of multiple panels on the page. Reading can be haphazard and 
random; panels may be read with or against each other, and may present multiple 
perspectives on a single page. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “placing elements of any 
nature in continuous variation is an operation that will perhaps give rise to new 
distinctions, but takes none as final and has none in advance” (A Thousand Plateaus 97).   
 “Fiction,” Patrick Murphy notes, “can generate a story that provides intellectual 
equipment for living and display the effect that such information can have on human lives 
as represented by fictional characters” (Farther Afield in the Study of Nature-Oriented 
Literature 25). Murphy labels as fiction those texts driven primarily by “narrative and its 
various aesthetic dimensions”—texts which are more interested in storytelling and 
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perhaps less driven by facts (or perhaps more willing not to be rigidly restricted by them) 
(Farther Afield 7). Concerned that “the nonfiction prejudice within the nature-writing 
critical tradition has impeded appreciation of representations of nonhuman nature and 
human-nonhuman ecosystemic interaction in literary works,” Murphy suggests instead a 
broader inclusion of multiple kinds of literature that does not “stylistically conform to 
canonical expectations” (Farther Afield 62-63). Graphic narrative, whether comic book 
or graphic novel format, “does the work of narrative at least in part through drawing,” 
and authors Hillary Chute and Marianne DeKoven emphasize that “the form’s 
fundamental syntactical operation is the representation of time as space on the page” 
(“Introduction: Graphic Narrative” 767, 769). The images may support the textual 
narrative but this is not a given; Chute and DeKoven stress that the comics medium (and 
by extension, that of the graphic novel) “is composed of verbal and visual narratives that 
do not simply blend together,” an aspect of this distinctively “cross-discursive” hybrid 
that I will pursue more specifically in my conclusion. There I take up the cognitive 
dissonance illustrated in the media coverage of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New 
Orleans and which resonates throughout Mat Johnson’s graphic novel, Dark Rain: A New 
Orleans Story. Johnson and artist Simon Gane juxtapose official narrative (“Words no 
longer suffice”) with telling images (“Symbolism is what matters”) that clearly 
demonstrate the gap between them. 
 Graphic narrative moves through and across time and space, both of key 
importance to an ecologically critical analysis.8 The evolution of environmental crisis and 
theories of risk assessment haunting the ecological discourse of our present moment 
places a premium on timelines; issues of environmental justice and global/local impacts 
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juxtapose notions of place that are both remote and close to home.  Annalisa Di Liddo 
notes how McCloud’s recognition of the ways that comics art visually “conflate space 
and time,” critically connects to another of Bakhtin’s theories, that of the chronotope (64). 
In fact, “the hybrid, verbal/visual nature of comics, and the fact that the narratives appear 
as sequential actions on the space of the page, make the space-time connection even more 
palpable than it appears in the prose novel” (Di Liddo 63). Bakhtin notes that time and 
space are inseparable; “space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, 
plot and history,” becoming a sort of visible time that is as open (or as restricted) as the 
movement of time that constructs it (84-85). If time is viewed as contained, as a past epic 
moment that is always already completed, embodied, and fully performed, then there are 
no options left to be explored: what will be is only what has already been. Ecocriticism’s 
contemporary engagement with the speculative realism of object-oriented ontology must 
address the very different apprehensions of time and space put forward by theorists 
whose environmental imagination is challenged by the looming hyperobject, global 
warming. In the contemporary graphic novel, the fluidity of a narrative that transgresses 
over and through time with its conflation of events both real and fictional, past and 
present, supplements an artistic rendering of time made visible on the page; their 
juxtaposition opens the existential present to the possibility of a future not fully inscribed 
by the past. It is toward this opening proffered by the graphic novel that ecocriticism 
must direct its analysis.  
 “The study of iconoclastic representations of space and world recovers fresh ways 
of thinking and creating,” Morton proposes, “demonstrating that there are, at least 
different sorts of fantasy images of the natural that would refresh environmental thinking” 
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(Ecology without Nature 18). His suggestion that it is the iconoclastic (rather than the 
referential) representation that can recover and refresh the environmental imagination 
restores the active nature of narrative representation and returns us to Rancière’s theories 
of the politics of literature. Gerald Prince emphasizes narrative’s recounting function; 
Latour describes a “good account as one that traces a network” (Prince, “On Narratology: 
Criteria, Corpus, Context” 75; Latour, Reassembling the Social 128-129). Rancière’s 
notion of politics is critically grounded in “a way of framing...a partition of the sensible, 
of the visible and the sayable” or in other words, a way of recounting that determines 
who counts at any given moment, a reordering out of which emerges momentary 
communities of sense that form networks of concern that disrupt the normative consensus 
(“The Politics of Literature” 10). Patrick Murphy suggests that one of the tasks of 
ecocriticism is to consider how to address and to encourage multiple ways of “negotiating 
the interanimating non-identity of humanity /nature,” to highlight how those 
representations of the other-than-human “call on humans to perform in the world” 
(Literature, Nature, and Other 34, 24). Graphic novels have the ability to use text and 
image to disrupt those iconic pictures of environmental representation that have perhaps 
numbed us to the urgency of our present dilemma. Groensteen stresses that “comics 
admit all sorts of narrative strategies,” providing a wealth of aesthetic resources for 
diegetic representation beyond simple mimetic display (117). Grant Morrison suggests 
that “the best comic stories never stopped delivering surprises,” and notes that “writers 
and artists build by hand little worlds that they hope might effect change in real minds, in 
the real world where stories are read” (Supergods 224, 409). There is an ecological vision 
and environmental imagination embodied in the panels and pages of contemporary 
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graphic narratives, and it is to that distinctive medium that I intend to turn my ecocritical 
attention.  
 Chapter 1, “Animal: Overlooking the Post-Other,” explores the postcolonial turn 
in ecocriticism and uses it to read three very different graphic novels. Moving from the 
allegorical noir of Richard Starkings’ Wounded Animals (Vol. 1 of Elephantmen), 
through the ripped-from-the-headlines topicality of Brian K. Vaughan’s Pride of 
Baghdad, to Grant Morrison’s deeply poignant and affective WE3, I explore the affinities 
and tensions between postcolonialism’s commitment to exposing issues of social and 
cultural damage (racism, sexism) and the posthuman aspects that ecocriticism wishes to 
foreground in its analyses. I also turn to the aesthetic and political arguments of French 
theorist Jacques Rancière, in order to consider how his topographical analysis might 
inform an ecocritical approach to graphic texts that seek to represent the immediate and 
long-term consequences of colonial policies in contexts near and far. Rancière’s lucid and 
compelling arguments about the powerful redistribution of the sensible that can result 
from imaginative representational practices makes a powerful addition to what I hope to 
demonstrate as a politically charged postcolonial ecocritical aesthetic.    
 In Chapter 2, “Vegetable: Emerging Entanglements,” I again use a theoretical 
armature to undergird my ecocritical analysis, this time focusing on graphic narratives 
which feature human/plant hybrids as their protagonists. My use of theory to espalier my 
analysis serves two purposes. First, in keeping with my interest in hybrid texts that 
commingle multiple components, I believe that ecocriticism can only benefit from the 
diversity that an engagement with contemporary critical theory can supply. Ecocriticism 
is an evolving discipline, one that cannot become the intellectual equivalent of a 
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monocrop without limiting its opportunities for long-term survival. Second, I also believe 
that graphic novels have real value as a pedagogical tool, effectively providing a 
compelling visual frame on which to display the ways in which theory can be grafted 
onto representations and in some cases, to be teased out of them. To that end, I frame my 
ecocritical readings of Alan Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing and Neil Gaiman’s Black 
Orchid in terms of yet another hybrid, Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory and its 
parent stock, the rhizome of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Assemblage theory, with 
its emphasis on the interactions of parts and wholes and on their individual and multiple 
agencies, provides a theoretical bridge between the concerns of postcolonial ecocriticism 
and the new materialism of ecocriticism’s nominal fourth wave. Both Saga of the Swamp 
Thing and Black Orchid are reboots of older, less inventive series; in this chapter, the 
environmental imagination that fertilizes them both is exemplified in multiple aspects of 
the graphic novel’s visual and verbal narrative. 
 Chapter 3, “Mineral: Dancing Like a Mountain,” directs the environmental 
imagination to consider what a material ecocriticism might look like in the wake of the 
collision between the Deleuzean/Spinozist new materialism of Karen Barad, Stacy 
Alaimo, and Jane Bennett, and the Heideggerian-grounded object-oriented ontology (or 
OOO) currently being developed by Graham Harman, Levi Bryant, Ian Bogost, and 
ecophilosopher Tim Morton, among others. After an attempt to tease out the nuanced 
differences between the vitalist process-oriented new materialism that is especially 
prevalent in contemporary ecofeminist discourse and the resolutely anti process 
speculative realist ontologies of the OOO philosophers, I turn to Dan Walsh’s eliminative 
revisions of Jim Davis’s classic Garfield cartoons, collected in Garfield Minus Garfield, 
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to illustrate the strange strangers and real objects imagined by OOO. From there, I look at 
how Taster’s Choice, the first volume collecting John Layman and Rob Guillory’s 
imaginatively appetizing comics series Chew, successfully visualizes the pervasive 
materiality of Stacy Alaimo’s “trans-corporeality.” Self-described material feminists are 
very focused on the smorgasbord of intra-actions involved in our body’s ingestion of and 
interpenetration by the kinds of unseen and transformative unnatural elements in 
foodstuffs: chemical preservatives, genetically-modified crops, and a host of antibiotics 
and hormones in factory-farmed food animals bring issues of bioethics and biopolitics 
back to the table. Finally, I spend more time specifically considering Paul Chadwick’s 
Concrete series, focusing particularly on Chadwick’s ongoing development of Concrete’s 
ecobiography, a material memoir that ponders in detail what it might be like to be a thing. 
 My conclusion, “Making Ecocriticism Matter,” extends my interest in material 
ecocriticism by articulating it with Ulrich Beck’s risk theory and with William 
Connolly’s attempts to craft an affirmative ethics of becoming in the face of what Tim 
Morton calls the Age of Asymmetry. Escalating neoliberal discourse demands a reduction 
in government agency (and a simultaneous increase in privatization) just as massively 
distributed self-organizing systems like global warming and global economic collapse 
threaten to swamp national boundaries and local controls. I explore two very recent 
graphic narratives that consider what might happen in a post-disaster world where 
laissez-faire reads more like laissez-fail. Brian Wood’s ongoing series, The Massive, 
provides the perfect opportunity to explore how Beck’s assessment of the cosmopolitan 
moment that emerges in risk society actually plays out after risk becomes all too real. 
Shifting from the global perspective of this heterogeneous mix of protagonists adrift in a 
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world made unrecognizable by multiple disasters, I turn then to Mat Johnson’s Dark 
Rain: A New Orleans Story, which takes a fictional look at that most nonfictional event, 
2005’s Hurricane Katrina and its effect on the city of New Orleans and on our national 
imaginary. Johnson’s thoughtful narrative and Simon Gane’s evocative artwork provide a 
very local context in which to consider the performances of individuals who find 
themselves in the viscous embrace of the hyperobject. Finally, I conclude with a brief 
look ahead, one that considers how an emerging ecocriticism might take shape in the time 
of hyperobjects.  
 My intention is to present a thoughtful and compelling case for the necessary 
ecocritical consideration of the graphic novel. Artifacts of popular culture reach a diverse 
and widespread audience who may not be the traditional readers of nature-oriented or 
environmental literature; at the same time, those artifacts can be invaluable resources for 
tracking how issues of the environment have penetrated the global imaginary. I am 
convinced that expanding the range of texts that ecocriticism addresses to include comics 
and graphic novels can only strengthen the analytical acuity of its tactics. Diversifying 
ecocriticism’s engagement with a much broader range of theoretical voices also adds to 
its reach and prevents the too-narrow focus that has plagued our discipline in the past. 
Evaluating the material and discursive effects of the visual and verbal rhetoric that 
permeates our global coexistence might also help ecocritics to engage more thoughtfully 
with the artistic and representational strategies of other, non-Western cultures. 
Developing pedagogical strategies that engage a wider range of students in ways that 
disrupt old habits and suggest new alternatives for our environmental performances is 
surely a worthy goal for ecocritics and educators alike. At the confluence of image and 
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text, ecocriticism locates a medium that stages its own global and local entanglements 
and that illustrates for us the mesh of coexistence we cannot not be a part of—a 

























1 See Roger Sabin (Comics, Comix & Graphic Novels 165-167), Douglas Wolk (Reading 
Comics 60-64). I will be using the term to refer to square-bound volumes which may 
contain a single story or which may collect multiple comics issues under one cover. 
 
2 And note my elaborate use here of parenthetical commentary and qualification—the 
textual equivalent, I would suggest, of the graphic “gutter” that separates the visual 
panels of the comics’ page. That seemingly empty space will come to occupy a 
significant share of our attention...but that’s another story. 
 
3 For a more detailed discussion of the critical history of the graphic novel, including a 
discussion of the multiple genres that contribute to the medium as a whole, see Roger 
Sabin’s Adult Comics, particularly Chapter 6, “‘Comics grow up!’: dawn of the graphic 
novel,” and Annalisa Di Liddo’s introduction to Alan Moore: Comics as Performance, 
Fiction as Scalpel. Paul Gravett’s Graphic Novels: Everything You Need to Know also 
offers a more detailed look at various subgenres of graphic novels, categorized by subject 
matter and linked to related texts. 
 
4 See “Reading Out Loud: Performing Ecocriticism as a Practice of the Wild,” in 
Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 19.1 (Winter 2012): 5-23. 
 
5 I will address Bissette and Totleben’s remarkable graphic support of Moore’s 
imaginative reboot of the original Swamp Thing comic series in Chapter 2, but for now it 
is important to note that their sophisticated use of perspective is both distinctive and 
increasingly absent in comics illustration; my sense is that the use of computer graphics 
in comics design has prompted a return to the boxy, grid-like page layouts of earlier 
comics.  
 
6 Currently, graphic novel critics do not seem inclined to identify a specifically 
“environmental” genre, one that consists of graphic texts that meet something like 
Lawrence Buell’s criteria for an “environmentally oriented work” where environmental 
issues and concerns are the central focus of the text and where issues of human 
accountability to and for the environment are also addressed (see The Environmental 
Imagination, pp. 6-8). I would argue that the heteroglossic nature of these graphic 
narratives actively resists the limitations of such a categorization.  
 
7 Specifically see Will Eisner (xii), Paul Gravett (9), and Annalisa Di Liddo’s textual 
analysis of Alan Moore’s work. 
 
8 Gotthold Lessing’s conflation of the word with time and the image with space is a well-
rehearsed argument that serves as background to all engagements with the graphic 
narrative as a conflation of image and text. For a concise summary of his work as it 
relates to comics criticism, see Robin Varnum and Christina T. Gibbons’ introduction to 
their edited collection, The Language of Comics (Jackson, MS: U P of Mississippi, 2001). 
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For an art-theoretical perspective, see “Beyond Comparison: Picture, Text, and Method” 




ANIMAL: OVERLOOKING THE POST-OTHER 
 
 
 I begin my exploration of the confluence of image and text (graphic and narrative) 
from the vantage point of another site of hybrid negotiation: that of the “overdue dialogue 
that is belatedly starting to emerge” between ecocriticism and postcolonial theory (Nixon 
231). Lawrence Buell identifies this disciplinary commingling as a significant component 
of ecocriticism’s third wave, and more recently, Ursula Heise succinctly notes that 
ecocriticism’s “global turn in the last decade” is “no longer news” (“Globality, 
Difference, and the International Turn in Ecocriticism” 637). Ecocriticism and 
postcolonialism share concerns with those issues of colonial conquest, including issues of 
racism, sexism, and cultural appropriation/deformation, which materially affect the lives 
of the colonized and the colonizer in the environmental present. The colonized, in turn, 
have been variously imagined as the indigent, persons of color, women, animals, plants, 
and/or the material resources that have long been reduced to objects, exploited by some 
predatory or colonizing other. Heise stresses ecocriticism’s continued commitment to an 
inclusive theoretical perspective—one that “looks” at both human and nonhuman 
actors—and lauds its posthuman engagement with environmental and cultural alterity. 
“The question of difference in ecocriticism,” she argues, “is never purely human,” and 
therefore “the question of globality and difference plays itself out not only at the borders  
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 of human communities but also at the interface of human and nonhuman systems 
(“Globality, Difference” 638).  
 The issue of the posthuman—a vital term for new materialists, as we will see in 
Chapter 3—is also at stake in ecocriticism’s turn to the postcolonial. Yet another 
heterogeneous term in the hybrid vocabulary I am invoking, posthumanism is the key 
word Cary Wolfe explored in 2010’s What is Posthumanism? Noting that the term 
emerged most noticeably in critical discourse in the 1990s (at about the same moment 
when ecocriticism made its debut), Wolfe’s posthumanism couples an appreciation for 
the multiple points of inter- and intrasection between the human and the “various forms 
of technicity and materiality, forms that are radically ‘not-human’ and yet have 
nevertheless made the human what it is” with a deep concern for “the problems of 
anthropocentrism and speciesism” (xxv, xix). This emphasis on the affective power of 
nonhuman agency that displaces the human as the sole actant in our world narratives 
animates what Rosi Braidotti refers to as “the post-human predicament,” a state of 
uncertainty that troubles “our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common 
reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this 
planet” in a time when human mastery of the environment is no longer accepted as a 
given (The Posthuman 1-2). Wolfe identifies “the profound ethical implication for our 
relations to nonhuman forms of life” opening within this troubling indeterminacy; in what 
would seem to be a related argument, postcolonial ecocritics Graham Huggan and Helen 
Tiffin emphasize that postcolonialism’s engagement with human exploitation of 
nonhuman nature under the guise of colonial governance provides an critical stage on 
which to examine “the very category of the human, in relation to animals and 
 51 
environment” (What is Posthumanism? xxvi, Huggan and Tiffin 18). When the 
postcolonial invades the posthuman, then, ontological and epistemological boundaries 
begin to blur.  
 Yet despite their affinities, ecocriticism and postcolonialism have been reluctant 
dance partners. In their introduction to 2010’s Postcolonial Ecocriticism: Literature, 
Animals, Environment, Huggan and Tiffin suggest that postcolonial theory, like 
ecocriticism, is a heterogeneous field whose practitioners do not always concur, either 
ideologically or methodologically (2). Rob Nixon, whose thoughtful engagements with 
environmental justice span the globe, identifies four major points of divergence in 
disciplinary perspective that separate postcolonial theory from ecocriticism, which might 
be rendered graphically as follows (236-243): 
Area of concern Postcolonialists Ecocritics 
Discursive focus Hybridity, cross-culturation Purity, wilderness, 
preservation 
Spatial focus Displacement, diaspora, 
migration 
Place-based, local loyalties 
Community focus Cosmopolitan, transnational National, bioregional 





 These differences in emphasis are not trivial. Postcolonial theory is grounded in 
the humanist tradition; the potential for traditional human/nonhuman dualism to overflow 
any smooth intermingling of postcolonial theory with that of ecocriticism is manifest in 
their opposing perspectives. Heise succinctly names difference as the turbulent location 
where these fields converge. Tensions between the discourses of the local and the global, 
the loss of vernacular history submerged in more holistic narratives, the variable impacts 
of environmental damage on local fauna, flora, and folk—each of these material 
differences reflect the centrifugal and centripetal forces reshaping the global/local 
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imaginary today. What also surfaces in the ebb and flow of disciplinary overlap between 
postcolonial and ecocritical theory, however, is yet another territory of shared concern.  
As postcolonial literary scholar Laura Wright argues, “both modes of inquiry find 
themselves facing challenges based on the decidedly political and potentially activist 
nature of their focus” (3). Wright specifically notes the effects of “mechanisms of 
colonial silencing” on “the voices of marginalized peoples” (Wright 2). Nixon identifies 
“the challenge of visibility” that complicates representational strategies engaged with the 
nuanced and temporally viscous effects of “slow violence” on the environment (Nixon 5). 
Representation and its spectral other, the unrepresented, recur in the considerations of 
both postcolonial theory and of ecocriticism. Homi Bhabha suggests that “the 
postcolonial perspective forces us to rethink the profound limitations of a consensual and 
collusive ‘liberal’ sense of cultural community,” and emphasizes that “cultural and 
political identity are constructed through a process of alterity” that also demands 
representation (251). Nixon asks how, in the face of private, corporate, national, and 
international contributions to global climate change, we can “convert into image and 
narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making,” how to retell stories 
of “the long emergencies of slow violence” that will “rouse public sentiment and warrant 
political intervention” in the contemporary era (3). The sense of political and 
representational urgency that subtends postcolonial ecocriticism requires an aesthetic 
attuned to what Huggan and Tiffin identify as its “utopian ambitions: to make 
exploitation and discrimination of all kinds, both human and nonhuman, visible in the 
world; and in so doing, to help make them obsolete” (“Introduction” 6, emphasis added).  
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 A politically charged postcolonial ecocritical aesthetic, then, could effect a 
rethinking by mapping the ways we recount the stories that people our environmental 
imagination and that animate our reactions. Such an aesthetic demands of art and 
literature “not to render the visible, but to render visible,” to return to visibility that which 
has been overlooked and underrepresented (Paul Klee qtd. in Deleuze, Francis Bacon 48). 
Huggan and Tiffin emphasize “the continuing centrality of the imagination and, more 
specifically, imaginative literature to the tasks of postcolonial ecocriticism” and stress, in 
a passage that Heise also quotes, that the “aesthetic choices” of this collaborative 
criticism “need to be understood as a particular way of reading,” rather than as a 
species/canon of texts (Huggan and Tiffin 12-13, italics original).  Recall also Scott 
McCloud’s insistence that “cartooning isn’t just a way of drawing, it’s a way of seeing” 
(31, italics original). A postcolonial ecocriticism sufficient to the task of reading and 
seeing critically must be fully alert to the multiple aesthetic choices present in any work 
of literature or of art—or in that confluence of image and text, the graphic novel—and to 
the ways those choices function to either make visible or render invisible the constituents 
it choses either to represent or deny representation to.1  
 Tim Morton tentatively reimagines “unworking” the categories of human and 
animal as a step towards a “threshold that resisted the separation of human and animal,” 
that would “resist their collapse into each other” while simultaneously resisting the siren 
call of “the ‘posthumanism’ that all too readily dematerializes the nonhuman” 
(“Ecologocentrism” 79).2 Morton rightly points out that representation is simultaneously 
a technology of inclusion and exclusion. My purpose here is to explore how the graphic 
novel can serve as a kind of aesthetic threshold, an artistic overlook: a place from which 
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to observe how/if graphic representation of the nonhuman (and in this chapter, 
specifically the animal) in a postcolonial ecocritical frame retains its singularity—its 
specificity—while at the same time encouraging readers to overlook species differences 
in the face of cultural and environmental exploitation in productive and consequential 
ways. To do so, a postcolonial ecocritical aesthetic must negotiate between multiple 
territories: the human and the nonhuman, the posthuman and the postcolonial, space and 
time. It requires an aesthetic, I would argue, that draws heavily on the work of French 
theorist Jacques Rancière, whose mapping of the intersections of literature, art, and 
politics offers a specifically topographical analysis for my use. 
 
Connecting Ecocriticism and Postcolonialism  
Through Jacques Rancière 
 
 Rancière’s aesthetic-political theory has been decades in the making, and the texts 
with which he illustrates his evolving arguments range from literature to works of art, the 
static images of photography, and the moving images of cinema. Certain key terms or 
phrases ground his contentions, with the “distribution of the sensible” the most 
foundational, and certainly the most relevant for a postcolonial ecocritical analysis of the 
graphic novel. “A distribution of the sensible...establishes at one and the same time 
something common that is shared” while also serving to exclude some other parts 
(Rancière, Politics of Aesthetics 12). Specific arrangements of things spoken and seen 
repeated across various cultural genres establish social and sensory consensus. Rancière 
defines consensus as that heavily guarded common “sense” whose exclusive borders are 
maintained through a variety of what he calls “police operations”—practices and 
prescriptives that would include “the selective framing of issues by mainstream news 
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operations; the management of economic, cultural, and existential insecurity” and other 
similar activities designed to “limit political participation” (Tanke 45). The goal of 
politics, and the event of its occurrence, is “dissensus,” “the process of making manifest 
the gap between the sensible and itself,” between what is authorized by the policed 
distribution of the sensible and what is excluded from it (Tanke 4). “Politics,” Rancière 
reiterates in much of his work, “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about 
it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of 
spaces and the possibilities of time” (Politics of Aesthetics 13). Those in power determine 
the outlines of these distributions: these “apportionment[s] of parts and positions” that 
determine what is understood by public and private space and that delineate cultural order 
and social hierarchies, who can do what, when, and where (Politics of Aesthetics 12). 
Politics, then, “is first of all a way of framing, among sensory data, a specific sphere of 
experience. It is a partition of the sensible, of the visible and the sayable...It is a specific 
intertwining of ways of being, ways of doing and ways of speaking” (Rancière, “Politics 
of Literature” 10). Politics, in the sense that Rancière intends, is both a doing and a 
happening; the event of politics occurs when something unexpected appears, disrupting 
the normal/normative order of the everyday—politics is not, in this sense, business as 
usual: that is the work of the police. In Rancière’s aesthetic theory, art and literature have 
the capacity to create political opportunities by altering “the distribution of the sensible 
through the creation of experiences that are opposed to it,” by countering the ways that 
dominant orders determine who or what “counts” as participants in the social order 
(Tanke 73).  
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 Artistic and literary dissensus “reconfigure[s] the landscape of what can be seen 
and what can be thought” in order “to alter the field of the possible and the distribution of 
capacities and incapacities” and by so doing, to restore the notion of equality to the field 
of the possible (Rancière, Emancipated Spectator 49). In his extremely useful 
introduction to Rancière’s diffuse theoretical work, Joseph Tanke notes that in this 
context, “politics is the process of disrupting the distribution of parts and roles through a 
claim about the equality of anyone with everyone” (43). Equality, in Rancière’s 
philosophy, is that originary ground from which every distribution of the sensible 
departs; dissensus reopens the “natural” order of things to the possibility of equality in 
order to prompt a new sense of self and of the Other, to demand a recount of bodies and 
voices and capacities. “Equality,” he writes, “ought to be thought as wholly horizontal” 
(Rancière, “Politics of the Spider” 245). Eric Méchoulan’s perceptive reading of 
Rancière’s definition of equality is illuminating. “Equality is characterized not by 
universal unification (everything is equal to everything else), but by a way of unlinking 
‘natural’ orders...Far from reducing everyone to the One, Rancière’s move is in the 
opposite direction—to multiply the One in each one” (Méchoulan 4). Equality, in these 
terms, is about singularity, not sameness.  
 While Rancière’s own work is resolutely focused on the human, I have no 
hesitation in extending it to a postcolonial ecocritical aesthetic. “Aesthetics is political 
because it introduces dissensus into the world of shared appearances and meanings,” 
Tanke explains, and globalization’s long reach and monologic narratives often produce a 
fiction of discursive unity that effectively silences dissenting local voices in the rush to 
represent a world consensus (85).  Rancière counters this fiction of global consensus with 
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the political potential in dissensus, the appearance of the previously uncounted, unseen, 
and unheard either in eventful performance or in representational forms like art and 
literature. The manifestation of these Others ruptures dominant discourses and can even 
perturb our quotidian sense of the world in which we find ourselves; literature and art in 
this sense offer precisely the ground whereupon our naturalized, habitual responses are 
suddenly made intensely unnatural. Narrative recounting of a tale told countless times 
before suddenly shifts into a re-counting of Other actants; imagining a world filled with 
nonhuman Others can cause the previously unseen to strangely appear in provocative new 
ways. Graphic novels “have the potential to be powerful precisely because they intervene 
against a culture of invisibility by taking the risk of representation,” a risk that often 
means foregrounding animal as well as human protagonists (Chute and DeKoven 772). 
“The ‘aesthetics of politics’ consists above all,” Rancière insists, “in the framing of a 
‘we’”(Dissensus 141). Dissensus prompts us to rethink the constitution of community, to 
refigure our understanding of who “we” are in an increasingly global world, and it 
challenges the idea that our embeddedness in place is our only starting point for 
community identity. Ecocritic Patrick Murphy proposed a new kind of environmental 
community when he advocated adopting “a ‘we and another’ rather than an ‘I and other’ 
orientation toward all life”—a post-Other image of coexistence that celebrates diversity 
without the very conflation or collapse of difference that Tim Morton decries (Farther 
Afield 88). Murphy advocates substituting the concepts of “relational difference and 
anotherness” for the notions of alienation and Otherness in our “human-human and 
human-nature interaction[s],” a radical shift that dissensus can make possible in the gaps 
it introduces in normative consensual discourse (Literature, Nature, and Other 35).   
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 Expanding Rancière’s aesthetic and political arguments to an explicitly 
postcolonial context, Ranjana Khanna investigates the consequences of globalization on a 
specifically national or local sense of community. Rancière, in “Contemporary Art and 
the Politics of Aesthetics,” the essay which opens the edited collection which is the site of 
Khanna’s essay, is quite specific about what he means by a community of sense: not an 
imagined community “shaped by some common feeling,” but rather “a frame of visibility 
and intelligibility that puts things or practices together under the same meaning;” it is a 
“certain cutting out of space and time that binds together practices, forms of visibility, 
and patterns of intelligibility,” an aesthetic, an artistic production, a “partition of the 
sensible” (33). In “Technologies of Belonging: Sensus Communis, Disidentification,” 
Khanna argues that modernism’s key trope of exile, with its ready-made identifications 
linked to an originary, if now distant, homeplace, has been supplanted in the wake of 
globalization by the postmodern figure of asylum—a condition that “foregrounds not 
only the loss of one’s sense of belonging to a homeland (exile) but, in fact, also the loss 
of belief in the possibility of an idea of community” (125). This wholesale loss of 
imaginary renders traditional (and normative) metaphors of community equally 
untenable; the simultaneous inability to relinquish an identity invested in the logic of 
community and the inability to see one’s self otherwise (and Other-wise?) induces the 
nostalgic perspective Khanna identifies as “postcolonial melancholia” (111). 
Globalization has weakened the ability of local and national metaphors to produce a 
sense of community drawn as one body, one family, earth as mother, place as home. 
Instead, it has produced dismemberment and disenfranchisement—a dislocation that is at 
the heart of “the geography of difference” that Heise suggests dominates postcolonial 
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ecocriticism (“Globality, Difference” 639). This sense of disorientation is not limited to 
those victims of diaspora forced to seek asylum in unfamiliar environments; Rob Nixon 
extends what he describes as “a more radical notion of displacement” to “the loss of the 
land and resources...a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the 
very characteristics that made it inhabitable,” characteristics that in many ways defined 
those communities (Slow Violence 19).  
 Rather than conflating the notion of sensus communis with similar bodies united 
through shared space, Khanna suggests that a common ground could form around a sense 
of disidentification. The excluded could find common voice through their “de-
metaphorization,” defined as the unraveling or untangling of the meta-myths that bind us, 
that suture over the dissenting ideas that might otherwise propel us into political 
engagement—in Rancièrian terms, a new community might realize its identification 
through dissensus (Khanna 130). Acknowledging the power of the novel to reimagine 
(and to re-image) the way readers perceive a world filled with multiple actants, Rancière 
notes that “fiction is a way of changing existing modes of sensory presentations and 
forms of enunciation; of varying frames, scales, and rhythms; and of building new 
relationships between reality and appearance, the individual and the collective” 
(Dissensus 141). The aesthetics of the graphic novel, with its unapologetic mix of 
nonhuman and human protagonists, its montage of perspectives and its heteroglossic 
intertextuality, potentially gestures towards an alternative community by unworking some 
familiar metaphors, by using familiar literary forms (allegory and fable) to complicate the 
spatial forms that dominate our postcolonial ecocritical imaginary (the global, the 
national, the local).  
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Welcome to the Postcolony: Unworking Animals 
 in Wounded Animals 
 
I’m an animal, always you’re bleating. I’m an animal, I don’t have to do like the rest of 
you, laws of society don’t apply to me because I’m such a fucking animal. 
 (Indra Sinha, Animal’s People 87) 
 
 While it is possible to read Richard Starkings’ Wounded Animals superficially as 
a straightforward postcolonial animal allegory, a topographical analysis of this powerful 
collection reveals multiple ways in which the graphic novel challenges globalization’s 
colonization of persons, places, and species while simultaneously perturbing the 
unconscious parochialism that sometimes inhabits regionalist imaginaries. Volume 1 of 
the Elephantmen series, Wounded Animals collects the first seven comics issues of what a 
Publishers Weekly reviewer described as a “superior dystopian sci-fi tale” about a group 
of weaponized animal-human hybrids decommissioned into a uneasy human society—
“the setting,” as the review goes on, “for plenty of metaphor about racism, xenophobia 
and globalism” (http://www.amazon.com/Elephantmen-Vol-1-Richard-Starkings). While 
author Richard Starkings’ own characterization of his series filled with “implausible 
ideas and impossible characters” is that of “Pulp Science Fiction,” I believe his breezy 
introduction to this unpaginated volume underestimates the powerful postcolonial 
ecocritical valence of his imaginary.3 Extolling the narrative potential of graphic novels 
“to figure ...differences of experience,” David Herman proposes a sliding scale along 
which to rank the degree of anthropomorphic versus zoomorphic representation in comics 
and/or graphic novels featuring animal protagonists (“Storyworld/Umwelt: Nonhuman 
Experiences in Graphic Narratives”). Certainly, Starkings’ graphic narrative can be read 
as little more than allegory, in which, as Herman makes clear, “nonhuman animals 
function as virtual stand-ins for humans, by way of cultural associations that have 
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accrued around particular species” (167). It is possible, however, that dismissing allegory 
because of its inherent anthropomorphism overlooks the ways in which the relation 
between these particular human AND nonhuman creatures (for they are, in fact, 
genetically both) is visually and verbally troubled in this text. This play between human 
and animal tends to destabilize the boundaries between them. Cary Wolfe describes a 
similar effect, which he attributes specifically to “iterative technologies” like “thinking, 
writing, speech” that seek to close the human/nonhuman gap. “The relation between the 
human and nonhuman animals is constantly opened anew and, as it were, permanently. It 
is a wound, if you will, that can never be healed” (What is Posthumanism 91). Wounded 
Animals’ overt use of allegory can also be analyzed as a kind of demetaphorizing 
wounding that holds those contestable constructions open for a curious and indelicate 
probing. Ursula Heise’s call for “aesthetic forms...that deploy allegory in larger formal 
frameworks of dynamic and interactive collage or montage,” seems to me to speak 
directly to the creative power at work in this graphic novel (Sense of Place and Sense of 
Planet 10). Graphic novel illustrators shatter the linear trajectory of traditional narrative, 
layering multiple character viewpoints on a single page in dynamically shifting panels. 
Their writers are thereby freed from the normal constraints of expository time and space. 
This fluid narrative that transgresses scripted timelines with its conflation of events and 
characters both real and fictional, past and present, supplements an artistic rendering of 
time made visible on the page; their juxtaposition produces an excess that opens the 
existential present to its underlying historical currents and to the possibilities of a future 
not wholly dictated by the past—to an affective postcommunity no longer hide-bound by 
traditional associations.  
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 The setting for Elephantmen is a fictional, yet recognizably urban and dystopian, 
future; in Volume 1’s four-page prologue readers are plunged immediately into the streets 
of Santa Monica, California, in the year 2259: a familiar/utterly unfamiliar world 
fragmented by difference and desire. A disembodied voice ironically advises a lone 
human pedestrian, “Don’t think about how the world changed...Don’t think about the way 
they look at you...Think about something else, Joe...Don’t think of an Elephantman” 
(“Just Another Guy Named Joe”). Moritat’s somber color palette, gritty rain-streaked 
urbanscape, and distorted perspective make it clear that these are the words of the 
Rancièrian police order; in the block captioning typically reserved for an external narrator, 
our visual sense is preframed by an authoritarian voice that visually talks down to us 
while simultaneously hailing us into the tiny, huddled figure at the bottom of the opening 
panel. On the following two-page spread, we are assaulted by a barrage of images that 
carefully construct our experience: monstrous hybrids roam the city streets, an elephant, a 
rhinoceros, a hippo, all dressed in human clothing yet barely discernable against the glare 
of neon lights and blatant billboard hypersexuality. Wounded Animals plunges us 
immediately into a postcolonial nightmare where we cannot be certain of the place “we” 
occupy, where no character invites our identification, and where we are radically out-of-
place in a graphic world we have no idea how to negotiate. “We” are the generic “Just 
Another Guy Named Joe,” our face that of an insignificant common laborer, petty thief, 
jobless vagrant...and even as we register that this is not “me,” this is no one “I” should 
identify with, we are forced to identify with this persona because “he” is the only human 
character available to us; surrounded by claustrophobic black gutters, we cling to the only 
visual metaphor we recognize. From the outset of this graphic novel, the technologies of 
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belonging are both apparent and disturbing, as is our own vulnerability to them. Welcome 
to the postcolony.  
 In fact, it is the very visibility of those technologies of framing that makes 
Rancière’s topographical analysis so useful here, and that signals the graphic novel’s 
tactical value as a representational medium. “Topographical analysis,” Tanke notes, 
“sticks to the surface of things. It offers a description of the relationships between 
elements in the common world” (3). It also serves to call attention to the ways those 
relationships are made and unmade by aesthetic practices; to consider how in literature 
and art, metaphor and metonymy work to produce habitual associations between places, 
persons, and things that can as easily render invisible as visible, inaudible as audible, 
other/Other actants. In the graphic novel, the breakdown of the narrative into the specific 
panels that make up each page is an aesthetic distribution of the sensible. “Comics is not 
only an art of fragments, of scattering, of distribution,” Thierry Groensteen notes, but “it 
is also an art of conjunction, of repetition, of linking together” (22). We see what the 
author and artist want us to see, we make sense of this arbitrary arrangement by focusing 
our attention on what appears in each panel and on each page, but we overlook much of 
that intentional artistry if we do not also deploy a conscious reading/seeing strategy that 
explores those aesthetic choices that produce what Groensteen calls the “plasticity of 
comics, which allows them to put in place messages of every order and narrations other 
than the fictional” (19). To move too quickly to an exegetical reading of Wounded 
Animals as a purely postcolonial allegory is to assume a discursive unity that I believe is 
radically challenged by its artistic strategies.      
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 Discursive unity is troubled here from the outset: the Elephantmen are unlike 
either their animal or their human progenitors, and they are not all elephants. Bio-
engineered hybrids produced by implanting cloned human/animal embryos into the 
bodies of indigenous African tribeswomen, they do not even resemble each other except 
in their unhumanness. To humans they are all “elephantmen,” an identification that they 
refuse in what might be read as a stubborn insistence on an individual, rather than a 
singular, identification. In “Shock Croc!” Starkings and Moritat explore this aspect of 
postcolonial disidentification; when abrasive satellite disk jockey Herman Strumm (who 
bears a more than passing resemblance to real life radio “Shock Jock” Howard Stern) 
asks the human/crocodile hybrid, Elijah Delaney, “What do I call you...Do you guys get 
all pissy if we use the ‘E’ word,” Delaney replies, “Elephantmen? Because we all look 
the same, right?” That Strumm immediately counters by quipping, “next thing he’s gonna 
ask me if all Jews look alike...which, of course, we do!” raises two issues simultaneously: 
the overt speciesism at work in this graphic postcolony, and the implicit racism that Paul 
Gilroy argues is “a mode of exploitation and domination that is not merely compatible 
with the phenomena of racialized differences but has amplified and projected them in 
order to remain intelligible, habitable, and productive” (31). Gilroy’s postcolonial inquiry 
is firmly fixed on how racism produces race as its object; naturalizing “racial difference 
and racial hierarchy” in the postcolony is a deliberate distribution of the sensible, 
supplying a “vivid natural means to lock an increasingly inhospitable and lonely social 
world in place and to secure one’s own position in turbulent environments” (6).4 A 
postcolonial ecocritical reading would also see that the wounded animals of Starkings’ 
imaginary include both human and nonhuman constituents. In the aforementioned 
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illustration, there are noticeable similarities between Strumm’s hand, his red-tinted 
glasses, and open mouth, and the image of Delaney immediately beneath him...they 
actually resemble each other more than do the very different-looking elephantmen. 
Women are generally represented as hypersexualized commodities, as property, or as 
breeding stock. Humans and nonhumans are increasingly isolated from one another and 
denied a share in a more productive boundary-crossing new “we” because of the police 
operations of the media and other social and cultural technologies that manage to 
reinstate, even while purporting to eliminate, our “existential insecurities” in order to 
deter or “limit political participation” (Tanke 45). In the first chapter, “See the Elephant,” 
the only truly part-elephant Elephantman has an illustrative encounter with a human child. 
Her instinctive desire to seek common ground with this enormous and imposing figure is 
undercut with a tripartite awareness that normative discourse renders this contact 
inadvisable, perhaps impermissible. “My friend Chase says you guys are monsters,” she 
says; her mother’s belated reaction is “Get away from him...You just stay away from 
her!” We are the third in this reactionary ménage: in her mother’s emotionally 
overwrought reaction to her daughter’s innocent contact with the Elephantman, we read 
racial fear and ambivalent hypocrisy in her “never mind what I said” response to her 
daughter’s “But, Mom...he’s an elephant...and you said animals are our friends.” Yet our 
reading is also made more complicated by the images that preceded this chapter’s 
conclusion. Starkings and Moritat juxtapose this child’s tentative overtures of friendship 
and recitation of standard animal lore with Ebony Hide’s graphic memories of his actual 
life as the vicious killing machine he was designed to be. Juxtaposed against the image of 
a wrinkled pachyderm gumshoe in a trench coat, we are also faced with a blood-soaked 
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weapon of mass destruction—as the chapter’s title suggests, we are forced to “See the 
Elephant,” in ways that may not fit our allegorical assumptions.         
 In this text, the various artists who supply the illustrations to Starkings’ 
developing story seldom invite his readers to step into these animal protagonists. Their 
elaborately rendered images are far too specific to admit easy identification; we are 
prohibited from inhabiting these characters whose “red-in-tooth-and-claw” animality 
defies easy anthropomorphism. Although the “Munts” are often depicted clothed in 
specific human roles (detective, urban businessman, blue-collar worker), in various issues 
they are also presented in little or no clothing, looming threateningly over us or over each 
other, eyes glowing with a martial redness. In these moments, we are reminded that these 
massive iconic African animals, the elephant, the rhinoceros, the crocodile, and the 
hippopotamus, can be weapons of destruction in their own right; their availability as mere 
ciphers for human actions and activities falls away in those moments when we are 
reminded of their material otherness. Illustrations by multiple artists also confuse our 
visual understanding of the primary characters (and actively undo the easy associations 
necessary for successful allegory): the Elephantmen not only do not look like us, they do 
not look like themselves from chapter to chapter. We constantly experience what 
Rancière describes as literature’s capacity for producing misunderstanding, which in this 
context could succinctly describe the work of the graphic novel—it “teaches us to choose 
between two interpretations: not two interpretations of the speech or actions of other, but 
two interpretations of our own perceptions and the feelings of affection that accompany 
them” (“Literary Misunderstanding” 101). We see the inhumanity of postcolonial 
appropriation and exploitation of the vulnerable, even as we recognize our own 
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vulnerability in the face of the unhuman—a predatory unhuman that is often institutional 
rather than animal. 
 Much of Starkings’ postcolonial imagination is directed at representing the impact 
of corporate and capitalistic forces on persons, places, and things, foreign and domestic, 
human and nonhuman. His Elephantmen are the products and property of Mappo 
Corporation, operating in North Africa but with a clearly global reach. In “The Last 
Thing I Remember,” Dave Hine’s cartoonish sketches accompanying Starkings’ bare 
bones rendering of the nameless indigenous women forced to bear these experimental 
products emphasizes the metonymic anonymity of colonized subjects throughout history. 
Reduced to bodies, somatic “specimens” and “vessels” whose only identity lies in their 
utility, these women have no voice represented in the panels that contain their images; 
instead, their captor intones, “You will not be missed.” Comics theorist Thierry 
Groensteen notes that “the space reserved for the text is a space taken from the drawing,” 
and I think this is fully consonant with Rancière’s political aesthetic. In this chapter, text, 
as the voice of the dominant, overwrites the images of these women, subtracts from their 
vital materiality while it gives pride of place to the will of the dominant. His speech acts 
their erasure; he commands them to “Forget your own life” as he takes it from them. At 
the same time, we are drawn into the place of one of the colonized; we see her eyes, even 
as we also find ourselves pulled into the “I” that opens a rupture in his colonizing 
discourse. She and “I” remember (and re-member) “our” child and  “our” humanity, but 
what that humanity might become is left for another issue to explore. With these scarcely 
visible women and their abject hybrid offspring, we experience a common sense of our 
radical disidentification through our mutual exclusion by a multinational corporate 
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worldview that dismisses them and us as “less than animals...nothing more than property.” 
With them, we refuse subjectification through our metaphorization as commodity, yet we 
acutely feel the lack of some unifying metaphor to ground our place in this post-global 
economy; something, it is to be hoped, other than the Mappo corporate logo inscribed 
over their anonymous bodies and blocking our vision of them.  
 Our sense of dislocation is compounded by Starkings’ elaborate use of 
intertextuality both within the chapters and between them; the reader is assaulted by real 
and fictional voices from multiple contexts and time periods. Biblical texts share a page 
with Charles Darwin, George W. Bush decries human cloning while the fictional scientist 
who created the Elephantmen celebrates it, and bytes of information from the Texas 
A&M Health Science website commingle with the “once upon a time” of a fairy story. 
From a visual perspective, Groensteen emphasizes the iconic power of comics images 
that recur throughout a text to draw the various denotative and connotative nuances of 
those images into new combinations that can narratively overflow simple representation 
(147-155). The technique he calls “braiding” serves to refigure time both synchronically 
and diachronically, encouraging us to “plurivectoral readings” animated by recurring 
motifs that produce their own serial relationships (155). Intertextuality produces a similar 
effect, bringing the past into conjunction with the present, the fictional into contact with 
the nonfictional, the historic, and the scientific. “Presence and representation are two 
regimes of the plaiting of words and forms,” Rancière contends, unmistakably echoing 
Groensteen’s definition of tressage (Future of the Image 78, emphasis added). In 
Wounded Animals, contradictory behavior is illustrated with words as well as figures, and 
the result opens a space in the institutional discourses that so often structure our 
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experience of the world. The discourses of bioethics and biopower are clearly pitted here 
against faith-based and partisan politics-inflected global conversations: in Rancière’s 
terms, the making visible and audible of the coincidences and gaps between these 
disparate commentaries provide opportunities for emancipation. Freed from the binding 
constraints of seemingly expert and consensual testimonies, the emancipated spectator (or 
reader or member of the community) is given the opportunity “to translate what she 
perceives in her own way,” to seize for herself “the capacity of anonymous people, the 
capacity that makes everyone equal to everyone else” (Rancière, The Emancipated 
Spectator 17). Remembering, in this sense, is not about simply recalling old histories or 
recounting the same allegorical narratives. Instead, the intent of Starkings’ intertextuality 
is to emancipate his readers, to give them the opportunity to re-member our “humanity” 
as something not simply posthuman but as more fully post-Other; emancipation is “the 
blurring of the boundary between those who act and those who look; between individuals 
and members of a collective body” (Rancière, Emancipated Spectator 19).     
 Rancière traces what he fears is the disappearance of “the dissensual forms of 
critical art” and notes particularly the emergence in postmodernity of “the 
collection...heterogeneous elements” that are randomly combined but that fail to 
“provoke a critical clash” (“Contemporary Art” 46). He sees the collection, “a 
recollection as well,” as a concerted effort to assemble a community of objects in order to 
produce not dissensus but an often nostalgic consensus, the univocal death of politics 
(“Contemporary Art” 46). What he proposes as an alternative is art that seeks not to 
collect, not to combine in ways intended to outline (and therefore to contain) a 
community of the Same but rather art that unmakes by recombination, by “inventing 
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fictions that challenge the existing distribution of the real and the fictional,” by “undoing 
and rearticulating the connections between signs and images, images and times, or signs 
and space” (“Contemporary Art” 49). Critical art, as Rancière continues to argue, “is not 
so much a type of art that reveals the forms and contradictions of domination as it is an 
art that questions its own limits and powers, that refuses to anticipate its own effects” 
(Dissensus 149). Elephantmen, I would argue, does precisely this by using the aesthetic 
resources of the graphic novel to destabilize our sense of security in the world we thought 
we knew, and by asking us to ask ourselves what space we really occupy in an 
increasingly unrecognizable chronotope. If there is no home like place, then what do we 
do when there is no longer any place called “home”? 
 The Elephantmen are not trying to get back to some real or imagined homeplace. 
Literally the products of corporate ambition, these bioengineered hybrids have been 
liberated by U.N. forces and given asylum in order to forestall community. As one 
Elephantman explains, “they keep the rest of us alive...as a demonstration of their 
compassion and humanity,” but this (un)freedom/salvation is contingent upon a system of 
containment and surveillance (“Tusk”). The Elephantmen are reminders of scientific and 
corporate misconduct. Politics is denied them: “They keep a close eye on all of us...They 
don’t want us meeting in big groups...They don’t want us getting any funny ideas” 
(“Tusk”). Not persons but products, they are not merely homeless—the Elephantmen 
embody the “profound distrust of any kind of comfort with the concept of belonging” that 
Ranjana Khanna associates with postcolonial melancholy (123). The Elephantmen are not 
merely displaced—they are always already unwelcome, eternally unhomely.  
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 The exile’s desire for belonging was often expressed in the modern novel as a 
search for origins, in the wish “to go home” frequently manifested in the trope of the 
primitive (Torgovnick 185-189). Acting locally, even if thinking globally, cannot provide 
an antidote to the postcolonial experience of pervasive melancholy if community is 
conflated solely with place; if who you are is contingent on where you are, then the 
permanently dislocated can never become anyone at all. Ranjana Khanna proposes 
instead that an affective community could form around a sense of disidentification (125). 
“Commonality,” she concludes, “can only be found...as it is sensed, as coming undone 
through nonidentification, demetaphorization, unworking...the constitution of a...shared 
sense of belonging as...nonbelonging” (130). Starkings’ stories work like slave narratives, 
providing an alternate discourse that recalls a space for deterritorialized bodies to be seen 
and heard uncoupled from the metaphors that seek to predestine their place. “This isn’t 
the way it has to be,” the pivotal human character, whose transgressive interspecies love 
is the fulcrum for this series, urges the tormented Ebony Hide, “Your world is not yet 
made” (“See the Elephant”). Yet it is here, I would also argue, that Starkings misses a 
politically potent opportunity to stage a graphic moment of dissensus.  
 Dissensus, Rancière writes, “means a conflict between one sensible order and 
another. There is dissensus when there is something wrong in the picture, when 
something is not in the right place” (“What Does It Mean to be Un?” 560). In 
Disagreement, he elaborates that “the assertion of a common world thus happens through 
a paradoxical mise-en-scène that brings the community and the noncommunity together,” 
a performance that is also performative, juxtaposing seemingly incompatible images to 
provide an opening for what he has elsewhere described as “an impossible identification, 
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an identification that cannot be embodied by he or she who utters it”  (Disagreement 55, 
“Politics, Identification, Subjectivization” 61). Rancière often uses the example of French 
activists in May 1968, who adopted the slogan “We are all German Jews” to protest 
police brutality against Algerian immigrants, to demonstrate how “the first act of politics 
is to throw off a policed identity” by embracing what he also calls “the heterogeneity of 
language games” (Tanke 49; Rancière, Disagreement 50). In his 2011 lecture entitled 
“Jacques Rancière’s Politics of the Ordinary,” political historian Jason Frank located the 
same moment of emerging equality in the dissensual claims made by sanitation workers 
marching with Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968 in Memphis, Tennessee. Using 
Ernest Withers’ photographs of workers’ signs proclaiming “I AM A MAN, ” Frank 
noted this potent moment of impossible identification, of the emergence into visibility of 
a minoritized group upon their asserting an equality that was, at the time, barely thinkable, 
much less visible. When Elijah Delaney rejects the inaccurate designation “Elephantmen” 
in a broadcast interview, we can read his response as a refusal of the strategic discourse 
of speciesism, of the effects of a naturalizing distribution of the sensible that is as 
demeaning as it is conservative of a policed order. On the other hand, we could read this 
as a foregone opportunity for political rupture—a failure of the text to “crack [this 
situation] open from the inside” (Rancière, Emancipated Spectator 49). I wish that 
Starkings had chosen, in a move that both recalls and recasts John Merrick’s emphatic 
denunciation in the 1980 film The Elephantman, to have Delaney and the other hybrids 
announce in solidarity “I AM AN ELEPHANTMAN.” To do so, I think, would have 
opened the series to what Rancière would identify as a “political interval”—the creation 
of a political community founded not in “the realization of a common essence or the 
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essence of the common. It is the sharing of what is not given as being in-common” 
(Disagreement 138). He lists “the visible and the invisible, the near and the far, the 
present and the absent” as some of those critical not-being-in-common states of being; a 
postcolonial ecocriticism must surely add to that the human and the nonhuman 
(Disagreement 138).  
 If this moment for solidarity between the Elephantmen is foregone in Starkings’ 
imaginary, however, I would argue that his graphic novel does succeed in challenging our 
allegorical expectations. As material metaphors, these hybrid creatures succeed at 
bringing human and nonhuman into intimate contact without rendering either invisible in 
the other; we see the Elephant and the Man. In The Ecological Thought, Tim Morton 
offers this paradoxical observation: “Humans may be ‘animals,’ but ‘animals’ aren’t 
‘animals’” (62). I would add that in this graphic novel, animals are not allegories, or not 
allegories alone. Unworking those categorical assumptions that structure the material 
worlds we live in, or the fictional worlds we think with, help us to keep the idea of a 
political community alive. What ultimately binds us to the Elephantmen is our 
disidentification with the “truths” of humanism and homecoming; we are all Wounded 
Animals here in a global postcolony offering neither refuge nor asylum.  
 
Can I Get a Witness? Fable and Figure in Pride of Baghdad 
 
Whatever I say becomes a picture and the eyes settle on it like flies.                           
(Indra Sinha, Animal’s People 13)  
 If Richard Starkings’ Wounded Animals takes the form of an allegory, then Brian 
K. Vaughan and Niko Henrichon’s Pride of Baghdad is perhaps better described as a 
fable. Fables often feature animal characters and tend to “illustrate a moral;” the 
characters “are merely sketched, not greatly developed,” and are valued chiefly for their 
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ability to illustrate human qualities and predicaments (Kennedy and Gioia 23, 7). David 
Herman distinguishes Pride of Baghdad from animal allegory by designating it as 
“anthropomorphic projection;” while he accords this graphic novel a greater degree of 
zoomorphic focus, he contends that “human motivations and practices continue to be 
used as the template for interpreting nonhuman behavior” (Herman “Storyworld” 167). 
Also commenting specifically on Pride of Baghdad, Suzanne Keen notes that its 
anthropomorphized animal protagonists reflect the representational strategies of “imperial 
animal tales,” a technique that “predates comic books and graphic novels, calling upon a 
long literary tradition of moralized animal fables, political allegories, and myths of origin 
in folklore” (137). What distinguishes this graphic novel from Starkings’ purely invented 
tale, however, is its grounding in actual events—this graphic novel is based on a true 
story. On April 22, 2003, BBC News reported that “four starving lions which dug their 
way out of a Baghdad zoo have been shot dead by American soldiers” (“US troops kill 
Baghdad lions”). The nonhuman characters depicted here were among the “excess deaths” 
of noncombatants during the Iraq War. MIT’s website intended to rectify early (typically 
American) miscounts of those casualties—estimates that tended to overlook Iraqi 
bodies—is quite tellingly titled “Iraq: The Human Cost,” an unconscious gesture to 
Rancière’s emphasis on the political valence that underpins any kind of a count 
(http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/, emphasis added). In this emotionally loaded graphic 
novel, myth and history, fiction and nonfiction, human and nonhuman collide in ways 
that challenge readers to consider the place (and the displacement) of truth for “a 
community existing solely through being divided” (Rancière, Disagreement 32). 
  “The place of truth,” Rancière contends, “is not the place of a ground or an ideal; 
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it is always a topos, the place of a subjectivization in an argumentative plot” (“Politics, 
Identification, and Subjectivization” 60). Achille Mbembe argues that “a true narrative” 
is simply one that is “believed true and so regarded by the person narrating it, hearing it, 
or accepting it...The question of truth is, effectively, resolved by the reader” (Mbembe, 
On the Postcolony 158). In his searing exploration of the effects of the Vietnam War on 
American combat troops, Tim O’Brien devotes an entire chapter to “How to Tell a True 
War Story,” observing that “you can tell a true war story by the way it never seems to 
end,” and suggesting that “in a true war story, if there’s a moral at all, it’s like the thread 
that makes the cloth. You can’t tease it out. You can’t extract the meaning without 
unraveling the deeper meaning” (76-77). Keen’s perceptive reading of Pride of Baghdad 
certainly suggests that it provides more complicated representations of its animal 
protagonists than its more simplistic literary forbearers, but I would suggest that her 
concern that the “ambassadorial strategic empathy” produced by the novel’s “visual arts 
techniques” may not “necessarily translate into justice for peoples and nations” strays 
beyond the actual goals of critical art and of a postcolonial ecocritical reading of it (136, 
149). Rancière argues that spectatorship is not somehow the opposite of action; 
spectatorship, and in this context, readership, is instead its own kind of action, “a form of 
inhabiting the world that follows traces, draws connections, and offers interpretations” 
(Tanke 93). Pride of Baghdad presents its readers with what Rancière describes as the 
intolerable image, an image that contains something intolerable in it and that produces in 
its viewers a response to its intolerability (Emancipated Spectator 83-105). It is an image 
that interpellates a witness, “one who does not want to witness” but who is nonetheless 
compelled to speak for the other whose represented body makes us “see what it tells us” 
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(Emancipated Spectator 91, 94). Steve Baker, whose lucid writing on postmodernism’s 
representation of the animal is critical to my reading here, suggests that “the particular 
advantage of the genre,” by which he specifically means the animal comic strip, “lies 
precisely in its adaptability and its slipperiness,” its ability to move outside the 
boundaries of “orderly, rational narrative” (Picturing the Beast 131). To suggest that 
“talking-animal narratives are not really about animals—that the worthwhile ones, at least, 
must surely be about something more important than mere animals,” he argues, trivializes 
the animal in a deeply anthropocentric way (Picturing the Beast 138).  
 Rancière argues that like metaphor, fable is one of many “modes of this power of 
fabulation, that is, the presentation of truth in images,” and if Pride of Baghdad is a fable, 
it is surely more than just a human sketch clothed in fur (Mute Speech 62). It is also a 
very deliberate rendering of a truth, a truth that appears in the entanglement of myth and 
history, in the memories of multiple minds. Rancière insists on the aesthetic nature of 
memory: it is “an orderly collection, a certain arrangement of signs, traces, and 
monuments” that functions in a very selective (and political) way (Film Fables 157). “In 
comics,” Scott McCloud argues, “the past is more than just memories for the audience 
and the future is more than just possibilities;” the contingent juxtaposition of seemingly 
disparate images, working with iconic solidarity’s capacity for narrative power, provides 
those ruptures wherein new truths about old assumptions can emerge (104). “The image 
is valuable as a liberating power, pure form and pure pathos dismantling the classical 
order of organization of fictional action, of stories,” Rancière elaborates. “On the other 
hand, it is valuable as the factor in a connection that constructs the figure of a common 
history” (Future of the Image 34). Meaning is therefore contingent on the image+text of 
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the graphic novel and yet capable of exceeding it.5 The fact that the graphic novel uses a 
sequence of images to tell a story raises concerns about the connotative meaning 
conveyed by those images. It shares the photograph’s ability to join two discrete objects 
into one image that naturalizes a relationship that is not, in fact natural. Myth functions in 
a similar way, seizing on an image or sign and redeploying it in a new way that detaches 
it from its original time and place, context and history (Barthes 116-117).  Barthes 
stresses that the mythic form “does not suppress...meaning, it only impoverishes it, it puts 
it at a distance, it holds it at one’s disposal” (118). Myth, with its deliberate structuring of 
the visible and the sensible, its specific inclusion (and therefore operational exclusion) of 
persons, attributes, and interpretations, serves a political as well as an aesthetic purpose. 
Yet even appropriated as mythic symbol, the sign is still inherently unstable; the 
ambiguity at its heart invites the graphic novel to use the power of the mythic symbol and 
simultaneously to disrupt it.  
 This is the project of Brian K. Vaughan’s 2006 graphic novel, Pride of Baghdad. 
Vaughan’s poignant story images these actual events as the intersection of multiple myths, 
entangling the nonfictional escape of the living lions with the legend of an ancient 
Persian statue, the “Lion of Babylon,” and mapping it onto what an aging tortoise 
describes as “the other Lions of Babylon,” Iraqi-built Soviet-designed tanks 
commissioned during the Gulf War by Saddam Hussein (and actually nicknamed “the 
Lions of Babylon).6 The parallel to Barthes’ Mythologies is uncanny: his first example of 
myth’s ability to shift the signifier “from meaning to form, from the linguistic sign to the 
mythical signifier,” is the linguistic phrase, “my name is lion” (Barthes 117). Barthes 
argues that the phrase houses a linguistic richness of natural, behavioral, and historical 
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context that is lost in the shift to signification. The tortoise dismisses the cub’s confusion 
over the collision of signifier and signified in his recounting of these mutable 
mythologies  (“What was that/Those’ll be the Lions of Babylon/Don’t worry, they ain’t 
real lions/ Babylon’s a town downriver. Their lion’s a statue”). “Everything’s got a 
name,” the tortoise argues in an earlier passage he now refers back to. “It’s how we make 
crap belong to us.” He emphasizes the political appropriation of the mythic by multiple 
stakeholders in this global context. These lions (the tanks, the statue) are “just, what do 
you call ‘em...symbols. You know walkers [humans], never say what they mean.” The 
narrative self-consciously deconstructs its own layering of myth and symbol, illustrating 
that meaning is both multiple and contested in this textual environment. At the same time, 
the use of bold text both emphasizes specific words and makes their graphic 
representation as symbols more evident to our reading of them. In Pride of Baghdad, we 
are asked to rethink not only the shifting connections between the past and the present, 
between history and myth. We are also placed in the position of asking whether these 
animals, in the language of images, truly mean what they seem to say. 
 Aesthetically, then, Pride of Baghdad manipulates the distinction between figure 
and figuration; between “the representation or characterization of the form of an object 
[which] is its figure,” and to the viewer’s interpretation of it (Shiff 480). “Figuration 
occurs to the extent that a simple act of visual attention—looking at something, becoming 
aware that it has significance—is interpretive” (Shiff 480). Pride of Baghdad opens with 
a panel of empty sky on the left page, while a raven on the right hand page cries, “The 
sky is falling! The sky is falling!”  Beneath the raven, a male lion questions the apparent 
hyperbole of such a claim. “The damn sky is never going to...” An inset interrupts our 
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perspective and the context of his argument; like a close up, it functions to localize our 
attention within the larger territory, to more narrowly align what we see with, in this 
instance, the lion’s upward glance. Framed within a frame and located just at the lower 
right hand corner of the page, we are forced to pause our reading of this unfolding story 
until we turn the page—to a double-page spread that is nearly wordless. The lion’s sky 
(and ours) is full of “falling” fighter jets. Another inset of his face, again positioned at the 
lower right, aligns our understanding with his...or does it? Do we see the same thing...or, 
more importantly, do we understand what each of us “sees” in the same way? Richard 
Shiff, one of the editors of Critical Terms for Art History, would say no. “What the thing 
viewed means to me is not necessary what it means to you,” and the importance of this 
distinction between the figure and what it means to be figured seems to me to suggest the 
source of the graphic novel’s slipperiness, its dance of image and text that, as Shiff 
suggests, “oscillates between the visual and the textual and between matter and sign” 
(479). Figures, like the figures of the various lions who “people” this pride of Baghdad, 
are both material and immaterial, real and imagined. And this leads Shiff to argue that 
when we view these seemingly “natural and unchanging” figures from “an ideological 
perspective other than our initial one,” we can suddenly see them as “arbitrary products 
of a social process,” as cultural chimeras reflecting “an instance of collective poetic 
figuration” that he also describes as mythology (480). From its opening pages, then, Pride 
of Baghdad warns us not to take anything at face value, not to be beguiled by the 
simplicity of its illustrations or its narrative into underestimating its meaning(s). 
 The lion’s “Ah” is also ours, but in a way that seems less comprehensive than 
apprehensive, a kind of involuntary response that suggests that our expectations may not 
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be met precisely as we anticipate. Deleuze warns that narration “tends to slip into the 
space between two figures” in order to overdetermine them in some kind of relationship; 
Seymour Chatman argues that audiences feel compelled to complete a narrative, to “fill 
in gaps” (Francis Bacon 6; Story and Discourse 28). Deleuze’s solution is to interrupt 
those figural impulses (or “closure,” to recall Scott McCloud’s argument from my 
Introduction) through isolation: “to break with narration, to escape illustration, to liberate 
the Figure” by, in the case of the artwork of Francis Bacon, enclosing the figure in some 
artificial framework that wards off the connectivity of a storyline (6). In the graphic novel, 
the use of a guttered or bordered inset accomplishes the same thing, emphasizing a 
relatively local perspective “to highlight a privileged relationship between two terms”—
in this case between the lion and the reader—but because of its sequential arrangement of 
images, panels, and pages, that same relationship also begs to be “read and interpreted in 
taking account of everything that, upstream and downstream, can index or echo it” 
(Groensteen 89). Rancière embraces this “union of contraries,” as he puts it, in the work 
of the cinema; “the long work of de-figuration,” he suggests, “contradicts the expectation 
borne by the subject matter or the story” (Film Fables 8). In Pride of Baghdad, there is 
often both a local and a global context at work in the same image. Donna Haraway 
devotes considerable attention to the idea of the figure in several of her texts, from her 
famous cyborg to primates and, more recently, to dogs. “In every case,” she observes, 
“the figures are at the same time creatures of imagined possibility and creatures of fierce 
and ordinary reality; the dimensions tangle and require response” (When Species Meet 4). 
I believe that is precisely what Vaughan and Henrichon intend in this graphic novel, 
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which relies on the hybrid nature of its animal figures to multiply our reaction to the 
outlines of the text.  
 The multiple opportunities for viewer identification in this graphic novel provide 
resistance to the occlusive universal validity that mythic monologues speak through a cast 
of stereotypical characters. The aesthetic of the graphic novel encourages what Rancière 
valorizes as political art’s “continuous process of border crossings” (“Contemporary Art” 
43). The graphic novel’s masking effect, the readiness with which some characters are 
drawn more iconically and less realistically, encourages us to inhabit a persona, to adopt 
a role that puts a face on the Other, and that allows us to face (an)other world freed of the 
specific constraints of our own cultural, historic, and organic myths.7 A mask “urgently 
calls attention to the need to enact (depending on the circumstances) a new or 
transformed identity” (Bouittioux 11). As Keen observes, in this graphic novel the 
aesthetic choice is not to produce an accurate ethological representation of animal 
behavior; to do so would subvert Vaughan’s narrative commingling of human and other-
than-human experience in this war-torn community. The multiple animal protagonists of 
Pride of Baghdad invite the reader to experiment with creative mimesis, to take 
advantage of an opportunity for “slipping into Otherness, trying it on for size” (Taussig 
33). Yet at the same time, I would also argue that Vaughan and Henrichon constantly 
choose to remind the reader of these animals’ distinctive materiality, of the very real 
distance that separates us from them, and of representation’s always already distancing 
point of view. “Distance,” Rancière writes, is not an evil to be abolished, but the normal 
condition of any communication. Human animals are distant animals who communicate 
through the forest of signs” (Emancipated Spectator 10). Tim Morton agrees, arguing “if 
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we try to get rid of distance too fast, in our rush to join the nonhuman, we will end up 
caught in our prejudice...our concept of ‘them.’ Hanging out in the distance may be the 
surest way of relating to the nonhuman” (Ecology Without Nature 205). Henrichon’s use 
of inset and perspective works to align our experiences with those of these lions of 
Baghdad, but we are always reminded that we are seeing with them or past them, never 
through them—we never fully appropriate their gaze. Even when the perspective is that 
of the lions, looking upward or downward, the lions themselves appear in the frame; we 
are looking over their shoulder, and they inevitably stand between us and the events that 
are occurring. Henrichon’s illustrations provide us with a distinctly third person overlook 
from which to hang back, to be reminded that lions are predators, that they do not gasp in 
awe at the beauty of a herd of Arabian horses—they flatten themselves into a hunting 
phalanx, the better to seize their prey. What is clearly at stake here is the presentation of 
multiple aspects of our engagement with alterity. This is not a failure of representation, 
but rather a demonstration of its strength and of its deliberate partitioning of experience; 
Vaughan and Henrichon experiment here with the graphic novel’s capacity for exposing 
how the potential disruption of any predetermined political subjectivity can also be 
undercut by the ability to slip out of, as well as to slip into, Otherness. 
 Marianna Torgovnick’s critical evaluation of the uses and abuses of the primitive 
in modernist art can be usefully expanded to an analysis of the graphic novel’s frequent 
use of the animal as the mask through which we are invited to investigate the Other. She 
notes, “Explorations of the primitive could thus potentially make us change our ideas 
about ourselves and change our social forms. Or they could support traditional values and 
arrest changes found threatening in contemporary culture” (46). Torgovnick emphasizes 
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the malleability of the category of the primitive, its iconic usefulness as a trope that can 
be deployed in multiple ways and its value as a negative measure of self, as that which 
we are not.  Torgovnick is specifically concerned with definitions of the primitive that 
emphasize the naturalness of what are considered essential differences, with the 
seemingly organic support for species hierarchies that were used to justify colonial (as 
well as racial and gendered) projects of oppression and control (46). Animal discourse 
can be similarly deployed, made to serve a mythic narrative that promotes a political 
project that naturalizes a dominant order and silences subordinate voices at the same time. 
The animals of Pride of Baghdad display a constant awareness of their species difference, 
one that acknowledges predator/prey conflicts and questions whether social liberation 
could challenge instinctive hostilities. When Noor suggests a revolt against the 
zookeepers that would unite lion and antelope with monkey and rat, the antelope’s 
incredulous “what would we do with keys?” risks the reader’s assumption that all Iraqis 
(whether Christian or Muslim, Shiite or Sunni) are merely animals, incapable primitives 
who cannot function without their “keepers.” Yet even as we recognize the larger 
metaphor at work in this narrative, the visual difference between the species and a 
narrative structure that continues to make the individual differences between the lions 
both audible and visible work to interrupt our easy assumptions about the nature of either 
lion or human. In this graphic novel, they and we are both predator and prey, never just 
one or the other. 
 “Culture shapes our reading of animals just as much as animals shape our reading 
of culture,” Baker argues, and the disfiguring work of clashing cultures at war with one 
another both locally and globally is restaged here (Picturing the Beast 4). The lions, one 
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male, two females, and a cub, represent distinctly different viewpoints whose individual 
experiences collide with the mythic meanings of freedom and with the naturalness of 
nature, the essentialness of instinct. The characters are drawn less with an eye towards 
realism than with an intent to make each recognizably distinct; we can freely shift our 
identification from one to the other while still distinguishing between them. Zill, the male, 
recalls a memory from his life in the wild, looking down towards a horizon “devour[ing] 
the sun in slow, steady bites, spilling its blood across the azure sky,” but rationalizes his 
captivity as preferable because of the regular meals the keepers provide. Ali, the cub, was 
born in the zoo, so he relies on the older lions for a description of a world he has never 
known. Safa, the older female, remembers “the old days” with loathing, describing “black, 
bloodsucking flies” as she pictures her rape by roaming males. Noor, the younger female, 
longs for a freedom whose outlines she vaguely remembers, but whose details she has 
supplied from her present desire, a longing to freely experience the thrill of the chase, the 
independence she believes was her birthright. The lions and the other animals in the zoo 
discuss the function of the zookeepers, debating whether being kept safe is more 
important than being kept from freedom and speculating on what an interspecies freedom 
might look like. Each offers the reader a different access point into the American 
discourse of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the constant shifting between protagonists 
destabilizes any fixed standpoint, for the reader or for the subjects of this fictionalized 
reality, this realistic fiction.  This instability represents a critical feature of Rancière’s 
concept of political art. “The main procedure of political or critical art consists in setting 
out the encounter, and possibly the clash, of heterogeneous elements,” he writes, and 
posits that this narrative disruption can “provoke a break in our perception,” one that 
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might then “disclose some secret connection of things hidden behind everyday reality” 
(“Contemporary Art” 41). Recall as well his argument that community is formed not 
from the simple sharing of space but from dissensus, from disconnection. Vaughan’s 
lions, like Rob Nixon’s displaced local populations, find themselves thrust out of their 
habitual environment when the literal ground beneath their feet is radically, and 
irrevocably, altered. Henrichon’s double page spread illustrates this by once again using 
the global backdrop of shared circumstance to contextualize a series of guttered insets 
focusing our attention on each lion’s separate reaction to their unexpected liberation from 
the zoo, a freedom born of explosive destruction that, as Noor notes, “isn’t right.”   
 This perceptual dissonance is staged across time and space, between conflicting 
ideologies and between multiple local and national identities, and it is embodied literally 
and graphically in the figure of the famed “Lion of Baghdad” sculpture. In this statue, the 
lion, “one of your kind,” is “trying to eat a man...but the man’s fighting off the big stone 
cat. Legend says that as long as that statue’s still standing, this land’ll never fall to 
outsiders.” The lions are mystified, confused by what is clearly a disconnection between 
this representation of their historic location and their contemporary moment. “Yes, but 
this is our land now, too. Who are we supposed to be in the statue...the lion, or the man? 
The tortoise responds, “Maybe you’re both. Or maybe you’re neither,” underscoring 
what Baker identifies as the figural’s dependence on a necessary isolation of the Figure—
in this case, the animal—from “clues in its surroundings which would make it more 
readily meaningful in human terms,” more recognizably itself and less available as a 
semiotic reference for something else (Postmodern Animal 148). This moment in Pride of 
Baghdad stages the demetaphorization of a colonized minority emerging as a new “we” 
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precisely in the moment they experience their displacement and disidentification. The 
lions’ uncertainty in turn underlines the instability Vaughan’s readers experience over the 
course of this novel. What is our position in this war-torn environment, and where should 
our sympathies lie? Are we the lion or the man, the predator or the victim, are we other or 
Other, and as the tortoise asks, “What’s it matter?” 
 Ultimately, there is no return to stability in the image+text environment of Pride 
of Baghdad. The stain of our slip into Otherness lingers long after we shift back into our 
own identities, now strangely less comfortable than before. The experience is “not a 
return to naïve mimesis,” but rather an opportunity for a liminoid and “complex interplay 
between visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies, and figurality” (Mitchell 
Picture Theory 16). The final scenes of the novel reenact the killing of the pride by U.S. 
soldiers; like them, we see only identically uniformed, armed, faceless boots-on-the-
ground. The disembodied voice of an officer absolves anyone of responsibility for the 
deaths, intoning “you didn’t have a choice” against the visible evidence to the contrary. 
When an anonymous soldier asks if lions are native to Bagdad, if “those things are...wild 
out here,” the same disembodied patriarchal voice responds, “No, not wild...they’re free.” 
Beneath this seemingly paradoxical claim, we hear the echoes of one of the key points of 
disconnection between postcolonial and ecocritical theory, ecocriticism’s prioritization of 
the wild, the exurban, the indigenous juxtaposed with postcolonialism’s affiliation with 
the hybrid, the cross-cultural, the impure. One of Rob Nixon’s charges to a newly 
imagined postcolonial environmental literary study is that it must overcome its apparent 
“reluctance to engage the environmental repercussions of American foreign policy, 
particularly in regard to contemporary imperial practices” (33). Both Elephantmen Vol. 1: 
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Wounded Animals and Pride of Baghdad attempt to remedy that “ecocritical silence” that 
Nixon finds so “resounding” (33). Achille Mbembe clearly ties war to the colonial (and 
therefore imperial) enterprise; the colonies are “zones in which war and disorder, internal 
and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other” 
(“Necropolitics” 24). Elephantmen relocates its wounded animals within an American 
postcolony; in Pride of Baghdad, we are left with Mbembe’s assertion that “the 
postcolony is a particularly revealing, and rather dramatic, stage on which are played out 
the wider problems of subjection and its corollary, discipline” (On the Postcolony 102-
103). Pride’s final panels present full-page aerial views of the burning city and of a more 
suburban landscape that could be Iraq, could be America, could be anywhere. Reportorial 
text, starkly inscribed above the image of the burning city notes the actual escape of four 
lions from the Baghdad Zoo; against the ambiguous landscape, the text pronounces, 
“There were other casualties as well.” The final panel is a backlit scene of the Lion of 
Babylon, the fabled statue of the lion poised above its human prey. In the background, the 
figure of a raven, bird of ill omen (and the first speaking character in this graphic novel), 
is about to light on the statue. We are back where we started, back in the colony, “where 
‘peace’ is more likely to take on the face of a ‘war without end’” (Mbembe, 
“Necropolitics” 23). Are we the victors or the victims of this war? Are we the lions, or 
are we the humans?8  
 But would a truly postcolonial ecocriticism even make those distinctions? In his 
thoughtful response to postcolonial ecocriticism’s future, Anthony Vital suggests that in 
order to “attempt reconciling ecocriticism and postcolonial critique,” it will be necessary 
for scholars and critics to begin by recognizing “the complex interplay of social history 
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with the natural world,” to understand how “language both shapes and reveals such 
interactions” (90). Barbara Noske, animal studies scholar, notes in 1989’s Human and 
Other Animals that “humans have divided the entire world into nation-states,” and as a 
result, “all animals, even those living in very remote areas, have come to live in countries 
and are experiencing the impact (directly or indirectly) of human industries and human 
legislation” (1, italics original). Animals, no less than humans, find themselves 
postcolonial subjects, negotiating the same environmental issues, interpellated and 
interrogated by the same discourse. Vital suggests, “postcolonial ecocriticism might 
unfold through critical engagement with environmental discourses emerging in response 
to local conditions—and differing as local conditions differ” (100). Rancière concurs, I 
think, in his own rethinking of the political in a global age. “Politics,” he suggests, “is the 
art of warped deductions and mixed identities” (Disagreement 139). Undeterred by 
globalization’s claims to universality and homogeneity, he suggests that politics is 
resolutely “the art of the local...It is always local and occasional” (Disagreement 139). As 
yet another of Rancière’s places of subjectivization in an argumentative plot, the local is 
the last topos we will explore in our final graphic novel representing the animal—
an/other place of mixed identities whose “language is always idiomatic” (“Politics, 
Identification, and Subjectivization” 60). Gayatri Spivak, whose published conversation 
with Judith Butler about issues postcolonial and postnational explore questions and 
claims about “language, politics, belonging,” observes that “the nation-state requires the 
national language,” that a kind of homoglossia supports the image of a unified, single-
minded, and single-spoken Being-as-Nation (74). How then, might the language of the 
 89 
graphic novel, its confluence of image and text, convey a less holistic idiom? Who sings, 
to paraphrase Butler and Spivak’s provocative title, the local state?  
 
Telling Tales: Novel Voices and Impossible 
Identifications in WE3 
 
If you want my story, you’ll have to put up with how I tell it.                                             
(Indra Sinha, Animal’s People 12). 
 
 Can the Post-Other speak?9 The question of voice in the graphic novel speaks 
directly to its availability as a political practice. Rancière’s demand for dissensus is 
grounded in his belief that “equality is...the condition required for being able to think 
politics” (Politics of Aesthetics 52). Equality is not, in Rancière’s politics, a permanent 
condition; it “takes effect” and then “generates politics” only “when it is implemented” in 
“a particular case of dissensus” (Politics of Aesthetics 52) Elsewhere, as I have noted, 
Rancière argues that equality is the originary or founding moment of existence, but one 
always already departed from. Dissensus can give birth to moments of equality, but note 
that according to Gabriel Rockhill’s Translator’s Introduction, equality, in Rancière’s 
terms, even when it does happen is not itself the goal. Rather, he suggests, that eruption 
of equality into visibility is “the very axiomatic point of departure whose sporadic 
reappearance via disturbances in the set system of social inequalities is the very essence 
of emancipation” (Rockhill 2-3). What happens next is politics. 
 Politics, then, “consists in reconfiguring the distribution of the sensible which 
defines the common of a community, to introduce into it new subjects and objects, to 
render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who had been 
perceived as merely noisy animals” (Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents 25, 
emphasis added). At issue in this argument is not the capacity for speech, but rather the 
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police operations that prevent Other voices from being heard; as in the case of visibility, 
politics does not make present that which was absent but rather renders audible that 
which has been suppressed. As Eric Méchoulan clarifies, “the original wrong consists in 
hearing ‘noises’ instead of voices, something ‘roaring’ in place of someone speaking. 
This is where politics emerges” (3). While Rancière’s early work focuses on issues of 
public speech and art’s ability to create those opportunities for new speaking (and clearly 
human) subjects to be understood, his more recent work with images expands this 
argument. He argues that images are not merely the pictorial version of human language; 
the image “is a way in which things themselves speak and are silent,” and it renders 
visible, if you will, “their silent speech” (Future of the Image 13). “Silent speech,” he 
elaborates, “is the eloquence of the very thing that is silent, the capacity to exhibit signs 
written on a body, the marks directly imprinted by its history, which are more truthful 
than any discourse proffered by a mouth” (Rancière, Future of the Image 13).  If “the 
process of emancipation is the verification of the equality of any speaking being with any 
other speaking being,” and if the silent speech of things is made audible and visible in the 
image, through art’s work, then I think Rancière’s arguments apply vitally to a 
postcolonial (and posthumanist) ecocritical analysis of the graphic novel (Rancière, 
“Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization” 59). The aesthetics of the graphic novel as 
image+text (suggestively equated by W.J.T. Mitchell to Derrida’s “différance, a site of 
dialectical tension, slippage, and transformation”) readily serve as a staging ground for 
the production of a heteroglossic excess that overflows any consensual (and in this 
situation, species-specific) discourse (Mitchell, Picture Theory 106). “When mute images 
begin to speak,” Mitchell also specifies, “the ‘natural’ semiotic and aesthetic order 
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undergoes stress and fracture...[They are] put into question: ‘natural’ for whom? since 
when? and why” (“Word and Image” 60). In Film Fables, Rancière also elaborates that 
there are essentially two ways that we can make “mute things speak the language of their 
mutism”; either we open ourselves to “their intimate murmurings” or we “manipulate 
them to make them speak, we have to uproot them and put them in touch with all the 
things, forms, signs and ways of doing that are their co-presents” (179). We juxtapose 
them, in other words, with other words and images—we may even creatively use 
anthropomorphism to put ourselves in touch with them.   
 Anthropomorphic discourse, the attribution of human values and emotions to 
animals, has a long and troubled history for both the sciences and for literature. It ranges 
from the purely instrumental and overt use of animals as a symbolic language that 
illustrates human behavior, to a constructive attempt to empathize with another species 
by using a human perspective as the gateway to nonhuman understanding (Corbett 197-
199). At its most objectionable, anthropomorphism, like primitivism, is understood as a 
perspective that always looks back and down at an Other understood as both prior to, and 
incommensurate with, contemporary civilized humankind. Even comics theorist Scott 
McCloud is not unaware of the appropriative and utilitarian impulse that often pervades 
anthropomorphism. “We humans are a self-centered race. We see ourselves in everything. 
We assign identities and emotions where none exist. And we make the world over in our 
image” (McCloud 32-33). Yet there is something compelling, something desirable, about 
that solipsistic gaze; something that compelled Michael Taussig to consider “why looking 
at the savage is interesting,” and something that led John Berger to ask, “Why look at 
animals?” (Taussig 75; Berger 259-273). Before industrialization reshaped the 
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environment in the nineteenth century, Berger argues, anthropomorphism “was integral to 
the relation between man and animal and was an expression of their proximity” (264). 
Animals and man encountered their differences in two ways, Berger contends—through 
their lack of language and through their reciprocal gaze. In the modern world, that silent 
but visible acknowledgement has vanished as animals have lost their place in human 
society. Animals no longer partake of that parallel copresence; they are now 
marginalized and frequently rendered invisible, “absorbed into the so-called silent 
majority” (266-267).  
 “Partaking” is another essential term in Rancière’s aesthetics; both Tanke and 
Méchoulan note that the English translation, “the distribution of the sensible,” somewhat 
mutes the double meaning of the French original, “le partage du sensible.” Partage “can 
have two almost opposite meanings, the first is ‘to share, to have in common,’ the second, 
‘to divide out, to share out’” (Méchoulan 4). Partaking signals both taking part in 
something shared with others and also redistributing what was previously allocated in a 
different way; for Rancière, this doubled meaning emphasizes that “it is important to 
attend to the sensible, for its distinctions and divisions anticipate what becomes thinkable 
and possible” (Tanke 2). Attending to the sensible in terms of our communion with 
animals and other nonhuman things means that we grant them their materiality, their own 
experience of our shared world. “Although I do acknowledge that there is a sense in 
which we cannot know the Other (whether it be other species, other cultures, the other 
sex or even each other),” Barbara Noske writes, “we must remind ourselves that other 
meanings exist, even if we may be severely limited in our understanding of them” (160). 
Representing those meanings in our own words helps us to hear (or to see) theirs, not as 
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noise, but as speech. “All things and all meanings inter-express,” Rancière insists; 
anthropomorphism decodes that interexpression for us (Film Fables 179). Jane Bennett 
argues, “We need to cultivate a bit of anthropomorphism—the idea that human agency 
has some echoes in nonhuman nature—to counter the narcissism of humans in charge of 
the world;” “a touch of anthropomorphism...can catalyze a sensibility” that our world is 
shared with not only different others but also with others who partake in our communities 
of sense (Vibrant Matter xvi, 99). Donna Haraway posits that anthropomorphism’s 
“philosophically suspect language” is “necessary to keep the humans alert to the fact that 
somebody is at home in the animals they work with” (Companion Species Manifesto 50).  
 In Picturing the Beast, Steve Baker’s response to Berger’s essay (in which he 
announces a desire to examine the history of animal representation in a way that resists 
the urge to “deny the animal” in its representation) parallels my desire to read 
anthropomorphism in the graphic novel not as a univocal discourse of the human, but 
rather as a productive doubling of the voices equally present within its narrative borders 
(Baker 15). Berger argues that as “man can surprise the animal,” so too “the animal—
even if domesticated—can also surprise the man” (260). It is that element of surprise that 
Baker embraces as the supplemental potential located in reading animal images for their 
animal content, against their use as metaphors for human actions. He observes, “it is the 
very instability of the anthropomorphized animal’s identity which can make contact or 
even proximity with it so hazardous for those with an overblown sense of their own 
importance, power, and identity” (Picturing the Beast 159). Berger, like Baker, 
recognizes the power inherent in animals who speak like humans (speak to them? speak 
for them?); “anthropomorphism,” he observes, “makes us doubly uneasy” (264).10 It is 
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precisely the productive destabilization inherent in talking animals that author Grant 
Morrison and illustrator Frank Quitely explore in their viscerally emotional graphic novel, 
WE3.  
 WE3 tells the story of three lost pets, experimentally altered into biomechanical 
weapons as part of a congressionally funded secret military project. The animals, a mixed 
breed dog, a domestic tabby, and a rabbit, have been surgically and chemically altered, 
encased in armored shells...and programmed with simple language skills. As with Pride 
of Baghdad, the story quickly shifts from the laboratory setting to an extended narrative 
that centers on the three biorgs’ escape from their imprisonment; Washington has ordered 
the decommissioning of the biorgs in favor of a specific program designed to breed 
animals for weapons purposes, and a sympathetic female researcher, Dr. Berry, frees her 
protégées. The novel’s tale of human/animal contact predicated on the invasion of 
borders and bodies that is the consequence of animal experimentation relies on typically 
postcolonial tropes. These “biorgs” have been developed as weapons, a pilot project for 
“replacing an expensive and outmoded workforce with efficient animal slaves...living 
weapons” whose primary efficacy is to prevent the deaths of “countless men and women 
in our armed forces.”11 Animal bodies clearly do not count in this policed distribution of 
the sensible; instead, they suffer the appropriation, the overfamiliarization, and the 
utilization of the animal/native by the human/colonist that typifies colonization, whether 
at the hands of individual or institutional (military or scientific) colonizers (Mbembe, On 
the Postcolony 5294-5308/6295). Morrison and Quitely also subtly link the practice of 
keeping domestic pets to the conditions of colonization. Each of WE3’s three chapters 
begins with a poster asking for help relocating one of the three pets who have been 
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altered from “Bandit,” “Tinker,” and “Pirate” into the team of automatons collectively 
referred to as WE3 and individually known only as 1, 2, and 3. The “friendly & 
approachable” mixed breed dog, a little girl’s “ginger-striped cat with a white nose & 
white tip of her tail” (each occurrence carefully dotted with tiny hearts), the “lost rabbit” 
who “likes lettuce and carrots” (penned in a noticeably childish hand)—these simplistic 
descriptions underdetermine these pluripotent creatures even as their reduction to 
numeric ciphers overdetermines the identities of “man’s new best friends.” Offended by 
what he considers to be Dr. Berry’s accusation of inhumanity, the head of the military’s 
“little pet project” defends his integrity by assuring his colleagues, “I don’t hate animals. 
I have two dogs of my own.” Mbembe succinctly defines colonization as “an enterprise 
of domestication,” as a strictly one-way and linear operation that would leave no room 
for the emancipation of any invisible or inaudible other into some kind of political 
equality—no manifestation of Rancière’s new “we” (On the Postcolony 5294-5308/6295). 
Donna Haraway, however, recharacterizes domestication as “an emergent process of co-
habiting,” something approaching that threshold of human/nonhuman where species meet 
and where neither is either conflated with or fully subsumed by the other term; “co-
habiting does not mean fuzzy and touchy-feely...Relationship is multiform, at stake, 
unfinished, consequential” (Companion Species Manifesto 30). WE3, I think, responds to 
both perspectives in visual and verbal ways.    
 David Herman includes WE3 in his ranking of anthropomorphic versus 
zoomorphic animal representation in the graphic novel, identifying it as a model of what 
he calls Umwelt exploration, the visual presentation of “what it is like for nonhuman 
agents to interact with their environment on a moment-by-moment basis” 
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(“Storyworld/Umwelt” 166). Contemplating contemporary demand that environmental 
texts become more posthumanist in their aesthetic practices, Lawrence Buell speculated 
that nonanthropocentric literature might have to abandon “what would seem to be 
literature’s most basic foci: character, persona, narrative consciousness;” he asks, “What 
literature can survive under these conditions” (Environmental Imagination 145). WE3 
attempts to be that literature, demonstrating how the graphic novel’s ability to repartition 
both narrative conventions and visual representation simultaneously “allow[s] for the 
accommodation, rather than the subordination, of nonhuman experiences” and 
demonstrates “how a concern with nonhuman ways of encountering the world can 
reshape humans’ own modes of encounter” (Herman, “Storyworld/Umwelt” 175, 167). 
WE3’s narrative repeatedly foregrounds the trope of communication, but emphasizes the 
failures of language rather than its efficacy. One military official wonders, “What kind of 
lunatic would teach a killing machine to talk” while discussing how to face “the media” 
once news of the escaped animals inevitably and disastrously overflows the military’s 
ability to contain it. The scientist in charge of the project, Dr. Trendle, apprehends Dr. 
Berry after she releases the biorgs, but only because he stops “to talk to her,” not because 
he was able to read her obviously distressed body language. The various human actors 
repeatedly confer with one another on cell phones and radio equipment, and Berry 
(ironically referred to in the opening scenes as “our very own ‘Doctor Dolittle’” for her 
work with robotic speech and for her inability to communicate with “us mere humans”) 
is forced to “do the talking” necessary to recapture the fleeing specimens. Denied a phone 
call, her desperate plea “to talk to someone about this” ignored, Berry is blamed for the 
release of “three dangerous biological weapons into the environment” and her scientific 
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expertise is dismissed. Her only worth is as a mouthpiece for containment—“We’ll need 
you to do the talking, Roseanne,” to respond to the media and to lure the escaped animals 
to their death. She is sentenced to participate in the destruction of the biorgs and her 
arguments to the contrary go unheard: “the time for talking is done.” 
 Humanist discourse and species discourse flow equally across moody, evocative 
illustrations guttered entirely in black. The human discourse is presented as utterly 
unaware of its own ironies: actively planning to hunt down and destroy the escaped 
animals, Trendle repeatedly expresses his concerns for “those poor men,” the human 
soldiers who will likely die attempting to terminate the escaped “things.” Like their 
military counterparts in Pride of Baghdad, the human actors decry their lack of choice 
and justify the execution of the animals—creatures described as “instinctual, 
amoral...lack[ing] the fear that sets limits on human behavior.” More often than not, the 
human faces in this drama are represented only as lips and teeth; from an animal 
perspective, the mouth is the source of human identity, a visual pun that turns our 
vaunted use of language into our only identifying feature, and that is sometimes ironized 
by speech bubbles that literally overflow the space of the image they overwrite. The 
species discourse, rendered rudimentary and mechanical, relies heavily on the visual 
panels to carry and to convey its messages. Quitely effectively uses a robotic font in the 
speech balloons attached to the speaking animals, one that resembles digital code and that 
contrasts with the less rigid lettering used to depict human speech. Truly amoral, the 
animals react to the hostile environment they find themselves in with a simple directness 
that neatly undercuts the hidden agendas and moral duplicity of the human characters. 
The canine biorg urges the others to seek “HOME,” and continues to offer aid to fallen 
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humans even when under attack. The feline asserts its independence retorting, “2 SAY 
IS NO HOME” and pronouncing “NO WE!/SSST!NK BOSSS! 
 The visual contrast between the almost cartoonish renderings of the missing 
family pets and their technological reincarnations is also rhetorically effective. These 
manufactured weaponized artifacts are drawn in a noticeably realistic style; as Scott 
McCloud points out, the use of realistic detail not only closes off reader identification 
with characters, it is also used to “objectify them, emphasizing their ‘otherness’ from the 
reader” (44, emphasis original).  The biorgs are not the familiar dog, cat, and rabbit they 
were, yet each of these altered creatures still embodies its species traits. The human 
characters similarly represent human types: the duplicitous politician, the naïve scientist, 
and the maternal female—a nod, I think, to how nonhuman perception might grasp 
individual differences located within the human species. Both human and animal 
participants in this aesthetic setting commit acts of horrific violence, acts of aggression as 
well as acts of self-defense, acts of interspecies, as well as intraspecies, murder. In these 
scenes, Quitely shatters the visual field into a series of fragmentary panels, where human 
and animal parts commingle as bodies are randomly and violently dismembered. The 
perspective challenges linear narrative conventions and produces what Herman identifies 
as a more zoomorphic perspective, but I would argue that aesthetically there is more 
going on here. This radical redistribution of the sensible also begins that unworking that 
characterizes Rancière’s notion of subjectivation in a heart-stopping excess of visual 
dissensus. This radical layering of capacities, both positive and negative, nonhuman and 
human, “crack open the unity of the given and the obviousness of the visible, in order to 
sketch a new topography of the possible” (Rancière, Emancipated Spectator 49). We 
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aren’t in Kansas anymore: we are in a new world with a new “we” that we cannot 
envision from a purely anthropocentric point of view; this radical redistribution of the 
sensible demands a new aesthetic. 
 Both animals and humans transgress boundaries between acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviors, and struggle to find identification between the conflicting 
demands of the story’s images and text. Achille Mbembe and Paul Gilroy describe what 
they call the convivial relationship that obtains between the colonized and colonizer in 
the postcolony. Mbembe likens conviviality to the condition of being-with that Heidegger 
ascribes to the human/animal relationship: “We do not live with them if to live means: to 
be in the manner of the animal. Nevertheless we are with them...This being together with 
the animals is such that we let these animals move about in our world” (Heidegger qtd. in 
Mbembe, On the Postcolony 27). We are not like them, and we certainly do not allow 
that their cries of pleasure and pain approach the speech of citizens; we permit them to 
wander in our world without ever according them a part of it. Conviviality, Mbembe 
notes, is a logic of “familiarity and domesticity,” one that thankfully keeps public 
displays of resistance under wraps while encouraging postcolonial subjects to put on and 
take off multiple identities as the situation demands (On the Postcolony 103-104). 
Gilroy’s arguments for conviviality (like Haraway’s rethinking of domestication) tend 
toward a more open-ended interpretation; he describes it as a kind of “radical openness” 
present in “processes of cohabitation and interaction” that “make a nonsense of closed, 
fixed, and reified identity,” shifting instead “toward the always unpredictable 
mechanisms of identification” (162/3943). In WE3, Berry sacrifices her life to save these 
wounded animals. Regretting her “gift” of language that targeted them for exploitation 
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and destruction, she attempts to unwork the dog’s military I.D., reminding him that 
“U.R. BANDIT.” As Judith Butler asserts in conversation with Gayatri Spivak, 
“language becomes one way of asserting criterial control over who belongs and who does 
not,” structuring local experience in specifically inclusive and exclusive ways; WE3 
brings that lesson home in a palpably emotional way (Butler 59). Saved from 
extermination by Berry’s selflessness, the surviving biorgs escape their pursuers. 1 and 
2 reject the “BAD COAT” that weaponized them, ultimately shedding their mechanical 
skins; by the novel’s final panel, both Bandit and Tinker, dog and cat, have also shed 
their domestic identities. They are free of naming conventions and technological 
contraptions, and they are freed (or deprived?) of the burden of language as well. Instead, 
they have allied themselves with another creature whose lack of visibility and lack of 
voice renders him as politically mute as these abject animals—a homeless vagrant. 
Huddled together on the steps of the courthouse, they/we gaze mutely upward as Dr. 
Trendle enters the building to testify about the events that have just occurred. This is a 
new WE3, a new community formed outside institutional barriers and available only 
because of the creative anthropomorphism that has allowed both human and animal 
discourse to emerge on a common stage. The silence of Morrison’s text in the final panel 
refuses to narrate its conclusion, resisting the urge towards a happy ending or even a 
satisfactory resolution. Politics hovers in the gap between the unspoken question and its 
unspeakable answer: “?HOME IS?” 
 The graphic novel’s unique capacity for allowing image and text to work inter- 
and intra-actively together makes it possible, I think, to keep us, as Donna Haraway 
suggests, alert “to otherness-in-relation,” to remind us that we are both and neither human 
 101 
and nonhuman, that “we are not one, and being depends on getting on together. The 
obligation,” she continues, “is to ask who are present and who are emergent” 
(Companion Species Manifesto 50). Her use of the plural, I think, corrects Hamlet’s 
singular “Who is there” at the opening of Shakespeare’s most recognizable tragedy. 
Hamlet expects to hear a human voice and so he does, albeit a ghostly one. In the graphic 
novel, we are called to become what Rancière has already described for us as those 
“impossible identifications,” “impossible subjects” whose collective emergence (“Politics, 
Identification, and Subjectivization” 61; Tanke 65) shifts us away from our individual 
local identities into something like an assemblage, radically open to a commonality with 
precisely those Others with whom being-in-common seems impossible. Yet even as 
Rancière’s intuition nudges us towards this posthuman collectivity, his arguments do not 
take us all the way there. “Rancière’s assemblage is in its preliminary stages,” Garneau 
notes; for a more in-depth consideration of what the capacity of these anonymous “new 
figures...these metamorphoses” might be and do, we must turn to DeLanda and 






1 I first explored some of the ideas in this chapter in my presentation, “Visual Virtual 
Posthumanism in the Contemporary Graphic Novel,” delivered at the 2011 Popular 
Culture Association conference in San Antonio, TX, and in my presentation, “No Rest for 
the Other: Postcolonial Melancholy in the Graphic Novel,” delivered at the 2011 meeting 
of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment in Evanston, IN. I also 
had the opportunity to further refine my arguments while attending Northwestern 
University’s 2011 Jacques Rancière Summer Institute. I am deeply grateful for all those 
opportunities to receive critical feedback on my work. 
 
2 While Morton’s argument here is based on his claim that aesthetics is a kind of passive 
receptivity, a claim that counters Rancière’s conception of aesthetics as a more active, 
politically motivated practice of choice, both understand aesthetics in terms of openness; 
Morton emphasizes its openness to difference, while Rancière is clearly invested in its 
power to produce an opening for the appearance of difference. 
 
3 Like many graphic novels that collect multiple comics issues into one volume, Wounded 
Animals is not paginated. Chapter titles typically refer to individual issues, and I will 
reference those to locate the quoted text. Narrative text is generally depicted in all capital 
letters, using a combination of italics and bold type for emphasis; unless otherwise 
indicated, all uses of italics and bold lettering in quoted text are original. 
 
4 Interestingly, in this same exchange Strumm comments on the Biblical names that each 
of the Elephantmen was given at birth (Elijah, Ebenezer, Obadiah, Jedidiah) and suggests 
that “the Egyptians and the Jews looked upon crocs as gods.” He also notes that he “read 
that crocodiles and hippos are like, natural enemies,” an assertion Delaney dismisses 
(“I’m just saying, you can’t believe everything you read”) even though the storyworld 
clearly depicts that rivalry as ongoing since Biblical times and into the “present” of the 
year 2260. A 2013 editorial cartoon appearing in the Salt Lake Tribune satirized conflict 
between the Egyptian military and Islamic citizens, representing the respective 
combatants as a hippopotamus and a crocodile.  
 
5 I will use “image+text” in the same sense that W.J.T. Mitchell proposes for “image/text.” 
The “image/text” is his neologism for a medium in which the juxtaposition of image and 
text cannot be appropriately analyzed from the vantage point of either one of the terms 
independently of the other. See “Beyond Comparison: Picture, Text and Method” in 
Picture Theory, pp. 83-107. My graphic equivalent, I hope, draws attention to the middle 
of this productive hybrid, staging their heterogeneous interaction even as it intentionally 
preserves their difference. 
 
6 Pride of Baghdad is not paginated. Given the cyclical nature of Vaughan’s story, the 
interleaving of history and myth, time past and time future, I believe this to be a very 
deliberate aesthetic choice. This is in no way a linear narrative, and the lack of either first 
page or last would certainly underscore an intention to emphasize the immanence of a 
conflict that seems endless. 
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7 The catalog for the 2009 exhibit, “Persona-Masks of Africa: Identities Hidden and 
Revealed,” sponsored by the Royal Museum For Central Africa, contains a brief but 
useful discussion of the term “persona.” It is derived from the French “personne,” which 
can mean either ‘somebody’ or ‘nobody’ and “refers to opposites, the presence or 
absence of a human being” (11). 
 
8 The Lion of Babylon did not survive the Iraq War. The independent news agency 
Voices of Iraq reported on July 29, 2007, that it was completely destroyed by an 
explosive charge planted under the statue by unidentified gunmen 
(http://www.uruknet.info?p=34894).  
 
9 My opening query is a play on Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s famous essay, “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” It also reflects, I hope, my ironic use in this chapter of epigraphs all 
taken from Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People, a remarkable work of postcolonial fiction in 
which the main character, Animal, is in fact, human—human, but forced to walk on all 
fours as a result of congenital disfiguration caused by a fictional environmental accident 
that bears a striking resemblance to the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. He names 
himself Animal and insists on telling his story from his own perspective from eye level—
his. “Whole nother world it’s, below the waist,” he begins (2). Spivak contends that the 
subaltern cannot speak truly in the language of the colonizer; Animal becomes not 
subhuman but post-Other in order to achieve a greater honesty.  
 
10 I should point out the operation here of yet another aesthetic technology: my software 
would have me replace “animals who” with “animals that,” yet another distribution of the 
sensible designed to partition the human from the Other. 
 
11 In WE3, as in Wounded Animals and Pride of Baghdad, the creators have dispensed 







VEGETABLE: EMERGING ENTANGLEMENTS 
 
 
 On the face of it, plants seem unlikely protagonists for the graphic novel, oddly ill 
adapted to the demands of life as comic book superheroes and still less inviting as those 
metamorphic new figures of the coming assemblage I promised at the conclusion of my 
first chapter. After all, as Michael Pollan notes in his introductory remarks to The Botany 
of Desire, “the one big thing plants can’t do is move...plants can’t change location or 
extend their range without help” (xx). Assemblage theory depends heavily on the notion 
of capacity, and if plants “are beings that do only one thing—grow,” then they would 
seem to be impossible subjects indeed (Morton, The Ecological Thought 68). Anecdotally, 
we seem more inclined to think of plants as either objects or as environmental window-
dressing, as set decorations relegated to the background of our ecological mise en scène.   
“Our attitude towards plants is a singularly narrow one,” Rachel Carson suggested. “If we 
see any immediate utility in a plant we foster it. If for any reason we find its presence 
undesirable or merely a matter of indifference,” we simply weed it out (63). Yi-Fu Tuan 
also emphasized our instrumental approach to the vegetable matter of our environment, 
representing gardening as a model of colonial dominance in practice. “Gardeners alter the 
earth only a little,” he suggests in Dominance & Affection, “but they alter it” (3).
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Yet both Pollan and Lawrence Buell turn this rather conventional metaphor on its 
head. Buell argues that “the ecological colonization of the Americas by disease and 
invasive plant forms “ is as worthy of a postcolonial ecocritical analysis as our 
domination of the indigenous populations (The Environmental Imagination 6); Pollan 
suggests that while “we automatically think of domestication as something we do to other 
species,” it is equally plausible (and perhaps more fruitful) to also “think of it as 
something certain plants and animals have done to us” (xvi). In other words, perhaps the 
way that we think about plants, about their capacities and about our relationship with 
them, might bear some judicious pruning, reshaping the ways we represent those relations 
and considering that we, as well as they, might be more hybridized than we think. In his 
foundational 1995 work of ecocriticism, The Environmental Imagination, Buell claims, 
“How we image a thing, true or false, affects our conduct toward it, the conduct of 
nations as well as persons” (Buell 3, italics added). Buell’s titular “environmental 
imagination” refers to the creative and conceptual ways that literature represents the 
natural world; his admonition is that we must find “better ways of imaging nature and 
humanity’s relation to it” in the face of global environmental crisis (The Environmental 
Imagination 2). Pollan notes that “the metaphors we use to describe the natural world 
strongly influence the way we approach it,” just as Native American author Paula Gunn 
Allen conflates “our attitude toward our body and the bodies of other planetary creatures 
and plants” with “our inner attitude toward the planet. And as we believe, so we act” 
(Pollan 191, Allen 79). All three recognize the pungent entanglement of imagination, 
representation, and agency—the bouquet of capacities that animate what cultural 
anthropologist Eduardo Kohn describes as the “vast ecology of selves” (95).  
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While Buell was generally concerned with an American environmental 
imagination manifested in nonfiction literature (and specifically in the work of Henry 
David Thoreau), he admits that its creative germination could also be traced in 
“environmentally directed texts in other genres” (The Environmental Imagination 2). I 
am certain that Buell’s intent here was to acknowledge that works of fiction are equally 
valuable specimens for examining how and why literary “aesthetics can become a 
decisive force for or against environmental change”; I am less sure that he imagined his 
emphatic choice of the word “image” would seed an ecocritical exploration of the graphic 
novel (The Environmental Imagination 3). Yet just as Michael Pollan celebrates what he 
describes as the “coevolutionary drama” in which human and vegetable actors have 
engaged in “a dance of human and plant desire that has left neither the plants nor the 
people taking part in it unchanged,” I will argue that the graphic novel’s elaborate 
entanglement of image and text offers a profoundly useful stage on which to further 
explore the ramification of that dance.  If “developing the environmental imagination” 
requires, as Ann Fisher-Wirth suggests, reconceiving “the boundaries between culture 
and nature, human and nonhuman,” then the graphic novel provides fertile ground where 
grafting language onto Others conjoins verbiage with verbena, creating an assemblage of 
mindful matter whose ability to “speak a word for Nature” puts Thoreau’s in the shade 
(Fisher-Wirth 185; Emerson and Thoreau 71).1  
 
The Rhizome and the Assemblage 
 
 The concept of the assemblage has its origins in Gilles Deleuze’s illustrative 
model, the rhizome—a model he cultivates over several of the texts he cowrote with 
Félix Guattari. Deleuze is careful to describe what a rhizome is purely in terms of what it 
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does: an operation of principles that emphasize connection and heterogeneity, rather than 
isolated essences or typical qualities. Like the grasses on which he bases his observations, 
rhizomes are horizontal and flat, forming assemblages in a continuous and contiguous 
bidirectional movement that is metonymic rather than metaphoric; a rhizome does not 
stand in for something else, but rather “fosters transversal connections and 
communications between heterogeneous locations and events” because of the relations 
that germinate between the points it connects—when Deleuze reads between the lines 
here, he is mapping routes, not roots (O’Sullivan 12). Deleuze and Guattari begin A 
Thousand Plateaus by describing their collaborative text as an assemblage, a rhizome 
complete with “lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines 
of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification...all this, lines and 
measurable speeds” (3-4). In Kafka, they again use the rhizome as a model for a certain 
kind of representational strategy, likening Kafka’s body of work to a rhizome, a 
burrow—“one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has 
multiple entryways” (A Thousand Plateaus 12). The rhizome shares an affinity with 
Latour’s hybrid: “it has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from 
which it grows and which it overspills”; it has multiple ways to escape a singular 
interpretation (A Thousand Plateaus 21). “A rhizome,” Deleuze explains, “is not 
amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis 
or deep structure,” hence its resistance to genealogy, its kinship with a kind of mapping; a 
rhizome is an agent in an additive process of conjunction, not the product of an equation, 
and it lends itself to something akin to Rancière’s topographical analysis (A Thousand 
Plateaus 12). The relations that manifest between the nodal points connected 
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rhizomatically occur as a result of their metonymic adjacency and are strengthened by 
their differences; they are not captures of identicality or sameness. In another claim that 
recalls Rancière, Deleuze asserts that “there is no longer any proper sense or figurative 
sense, but only a distribution of states”; the rhizomatic assemblage is yet another 
distribution of the sensible (A Thousand Plateaus 12; Kafka 22). 
 The rhizome is also, as Simon O’Sullivan suggests, “not just a critique of 
representation, but...an active attempt to think our own subjectivities differently” (16). 
Rejecting the image of a genealogical subjectivity modeled on the upright configuration 
of a tree—branches and trunk above ground, roots below, Deleuze imagines subjectivity 
as less linear and more horizontal, not be-ing but be-coming: 
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between 
things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is 
alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb “to be,” but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, “and . . .and . . .and.” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 25, italics original) 
 
Subjectivity emerges out of this fluctuating solidarity with others, an active synthesis that 
renders identity’s “becoming” cooperative and social. Deleuze celebrates what he calls 
“the wisdom of the plants,” and he notes, “even when they have roots, there is always an 
outside where they form a rhizome with something else—with the wind, an animal, 
human beings” (A Thousand Plateaus 11). His signature example is the joining of male 
wasp and female orchid in pseudocopulation, a process climaxing in pollination for the 
orchid and, apparently, gratification for the wasp; Deleuze describes this as “a becoming-
wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp” (A Thousand Plateaus 10). Wasp 
and orchid are not transformed into one another in this becoming, but as heterogeneous 
elements in active synthesis they do experience a momentary solidarity. The result is a 
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conjunctive assemblage that is somehow more than simply the sum of its parts—an 
arguably social whole, even if only briefly.  
 It is this specific characteristic of assemblages, their emergence out of “relations 
of exteriority between self-subsistent components,” that both Bruno Latour and Manual 
DeLanda have consciously selected in their work transplanting Deleuze’s assemblage 
onto social theory (A New Philosophy of Society 11). Latour defines “social” as “the 
name of a...momentary association which is characterized by the way it gathers together 
into new shapes...a social world understood as an entanglement of interactions” (Latour, 
Reassembling the Social 65). Latour’s Actor Network Theory germinates from his 
interest in science as the collaborative networking of man and machine; he argues that 
“no science of the social can even begin if the question of who and what participates in 
the action is not first of all thoroughly explored, even though it might mean letting 
elements in which, for lack of a better term, we would call non-humans” (Reassembling 
the Social 72). DeLanda’s assemblage theory is more overtly anthropocentric, but his 
analysis of the processes out of which Latour’s entanglements emerge includes 
“cosmological and evolutionary history in addition to human history,” and his discussion 
of assemblages begins with species2 before shifting to communities, cities, and nations (A 
New Philosophy of Society 28).   
In her materialist engagement with both Deleuze’s assemblage and with 
posthumanism’s expansive acknowledgment of nonhuman (as well as human) actants, 
Jane Bennett argues, “Assemblages are ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant 
materials of all sorts. Assemblages are living, throbbing confederations that are able to 
function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from within” 
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(Vibrant Matter 24). DeLanda stresses that social entities—whether families, institutions, 
or communities, for example—have a distinct and durable identity that is neither 
reducible to nor fully accounted for by the attributes or agencies of its members, just as 
Bennett points out that while each assemblage member “has a certain vital force...there is 
also an effectivity proper to the grouping as such: an agency of the assemblage (A New 
Philosophy of Society 4, Vibrant Matter 24). Social assemblages emerge out of the 
constant flow of interaction between heterogeneous persons, places and things—
interactions that invite the exercise of capacities made possible through those sometimes-
unlikely alliances. These emergent assemblages exhibit new capacities not fully available 
to any of the components individually. Yet critically for both Deleuze and for DeLanda, 
the fragments collected in an assemblage are neither subordinated to it nor are they 
subsumed by it. Wasp and orchid are still identifiable as insect and flower; neither 
transforms into the other and their uncoupling is as likely as their joining. Their relations 
are those of exteriority rather than of interiority; “being part of a whole involves the 
exercise of a part’s capacities,” but being a part is neither an essential nor a constitutive 
property of that actant (DeLanda 10). Thus tied to agency, and uncoupled from organic 
essentialism, relations of exteriority return a measure of autonomy to individual 
components.  
An assemblage, then, blurs the gaps between its components’ capacities even 
while its own capacity flowers as a result of those transgressions. Thoreau’s 
“determination to know beans” in his cottage garden at Walden Pond demands that he 
enter into a collective assemblage of man-hoe-beans, where “it was no longer beans that I 
hoed, nor I that hoed beans,” but a machinic assemblage of a becoming-bean of Thoreau 
  
111 
and a becoming-Thoreau of beans (Walden 200-204). Rebooting literature’s 
environmental imagination in order to reexamine our own embedding in the global matrix 
requires this kind of messy entanglement of human and nonhuman, word and image. 
Thierry Groensteen describes comics as “not only an art of fragments, of scattering, of 
distribution; it is also an art of conjunction, of repetition, of linking together” (22). 
Graphic novels represent yet another kind of assemblage. Images and text, panels and 
pages, all are part of an ecology of representation founded on a principle Groensteen 
terms iconic solidarity: “comics submit the images of which they are composed to 
different sorts of relations” (21). This articulation of visual and verbal produces an 
assemblage where the intra-actions of its components’ capacities produces something 
over and above the abilities of each on its own. As Kress and van Leeuwen observe in 
Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design, “not everything that can be realized in 
language can also be realized by means of images, or vice versa” (17).  Images 
foreground space, while language conveys temporality. The confluence of these 
technologies of representation, however, can expand the abilities of both to pollinate the 
environmental imagination in surprisingly productive ways. 
Indeed, the graphic novel can be described as a kind of double assemblage, 
doubled through the alliances between text and image (and writer and artist) in its 
aesthetics and doubled again in its thematic content: its conceptual focus on transgressive 
collaborations between the human and all Others that fall outside that delimiting frame. 
According to graphic novelist Alan Moore (V for Vendetta, From Hell), creating a 
graphic text breaks down into three major areas, “characterization, depiction of 
environment, and finally plot” (Moore, Writing for Comics 20). Moore ranks 
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environment as primary: “the nature of the plot,” he contends, “and the motivations of the 
characters will be largely determined by the world in which they live”—in other words, 
environmental imagination is a critical component of the graphic assemblage (Writing 
20). And that “environment” consists of elements both material and social: Moore argues 
that “the imagined world” that author and artist conjure up should include material 
concerns like atmosphere and annual rainfall, along with social, political, and economic 
issues as well (Writing 21). In other words, Moore gestures towards Guattari’s three 
ecologies—“the environment, social relations, and human subjectivity”—“three 
ecological registers” Guattari argues must be fully cognized if we are to address the 
contemporary challenges to our existence (The Three Ecologies 27-28). Add to that an 
assortment of characters...and add the events that emerge out of their interactions...and 
then break that construction down into a series of frames and panels and pages...and add 
back “the correct stream of verbal and visual narrative...the flow of language...and the 
precise flow of imagery” and color and ink and. . . and. . . and you have the rhizomatic 
entanglement of interactions we know as the graphic novel (Moore, Writing 39).  
 
Minor Literature and the Mossy Man-Brute:  
Saga of the Swamp Thing 
 
So innocent and ridiculous the grass looked...You could not believe those fragile seeming 
strands would resist the impress of a careless boot, much less the entire arsenal of 
military and agricultural implements. It must have been this deceptive fragility  
which broke the spirit of so many people.                                                                               
 (Ward Moore, Greener Than You Think 92-93) 
 
 Alan Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing, a reboot of the Len Wein/Berni 
Wrightson Swamp Thing comics, luxuriantly demonstrates the spread of the 
environmental imagination across and through multiple assemblages. Deleuze argues that 
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“it’s not easy to see the grass in things and in words,” to image a nonlinear interbeing that 
is without origins or endings; but that is precisely what Moore demands of his readers (A 
Thousand Plateaus 23). “Anyone picking up a comic book for the first time is almost 
certain to find themselves in the middle of a continuum,” Moore writes, and Saga of the 
Swamp Thing demonstrates the segmentarity of the rhizome and its rupture: Moore’s 
Swamp Thing is and is not the familiar vegetable superhero of the 1972 original, just as 
Kafka’s expression machine, for Deleuze, is and is not the rhizomatic assemblage he first 
represented in A Thousand Plateaus (Saga “Introduction” n.p.). Deleuze maps the 
components of the larger oeuvre that is Kafka’s body of work and considers the 
capacities, strengths, and weaknesses of each component and of the whole. In A 
Thousand Plateau’s “10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals” (Who Does the Earth Think 
It Is?), Deleuze identified what he described as double articulation—a doubling that I 
think supports my own vision of the graphic novel as a kind of doubled assemblage. 
Deleuze defines this term as the recursive intra-action of substance and form, content and 
expression, in geological and linguistic modes—in other words, in terms of both natural 
and cultural realms (A Thousand Plateaus 40-43). In a move that anticipates the 
arguments of the material feminists we will encounter in Chapter 3 (especially those of 
Karen Barad), while at the same time recalling Rancière’s distribution of the sensible I 
have already mapped in Chapter 1, Deleuze notes that while the distinction between 
content and expression is “always real, in various ways...it cannot be said that the terms 
preexist their double articulation. It is the double articulation that distributes them,” 
arranges them, and “constitutes their real distinction” (A Thousand Plateaus 44). In Kafka, 
Deleuze identifies the particular capacity that this double articulation affords what he 
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describes as “a minor literature”—a literature that deterritorializes the more consensual 
major language and in which “everything takes on a collective value...literature that 
produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism” (17).  Rather than follow major 
literature’s typically linear narrative, which inherits a specific or traditional content that 
dictates its forms and figures of expression, a minor literature “begins by expressing 
itself...Expression must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings” (Deleuze, 
Kafka 28, emphasis added). To do so, Deleuze argues, is to experiment with what he calls 
deterritorializations and lines of flight, ruptures in the normative distribution of the 
sensible that offer opportunities for creative becomings that unwork the “false genesis 
implied by these pre-existing forms” (essences, or in this case, contents) and that seize 
opportunities for unlikely alliances with impossible subjects (DeLanda, Intensive Science 
6). On this account, an assemblage (whether a subjectivity, a text, or a social collective) 
is a collection of heterogeneous parts that are not ordered by some external or global 
criteria; instead, double articulation yields relations of exteriority between those parts that 
either stabilize the identity of the assemblage (territorialization) or destabilize it 
(deterritorialization) (DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society 12).  
 Lines of flight, chiefly illustrated in Deleuze by various “becomings-animal,” 
offer circuits of escape and capture, of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, of 
horizontal ruptures in the dominant distribution of the sensible. “To become animal is to 
participate in movement, to stake out the path of escape in all its positivity, to cross a 
threshold,” but at the same time, to do so is “never a reproduction or an imitation” 
(Deleuze, Kafka 13). In Kafka’s animal stories—and in the vegetable graphic novels 
under consideration in this chapter—“becoming-animal is a human being’s creative 
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opportunity to think themselves other-than-in-identity” (Baker, Postmodern Animal 125). 
Becoming, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, puts difference into play and summons 
incommensurability as an intensive pressure: DeLanda clarifies that for Deleuze, 
difference is conceived “not negatively, as lack of resemblance, but positively or 
productively, as that which drives a dynamical process” (Intensive Science 6).  But 
Deleuze also argues that Kafka’s stories often focus too narrowly, and too concretely, on 
the metamorphosis itself; that metamorphosis then becomes “a no-way out of the animal 
way out, an impasse of the line of escape” that makes a promise it cannot keep (Kafka 36). 
It is only in his novels that Kafka is able to realize those emerging promises, dismantling 
those becoming-animal-machines and their representations in order to open them up to 
further becomings of a less specific, more molecular expression (Deleuze, Kafka 37-38). 
Significantly, Deleuze notes, Kafka “opens up a field of immanence” by expanding these 
assemblages and by using doubles or “triangles” of characters, or—in a move that has 
critical resonance for the graphic novel—by allowing the proliferation of a central figure 
across an expanded textual territory (Kafka 55). In Moore’s re-imagining of Wein’s 
iconic figure, the graphic novel achieves precisely that power of the multiplicity that 
Deleuze maps in Kafka’s novels. From Wein’s “muck-encrusted shambling mockery of 
life...a twisted caricature of humanity,” we finally come face to face with...The Swamp 
Thing (Wein 28; Moore, Saga of the Swamp Thing 98). 
 Swamp Thing made his debut in an eight page Wein and Wrightson graphic 
romance published in 1971’s House of Secrets #92. Told almost entirely in flashback, the 
omnisciently articulate (yet physiologically silenced) “loathsome monstrosity” that was 
once Dr. Alex Olsen recalls that he was murdered by a jealous colleague and buried in 
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the swamp behind the old mansion that served as his laboratory. Resurrected inexplicably 
as an algae-covered ape-like figure, “what once had been my flesh” watches in silent 
anguish as his former colleague weds Olsen’s comely widow (“Linda...my bright, golden 
lady”) and then tries to kill her; this never-named creature saves her life, kills the 
duplicitous associate, but then returns to the swamp, doomed to a lonely, Linda- and 
loveless future (Swamp Thing: Dark Genesis 5-12). Encouraged by the popularity of this 
eco-Frankenstein, but recognizing that their “original swampy protagonist” could not 
carry a series, Wein and Wrightson grafted their origin story onto a new “swampy 
monster,” now re-presented as the accidental progeny of idealistic science meets 
corporate espionage gone wrong (Wein, “Introduction” n.p.). Dr. Alec Holland, 
attempting to create a “bio-restorative formula” to enhance worldwide food production, is 
spectacularly reborn as the Swamp Thing and launched into a series of episodes in which 
he attempts to avenge his wife’s murder (Linda, alas, is also killed in the explosion that 
triggers Holland’s metamorphosis) and his own disfigurement, and, more importantly, “to 
retrieve his lost humanity” (Saga “Introduction” n.p.).  
 Over the next four years, Wein and Wrightson (and then successor writers and 
artists) extended this becoming-Swamp Thing into a series of stories fatally bound by its 
origins. DeLanda opposes the notion of essence with what he calls “singularities,” the 
“inherent or intrinsic long-term tendencies of a system, the states which the system will 
spontaneously tend to adopt in the long run as long as it is not constrained by other forces” 
(Intensive Science 14, italics original). The difficulty with the Wein/Wrightson concept as 
it was articulated is precisely those “other forces,” the kudzu-like reterritorializing of an 
origin story that overcodes a potential line of flight. DeLanda maps the genesis of an 
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assemblage along two dimensions or axes: the material and expressive roles that the 
assembling components play and the processes of territorialization and 
deterritorialization that either strengthen or weaken the boundaries that outline the 
assemblage as a whole. Throughout this series, Swamp Thing’s human identity is 
deterritorialized by the conditions of his becoming-vegetable, by what is potentially a line 
of flight: the explosion that destroys his laboratory propels Alec Holland into the 
swamp—the oft-mentioned bio-restorative formula “mingled with my flesh...reacted with 
swamp ooze...turned me into...what?” (Wein, Dark Genesis 29). What, indeed? This 
distinctly green humanoid walks upright but cannot speak (although he continues to think 
in melodramatically overblown flowery dialogue), regenerates damaged appendages, 
demonstrates remarkable powers of strength, and is remarkably mobile for a plant, taking 
advantage of trains, planes, and automobiles to get from Louisiana to the Balkans, to 
Gotham City and to Appalachia. Materially, Swamp Thing’s moss-encrusted body and 
repeated encounters with certain key characters reinforce our apprehension of his 
physical character and his social milieu. Most issues begin with a full-page depiction of 
this becoming-plant embedded in a physical landscape—in fact, in many instances he 
seems to be emerging out of some vegetative surround, straining to escape its embrace 
while gazing longingly at some more “human” scene. Most issues end with a view of 
Swamp Thing’s usually massive body dwarfed by towering vegetation, shuffling 
dejectedly back into the landscape that will soon render him indistinct, unseen. In 
practical terms, Swamp Thing’s increasingly nonhuman or extra-human powers further 
serve to deterritorialize him from the man he was, just as his technologically assisted 
mobility distances him from his original (and originary) environment. But Wein’s Swamp 
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Thing never sees his becoming as an opportunity, as what Deleuze would describe as an 
escape into the world, into a field of immanence “where contents free themselves from 
their forms as well as from their expressions, from the signifier that formalized them” and 
from the tyranny of that first story (Kafka 13). The expressive role of this mute creature’s 
flood of consciousness and proliferating thought bubbles provides a constant 
reterritorializing refrain: “Alec Holland is dead...and in his place stands only a ...Swamp 
Thing” (37); “nothing left for me...anywhere!” (41); “Humanity...friendship...they 
were almost mine again” (64); “must be logical...must gather my thoughts” (29); “have to 
get away...collect my thoughts” (47); “this body imprisons me in more ways than 
one...refuses to help me rid myself of it” (66). Far from grasping his becoming as a 
creative line of escape and an opportunity for new alliances and new capacities, the Wein 
Swamp Thing only desires to regain his original identity and his familiar status, to 
recapture his humanity and his lost love. His life is predicated entirely on what he lacks; 
his vegetable-becoming represents an absolute deterritorialization into a stagnant end 
state, an imprisoning finitude that overwhelms its hero and its narrative. As Wein 
remarks, the series finally “breathed its last,” by which time “the death was euthanasia” 
(“Introduction” n.p.). 
 By contrast, the Alan Moore/Steve Bissette/John Totleben’s 1987 Saga of the 
Swamp Thing represents a hybrid rhizomatic assemblage at once less linear and more 
immanent than Wein’s first branch off the old shoot. This revitalized Swamp Thing 
dwells in an imaginative intermezzo where it’s not easy being green OR being human, 
and where the singular capacities of each component are weighed against the capacities 
of their assemblage, with far more profound results. In fact, as Ramsey Campbell 
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comments in his Foreword to Saga of the Swamp Thing, “the character has never made 
sense as he was presented,” and Moore’s first issue is a clear challenge to Wein’s Green 
Adam (Campbell n.p.).  Recall Deleuze’s assertion that it is by dismantling his animal-
becomings in order to expand them in the novels that Kafka succeeds in realizing a more 
positive and productive line of flight. “Writing has a double function, “ he writes, “to 
translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblages” (Kafka 47). In 
Alan Moore: Comics as Performance, Fiction as Scalpel, Annalisa Di Liddo mounts the 
perceptive argument that Moore uses fiction as a scalpel, both “to dissect Ripper 
mythology” in his graphic novel, From Hell, and “to deconstruct, manipulate, and 
reassemble the forms of tradition and narrative” in literature and in comics (15). Not 
coincidentally, Saga of the Swamp Thing begins with an autopsy: Moore immediately 
sets to work deconstructing Len Wein’s Swamp Thing in order to reconstruct a more 
functional assemblage. Graphically and verbally, this series begins abruptly in the 
middle; “The Anatomy Lesson” opens with a fractured scene that explodes our 
assumptions and demands a schizoanalysis of its polyvocal expressions of desire. 
 DeLanda clarifies for us that in assemblage theory, “a plant or animal species may 
be viewed as defined not by an essence but by the process which produced it” (Intensive 
Science 39). Deleuze’s process philosophy emphasizes the contributions of historical and 
social processes to the development of subjectivity, but cautions that “once a process of 
individuation is completed,” those intensive processes tend to “disappear or become 
hidden underneath the extensive and qualitative properties of the final product” (DeLanda, 
Intensive Science 68). In order to uncover those formative processes, then, it is necessary 
to rely on what Deleuze and Guattari call schizoanalysis—“the analysis of desire,” the 
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search for lines of flight, “lineaments running through groups as well as individuals”—to 
unwork the figure of expression in order to analyze the processes sedimented beneath it 
(A Thousand Plateaus 202-203, italics original). Book One of Saga of the Swamp Thing, 
“The Anatomy Lesson,” performs a feat of ventriloquism of power and desire absent 
from Wein’s original: we are no longer trapped inside Swamp Thing’s perspective, stifled 
by his desire for the life and love he lacks. Instead, the subject of this enunciation, the 
narrator, is Dr. Jason Woodrue, another figure from the assemblage that is the DC comics 
universe, and the subject of his statement, the thing he is talking about, is not the Swamp 
Thing but the head of the Sunderland corporation, which, tied to a quasi-military secret 
governmental agency, was responsible for the “death” of Swamp Thing in the closing 
pages of the old series. “It’s raining in Washington tonight,” he begins, and we are 
assaulted at once by multiple machines of power and desire, multiple assemblages that 
Deleuze would identify as “reified and isolated...abstract machines” that simply existed 
“outside the concrete, socio-political assemblages that incarnate [them]” in the old series, 
but which Moore activates here—with a vengeance (Kafka 48). In the Wein series, the 
confrontation of science with the acquisitive demands of both capital and corruption only 
fueled the explosion that produced the Swamp Thing; beyond that, Wein’s swampy 
protagonist battled improbable creatures from the horror and science fiction genres—
nothing that might suggest the very real tensions produced in a real world shaped and 
shaded by Guattari’s three ecologies. With Moore’s reboot, we find ourselves in an 
entirely different place. Nature, science, capitalism, the government, and the military 
appear as functioning assemblages voiced in recognizable and affective ways; Moore’s 
environmental imagination is peopled with multiple desiring machines whose 
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connections and conflicts will serve to animate a graphic ecology that is far more than 
simply the sum of its agential and affective parts. Their entanglements pollinate the 
relations of exteriority that shape this emerging Swamp Thing. 
 Moore’s deconstructed Swamp Thing is revealed to be a truly strange stranger, 
not just a bio-restored Alec Holland.  The human Alec Holland is dead, his body 
(saturated with bio-restorative formula) decomposed in “a patch of swampland...teeming 
with micro-organisms...and plants that have been altered” by that same formula—which 
was never designed to work on human flesh (Saga of the Swamp Thing 23). 
Literally/materially consumed by those plants, Holland’s consciousness infects them, 
“reshaping the plant cells it now inhabits” into a new assemblage that is not Alec Holland 
and yet is not NOT Alec Holland either (Saga of the Swamp Thing 24). In the original 
series, Alec Holland turns into Swamp Thing, a metamorphosis that forecloses the 
potential that Deleuze imagined for a true becoming. “Separate bodies enter into alliances 
in order to do things,” Steve Baker explains, “but are not undone by it. The wasp and 
orchid, after their becoming, are still wasp and orchid” (Postmodern Animal 133). Like 
Deleuze’s wasp-orchid assemblage, Moore’s Swamp Thing is not simply a 
transformation of man-into-plant or vice versa. Moore restages this becoming as trans-
corporeality: Swamp Thing becomes the material embodiment of what Stacy Alaimo 
evokes as “the literal contact zone between human corporeality and more-than-human 
nature,” an environmental assemblage from which, she argues, “potent ethical and 
political possibilities emerge” (Bodily Natures 2). Alaimo’s critical point is that “thinking 
across bodies” raises our awareness of how our bodies are multiply transgressed; in the 
contemporary world, those “unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, 
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nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other actors” radically 
destabilize traditional notions about human subjectivity and its hermetically sealed 
identity in an environment where “Contact! Contact!” is a two-way street (Alaimo, 
Bodily Natures 2; Thoreau, The Maine Woods 95). In the world of Swamp Thing, artists 
Steve Bissette and John Totleben graphically provoke that same sense of transgression 
through their imaginative rupturing of traditional comics panels. 
 As I noted in my Introduction, Bissette and Totleben constantly play with the 
graphic novel’s traditional panel structures in order to layer different character 
perspectives on a single page. Where the original Wrightson illustrations predominantly 
featured a grid of rectangles of varying sizes that emphasized character action, 
punctuated with occasional single-page illustrations for “environmental” stage-setting, 
Saga of the Swamp Thing’s graphic structure is as varied as the intensive forces that 
produce its contexts and characters. In the sequence depicting Woodrue’s reconstruction 
of Swamp Thing’s “real” genesis, panels overlay other panels to capture events in 
sequence while perspective shifts from that of an observer to the detailed close-up of a 
microscope. We read (in italicized type, indicating that this is a re-counting of past 
events) from the upper right hand corner diagonally down to the lower left hand corner 
and then across to the lower right hand corner, our eyes drifting downward following 
Holland’s burning grimace (in flaming reds, yellows, and oranges) as it sinks into the 
murky (black and blue) depths of the swamp—a rictus of agony transforming into the 
fixed stare and hollow grin of a recognizable skull that then further disintegrates into its 
watery surround. On the next page, the diffusion of all that remains, Holland’s 
consciousness, is visually incorporated into what can just be identified as progressive 
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stages of a kind of vegetable embryo: a shape that replicates its remembered organs 
although their nonfunctional fibrous equivalents serve no real purpose. Meanwhile, 
Woodrue’s voice continues its disembodied narration, not of what we see but of what 
“we” thought: “We thought that the Swamp Thing was Alec Holland, somehow 
transformed into a plant. It wasn’t...It was a plant that thought it was Alec Holland” 
(Saga of the Swamp Thing 24). On the closing page, following a resurrected Swamp 
Thing’s murder of his corporate captor and escape into the night, Woodrue again narrates, 
again in italicized type, but this time speculating on the future, on where the Swamp 
Thing might go. We see Woodrue in silhouette, staring out into the night...he peers back 
at us, his face broken into multiple panels, repeating both the visual and verbal sense of 
the first page.  “It’s raining in Washington tonight” closes Book One, just as it began...yet 
nothing we thought is the same (Saga of the Swamp Thing 35). 
And as altered as our founding assumptions are, so too are Swamp Thing’s. He 
has, through Woodrue’s machinations, discovered “hard, new scientific evidence 
concerning his origins,” evidence that he is not “really Alec Holland,” but “just the moss-
encrusted echo of a man. Not a man at all” (Saga of the Swamp Thing 40). Just like that, 
Swamp Thing, and our carefully constructed image of him, is undone. In Book Two, 
“Swamped,” Moore stages Swamp Thing’s efforts to reassemble a new self in a series of 
dream-like scenes. Materializing from little more than a quiescent assemblage of exotic 
leaves, vines, and tubers, a thinly detailed sketchy green creature wanders onto Moore’s 
imaginative stage (I think it is notable that on the splash page for the “Another Green 
World” issue/Book Three, Moore is credited with the “script”), carrying the bridal body 
of Alec Holland’s dead wife into a macabre banquet where planarian worms consume 
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Holland’s deceased but mortal flesh (Saga of the Swamp Thing 60). They leave him “the 
best part,” the humanity, his bony skeleton. “Try not to lose it,” they chortle. “I’m...so 
sorry, Linda...but I just can’t...carry...both of you” he stammers as he abandons 
his/Holland’s wife in order to take up the burden of Holland’s/his human outline (Saga of 
the Swamp Thing 48). In a two-page layout parodying Hamlet’s graveyard scene, this 
barely recognizable swamp Thing finally confronts his annoyingly vocal Humanity, 
whose nagging chatter culminates in questions and an ultimatum. “I’m still worth all the 
effort, aren’t I? After all, without me there’d be no point in running, would there?” and 
“This is the human race! You have to keep running or you get disqualified!” The 
creature finally silences this dismembered and demanding Yorick, relinquishing 
Holland’s humanity, seizing this line of flight (“It’s dark. It’s cool. It’s green.”), and 
surrendering to the intensive evolutionary process out which he emerged.3 He is 
“swamped” in the final panel, rendered indistinct, becoming imperceptible and 
molecular; he reemerges pages later in a series of panels whose aesthetic embedding in 
one another critically mirror his own entanglement with the green world: “Somewhere 
quiet...somewhere green and timeless...I drift...the cellular landscape stretching beneath 
me...my awareness...expanding out through the forgotten root systems...Am I at peace? 
Am I...happy? Oh yes” (Saga of the Swamp Thing 55, 61). Even his language has altered; 
visually, his speech patterns are no longer “human”—their rhythm has slowed, permeated 
with visual ellipses and verbal pauses that suggest the emergence of a new sensibility, 
new capacities.  
With those new capacities, however, come new responsibilities, and Swamp 
Thing senses the presence of something disturbing his newly apprehended green 
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environment...some Other Thing foreshadowed with a carefully scripted and illustrated 
doubling interwoven in the pages I have just described. Paralleling Swamp Thing’s 
evolution has been the de-evolution of Jason Woodrue. The botanist who orchestrated 
Swamp Thing’s deconstructive autopsy, Woodrue claims a kind of environmentalist 
stance: an extremist commitment to vegetarianism and an utter disregard for the human 
race. “How cretinous they are. How frail and squeamish...But really, what can one expect 
from creatures made of meat?” (Saga of the Swamp Thing 41). What Woodrue “hungers 
for” is what the Wein Swamp Thing so explicitly bemoaned; he desires a specifically 
becoming-plant in order to escape his fleshly mortality, “giving up the illusion of 
meathood and sinking back into the soft and welcoming green” (Saga of the Swamp 
Thing 46, 41). He eats one of the tubers extruded from the mass of plant fiber that will 
become Swamp Thing, counting on it to feed his “hunger for that green and silent 
eternity,” to deliver him to “that viridian state of grace” he desires (Saga of the Swamp 
Thing 46, 50). He emerges, in an image that anticipates Swamp Thing’s own 
metamorphosis, as the Floronic Man—a human/plant hybrid “engulfed...swamped” as 
Swamp Thing will be, but with a telling difference. Swamp Thing’s steps to an ecology 
of mind are depicted as the result of an inadvertently harmonious symbiosis—his 
involuntary enmeshment in a paradoxically empowering vegetative state is imaged as a 
serenely productive deterritorialization. The Floronic Man’s willed transformation is 
violently depicted as a kind of bloody cannibalism; his humanity is not relinquished but 
“consumed” and his mind is not peaceful but overloaded (Saga of the Swamp Thing 58). 
Woodrue’s line of flight illustrates not the creative and positive becoming of Swamp 
Thing, but an absolute deterritorialization, a devastating descent into madness. He 
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emerges with an appetite for destruction, claiming that his new capacity for connection 
and communication with the green world demands that he “destroy the creatures that 
would destroy us, that would destroy the ecosphere with their poisons and bulldozers” 
(Saga of the Swamp Thing 79). Page for page, panel for panel, Moore/Bissette/Totleben 
demonstrate that assemblages have capacities for evil as well as for good; the “red and 
angry world” that “just keeps on eating,” the world that Swamp Thing believes he left 
behind with his human body, becomes visible as red invades green, blood seeps into 
chlorophyll, and insect eats insect (Saga of the Swamp Thing 59). Woodrue reads green 
desire as a demand for purification; he expresses, in his rhetoric and in his posture, a 
vengeful ecofascism. Swamp Thing also intuits “a sense of something foreign among the 
green,” but his response to Woodrue’s chainsaw-wielding assault reveals the extent to 
which “the tangled territories of material and discursive, natural and cultural, biological 
and textual” can produce new varietals of the environmental imagination (Alaimo 3). 
 Swamp Thing perceives, as Woodrue in his madness cannot, the symbiotic 
relationship between the oxygen-producing plant world and its animal/human carbon 
dioxide producing counterparts in the global assemblage.4 Jane Bennett posits that 
“crossings,” her term for the transgressive deterritorialization of identity that a becoming 
like Swamp Thing’s imagines, “might play a role in cultivating an ethical sensibility” 
(Enchantment of Modern Life 30). “We are,” she elaborates, “an array of bodies, many 
different kinds of them in a nested set of microbiomes...if we were more attentive to the 
indispensible foreignness that we are, would we continue to produce and consume in the 
same violently reckless ways?” (Vibrant Matter 113, italics original). Woodrue’s 
Floronic Man misses this vital point; he assumes that he has shed his own difference and 
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demands that the world do so as well. Swamp Thing understands the need for difference, 
and in his own way asks the same question as Bennett; he concludes that “we” need 
carbon dioxide to survive and wonders whether “your people” will recognize their need 
for the oxygen that a healthy plant population can provide (Saga of the Swamp Thing 95, 
97). At peace with his hybridity, embracing this vegetable line of flight, this Swamp 
Thing performs in the final panels a simpler desire “to be alive...and grow...and rise up,” 
to continue his becoming another facet in the assemblage that has always already been 
Swamp Thing—a rhizome that is “to be continued” (Saga of the Swamp Thing 103-104).5  
 
Flowers Have Their Own Agenda: Black Orchid 
 
We want to smell like a rose. We want to smell like orange blossoms. We want to smell 
like jasmine. For their part, most flowers want to smell like food...                          
Flowers have their own agenda.                                                                                 
(Sharman Apt Russell, “Smelling Like a Rose” 14) 
 
 If Alan Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing can be read as the inflorescence of 
Deleuze’s rhizome, then Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean’s Black Orchid blossoms into 
DeLanda’s assemblage. Individual subjectivity is an assemblage, just like that of a 
community or a nation, and it can be mapped in the same manner. “All that is needed,” 
DeLanda contends, “is a plausible model of the subject that meets the constraints of 
assemblage theory...a model in which the subject emerges as relations of exteriority are 
established among the contents of experience” (New Philosophy 47). He proposes the 
same familiar axes on which to analyze what he terms a pragmatic subject, a “systematic 
entity” in which we can “distinguish those components playing a material role from those 
playing an expressive role, and those processes that give it stability from those that 
destabilize it” (New Philosophy 49). The body is the key material role player here, 
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producing those critical sense impressions; although he insists that there are both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic actants playing the expressive role, DeLanda does not rule 
out language’s contribution to this emerging subject, but he places greater value on vocal 
and verbal expressions that help to stabilize identity through shared expressions, language, 
slang, and interpersonal conversation. Continuing to model his philosophy on Deleuze’s, 
DeLanda emphasizes corporeal habit over language: repeated behaviors are the primary 
territorializing or stabilizing processes. Deterritorializing processes “include madness” 
and “sensory deprivation,” along with “augmentation of capacities” or the “acquisition of 
new skills” (like the onset of super powers) or other alterations that “increase one’s 
capacities to enter into novel assemblages” (New Philosophy 49-50). These processes 
contribute in various ways to subject formation, but DeLanda stresses that assemblage 
theory is not chiefly or solely concerned with “individuation;” instead, it assumes that 
these emerging individual assemblages “may become complexified as persons become 
part of larger assemblages” in an ever-widening outward ripple of entanglements (New 
Philosophy 33). 
 One of DeLanda’s key assertions is that this proliferating sociality will also 
recursively enter into subject formation; “although a whole emerges from the interactions 
among its parts, once it comes into existence it can affect those parts,” playing those 
expressive and territorializing roles that DeLanda’s analysis is meant to identify (New 
Philosophy 34). Assemblage theory also reproduces traditionally conceived and lineally 
mapped family structures along more horizontal and rhizomatic lines. A species or family 
is an emergent phenomenon, an assemblage with capacities that exceed the given 
properties of specific members; likewise, individual members retain their singular 
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capacities even when they are fully detached from that family—they are always 
subtended by virtual capacities that they may yet exercise, either outside their 
identifications or even despite them. At the same time, assemblages can outlive their 
constituents, persisting in a consequential fashion despite changes in their underlying 
makeup—original parts leave, new parts combine. Grant Morrison describes the original 
Black Orchid as one of several superheroines who “explored the seismic shifts of 
women’s liberation” in the Dark Age of Comics, the 1970s (Supergods 161). 
Exemplifying the period’s backlash against more conventional superheroes, “Black 
Orchid had no secret identity, no core personality, but assumed a series of masks and 
wigs, trying on and rejecting a parade of possibilities, role models, identities. Who was 
this new woman,” he asks only partially tongue-in-cheek (Supergods 161). Neil 
Gaiman’s reinvention of that DC superheroine shockingly begins with her brutal 
execution...setting up a reincarnation that fully exploits the environmental imagination’s 
capacity for juxtaposing the individual against the species, and for radically filling in the 
gaps. Nature, as “they” say, abhors a vacuum. 
 Deleuze asserts, “the subject is defined by the movement through which it is 
developed,” and Gaiman’s Black Orchid cultivates its reimagined protagonist with both 
intention and with nuanced care (Empiricism and Subjectivity 85). This iteration of the 
Black Orchid emerges into consciousness following the graphically rendered firing (pun 
very deliberately intended) of a previous Black Orchid. Simone de Beauvoir’s assertion, 
“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” is dramatically imagined here in Dave 
McKean’s lush staging of Gaiman’s floral reincarnation (The Second Sex 267). 
Awakening in an urban greenhouse, this violet (clearly female/not so clearly human) 
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creature has no conscious identity: only questions pollinated by bits and pieces of 
memory [A dream? Perhaps...perfume? Warm] (Gaiman 24). Her thoughts are provided 
in lavender-tinged word boxes (here represented with brackets) overlaid on black and 
white panels heavily guttered in thick white spaces...we are forced to view her confused 
struggle from a fragmentary and mostly scopic point of view, assaulted by [television 
voices] that [buzz in the background, words blurred and meaningless] (Gaiman 25). 
Sensing that she is somehow both singular and yet multiple [Singing. An echo from the 
green dream...a voice] [Us?], the Orchid approaches a seated man [the source of the 
sound] [I know him (I don’t know him)] in search of what she is aware that she lacks: 
[An identity] [Mine] (Gaiman 25). She begins to vocalize, her questions turn from “who 
am I” to “what am I” as she struggles to territorialize herself (Gaiman 27). As do we—
thus far, there have been few clues to locate the reader either. Most of these opening 
pages are laid out in the same repetitive grid—six identically sized panels stacked three 
on three, separated by generous white gutters that flow across adjacent pages. The effect 
is at once disorienting and rhizomatic; there is little to add hierarchy or priority to any 
given panel or episode, and the only apparent connection between what appear to be 
different locations and events taking place at different times is their connection—those 
impossibly empty lines that flow from panel to panel, page to page, entangling us in a 
mesh of a middle. We see faces but cannot identify them, faces of anonymous men and 
an unidentified secretary exposed as the Black Orchid just before her execution. They do 
not look at us; with one exception, their glances are evasive, sidelong; the only reciprocal 
gaze is that of the Man, the Man who is the source of the sound.  
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 Sound. Scent. Temperature. The Orchid turns first to her senses to answer the 
questions of where, who, and what she is. And the reader, who is desperately reading 
between the lines thus far, finds that the only thing that seems to have meaning in these 
opening scenes is color: color appears to signal something. The re-assemblage of this 
becoming-Black-Orchid begins in materiality but quickly shifts to the role of the 
expressive, particularly that of the power of language and of the powers of conversation, 
to produce what Julia Kristeva called parlêtres, speaking beings—those emerging 
subjectivities she also deemed le sujet en procès or the subject in process (McAfee 26-29). 
I find Kristeva particularly useful here, because her account of subjectivity is “one of a 
self that is always in process and heterogeneous,” not a “model of the self that is stable 
and unified” (McAfee 42). Despite her insistence that language produces the speaking 
being (which marks her difference from Deleuze), Kristeva also appreciates the force of 
le sémiotique, the expressive or “extra-verbal way in which bodily energy and affects 
make their way into language” (McAfee 16). She theorizes subjectivity as coalescing or 
becoming coherent “in an open system,” recognizing the centrifugal (therefore 
destabilizing, deterritorializing) power of the semiotic along with the centripetal (and 
therefore territorializing) force of our relationships with other people (McAfee 41-42). 
Black Orchid represents, I think, that fragile self whose coherence is always shaped and 
yet threatened by that “massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness” that is generated 
by the constant reminders of her “opaque and forgotten life” (Kristeva, Powers of Horror 
2). She is the product of intensive forces always challenging her coherence from without 
and from within, as is our reading of her manifestation. 
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 Skillfully scripted as a ruptured assemblage of intersecting accounts and 
ethereally rendered in McKean’s impressionistic artwork, the Orchid embodies desire and 
desiring. That plants, and especially orchids, have the ability to elicit human response is a 
pivotal point in Michael Pollan’s The Botany of Desire. Indeed, he even goes so far as to 
say that “flowers have always borne the often absurd weight of our meaning-making, so 
much so that I’m not prepared to say they don’t ask for it,” thus parodying the age-old 
male defense against accusations of rape (52). “Flowers,” he suggests, “by their very 
nature traffic in a kind of metaphor” proffering themselves (deliberately? innocently?) to 
our imaginative use and our material abuse (Pollan 70). Deleuze’s perennial orchid-wasp 
assemblage also returns to mind here. Using powerful attractors like scent or taste, 
flowers act on the desires of others (insect, animal, and human others alike) inviting them 
to produce assemblages that have capacities beyond their own but which will also alter 
them in pronounced ways. Charles Darwin found them beautiful and perplexing, noting, 
“orchids are universally acknowledged to rank among the most singular and most 
modified forms in the vegetable kingdom” (Various Contrivances 1). Lacking the 
capacity of locomotion, orchids have seemingly compelled others to accomplish for them 
what they cannot accomplish on their own; Susan Orlean notes that “there is something 
clever and unplantlike about their determination to survive” (8). This Orchid is 
unselfconsciously naked (after all, she lacks a “self” to be conscious of) and delicately, 
alluringly beautiful. Her virginal innocence may be subject to the words of her 
creator/protector, but he seems equally subject to her defenselessness. “The words just 
don’t work right for it,” he stammers. “The first thing I remember about her is the first 
thing I can remember” (Gaiman 33). Black Orchid is about to become “a dance of human 
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and plant desire that has left neither the plants nor the people taking part in it unchanged,” 
a once upon a time that is always already recounting (Pollan 243).  
 Across Gaiman’s nomadically intertextual environment, this “Susan” (re-called 
after the first Black Orchid, Susan Linden) relies on other perspectives to remember (and 
to re-member) her in a graphic enactment of what evolutionary biologist John Thompson 
describes as “the role of outsiders in manipulating behavior and shaping evolution” 
(Pennisi 372). Manipulative partnerships “are a theme we’re coming back to time and 
time again” he concludes in what is an uncanny approximation of one of this graphic 
novel’s key themes. Philip Sylvian, her creator and Carl Thorne, her abusive ex-husband; 
Jason Woodrue, Pamela Isley, Alec Holland, and Lex Luthor (characters known to most 
readers familiar to the DC universe)—these are the voices who story the Orchid’s past.6 
Gaiman’s environmental imagination is also subtly informed by facts about actual orchid 
growth and development, which results in a hybrid text, a fragrance compounded of 
botany and fantasy, underscored with spicy notes of ecofeminism. Sylvian is this 
Orchid’s rescuer, both from her abusive father and her equally abusive husband, but he is 
also her creator. Sylvian names himself as “Susan’s” father, albeit in constellation with 
Woodrue, Isley, and Holland—“I couldn’t have done it without the others,” he demurs 
suggesting that her DNA is due more to botany than to paternity (Gaiman 40). Like other 
specimen orchid seedpods that appear to be gestating in his greenhouse, she is, he 
informs her, epiphytic. “Epiphytic orchid seeds settle in a comfortable spot, sprout, grow, 
dangle their roots in the air and live a lazy life absorbing rainwater...They aren’t 
parasites—they give nothing to the tree and get nothing from it except a good place to sit,” 
and McKean’s images clearly capture this aspect of “Susan,” even as the very Platonic 
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nature of Susan Linden’s relationship with Sylvian is also made apparent (Orlean 8). 
Hence the source of “Susan’s” confusion; [In dreams we find only contractions] she 
thinks in sleep, [I dream my Sister]...[Further back, the dreams are Susan]...[Mother] 
(Gaiman 57). The appearance of a nearly identical child-orchid, “Little Suzy,” escaping 
the greenhouse before its destruction and turning to this Orchid for comfort and 
protection, adds to “Susan’s” confusion. [Little One]...[Little Sister]... “Can I call you 
‘Mommy’?”... “Uh...sure. I’d like that” (Gaiman 70, 80). Her “what am I” turns of 
necessity to “where did I come from?” 
 Charles Darwin’s 1885 botanical treatise is an endorsement of precisely Those 
Various Contrivances by Which Orchids are Fertilised by Insects and for which orchids 
have been frequently and pointedly stigmatized. “Orchids, gorgeous and elegant, are also 
some of the most deceitful flowers,” notes NYTimes.com writer Carol Yoon in an article 
titled “Tongue Orchids’ Sexual Guile: Utterly Convincing.” A recent American 
Naturalist study noted that while “most flowers attract and reward their pollinators with 
nectar...sexually deceptive orchids lure their pollinators with counterfeit signals” that 
suggest they are female insects, most frequently relying on “floral scents that mimic 
species-specific female-insect sex pheromones” (Gaskett et al. E206). This so-called 
pseudocopulation results in very real gratification; “male pollinators can prefer orchids to 
real females,” thus reducing their own procreative potency (Gaskett et al. E206). In Black 
Orchid, Sylvian acknowledges his paternal role as pollinator and as progenitor, and his 
desire to be with his Orchids is constant until his death; Carl Thorne seems as attracted to 
Susan Linden’s hybrid avatar as he was to his former spouse. Lex Luthor, “reinvented 
[here] as a ravenous mega-tycoon,” wants only to possess the Orchid and her botanical 
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secrets—an understandable desire that penetrates our own world as well as that of the DC 
universe (Morrison, Supergods 185). Orlean notes that at the time of her research, “the 
international trade in orchids is more than ten billion dollars a year,” a different kind of 
green that is just as alluring as sex.  
 That the Black Orchid uses deceptive tactics to manipulate others is part of the 
repertoire of both the original character (recall Grant Morrison’s description of her role-
playing, her use of cosmetic disguises, her mutable identity) and of Susan Linden, 
“Susan’s” predecessor. It is Phil Sylvian’s offer to “show you her computers, and the 
clothes, wigs, all that stuff...” that first prompts this new Susan to seek another model of 
identity elsewhere. “No...I need to be outside. In the open” she replies, a refusal of her 
spectral “forgotten life” that returns me to Kristeva (Gaiman 42). Kristeva’s subject in 
process develops in part through the process she calls abjection, a sort of self-
territorializing that occurs when internal consistency is achieved by “jettisoning what 
seems to be part of oneself”—through such literally expulsive processes as spitting, 
vomiting, and fecal elimination (McAfee 46). Critically, that which is abject is “Not me. 
Not that. But not nothing, either” (Kristeva, Powers of Horror 2). The subject produces 
herself through a process of subtraction, of elimination, but critically for Kristeva, “what 
is abjected” is at one and the same time, “radically excluded but never banished 
altogether,” never fully repressed or wholly absent from that burgeoning selfhood 
(McAfee 46). Kristeva points to the corpse as the exemplar of abjection, “there, I am at 
the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, 
from that border” (Powers of Horror 3). If abjection reaches its most extreme limit or 
condition, the subject then experiences herself as abject: “nothing is familiar, not even 
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the shadow of a memory”; she confronts the realization that “who she is” is founded not 
on what she wants/desires but on what she wants/lacks (Powers of Horror 5). For most of 
this graphic novel, “Susan” is the image of the abject, a shell, an empty husk; [I walk like 
a ghost] she thinks at her resurrection and she is the ghost of (one? several?) Black 
Orchid(s), a corpse always there at the boundaries of this stammering speaking being she 
is trying to become. “Susan” knows that she is wanted, but she also knows that she is 
wanting. “If I could be what Phil wanted me to be...If I knew what he wanted...if I knew 
what we were,” she laments to Little Suzy, before taking flight to try to locate her present 
in her past (Gaiman 79). 
 “Of the many different types of social encounters we may single out a particularly 
relevant one: conversations between two or more persons,” DeLanda notes. “As an 
assemblage, a conversation possesses components performing both material and 
expressive roles” (New Philosophy 53). As his assemblage theory widens outward from 
individual persons to population networks, DeLanda focuses on the dynamics of 
conversation. Co-presence, the actual assembly in space of conversing bodies, provides 
the material dimension; the expressive roles lie not just in the contents of those 
conversations, but also in the gestures and body postures that accompany them. 
Conversations can be either reaffirming or destabilizing as participants are either 
reassured about the way others perceive them or find themselves 
dismembered/deterritorialized, perhaps through destabilizing affects like embarrassment 
or humiliation (DeLanda, New Philosophy 53-55). “Susan,” in a series of wonderfully 
illustrated panels, goes to Gotham City’s Arkham Asylum in search of Woodrue and 
Pamela Isley. McKean’s inky gutters and darkly monochromatic palette atmospherically 
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renders Arkham’s infamous reputation as “the jungle of despair,” an abject assemblage of 
“other and others and others. Here are the obsessed and the anguished and the damned. It 
goes so deep” (Gaiman 93). These images express the dysfunctional lineaments of a 
subterranean root system from which “Susan” draws no sustenance; her extended 
conversation with Pamela Isley simply underscores the toxic consequences of an absolute 
deterritorialization into madness. “Becoming is anti-memory,” Deleuze states 
unequivocally; “Susan” must find some line of flight that will help her escape the 
arboreal claustrophobia of this assemblage of the past before she can start her own 
becoming (A Thousand Plateaus 294). From an unlikely source comes an unlikely 
suggestion: 
Batman: I would suggest that you talk to Alec Holland. 
“Susan”: Alec Holland is dead! He died years ago. Everybody knows 
 that! 
Batman: Most of the things that ‘everybody knows’ are wrong. The rest 
 are merely unreliable. Go to Louisiana...If he wants you to find 
 him, you’ll find him. (Gaiman 99) 
 
 In Black Orchid, the Orchid’s development only accelerates when she escapes the 
competing demands of the human men in her past lives, reterritorializing her own 
assemblage on her own terms. In a green dream of trans-corporeal and transtextual 
concupiscence, she shares an empathic exchange with another vegetable hybrid: Swamp 
Thing. She and Little Suzy are the last of their kind, females alone and without their 
traditional pollinators. He helps her reach within herself for the capacity to reproduce, 
then silences her seemingly endless flow of questions with a question of his own: “How 
the story ends...? That is your affair. What do you want?” (Gaiman 114-115). Like him, 
she opts to re-author herself by transgressing her limitations and (e)merging with/as the 
ever-changing assemblage that was and will be Black Orchid. “No flower is more 
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guarded against self-pollination than orchids,” Orlean writes, and “most never pollinate 
themselves” unless survival demands it (Orlean 5-6). Darwin specifically noted 
hermaphroditic reproduction in the orchid species O. apifera, considering it an extreme 
adaptation made only to “ensure a full supply of seed” in a species that clearly was, at 
some earlier point in its development, “adapted for cross-fertilisation,” but he repeatedly 
questions the threat to survival of “the evil effects of long-continued self-fertilisation” 
(Various Contrivances 57-58, 285). In this assemblage, however, I hear the voice of 
Deleuze: “We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 257). The Orchid’s encounter with Swamp Thing constitutes what DeLanda 
would consider a deterritorializing event. “Eventfulness changes the distribution of 
opportunities and risks...[they] allow participants the expressive possibility of displaying 
character” (DeLanda, New Philosophy 55). This is a new distribution of the sensible, one 
that I think helps us shift DeLanda’s anthropocentric assemblage theory towards a more 
posthuman environmental entanglement. 
 When Tim Morton suggests, “The trouble with vegetable growth is that it consists 
of sets of algorithms—iterated functions, often producing fractal shapes,” his intention is 
to shift our perspective towards “a strange and wonderful way to look at flowers,” an 
alien and unnatural encounter that puts us in conversation with the materiality of 
expression, with a de-natured nature (The Ecological Thought 68). We will spend more 
time on the new materialism and Morton’s engagement with object-oriented ontology in 
Chapter 3, but I feel that here, this is putting the Thing before the Swamp. Assemblage 
theory may seem strangely fractal and fracturing in the garden of the environmental 
imagination, but I believe its value is in the way it encourages us to map those significant 
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moments of our contact with the heterogeneous green world, of our need to better 
recognize our embeddedness in it, our entanglement with it. In a text that was eventful for 
my own environmental subjectivization, Neil Evernden captures precisely the boundary-
blurring potential that animates the capacities of these transgressive assemblages. “There 
may be more going on in a plant than we can see,” he writes, and he comments on the 
way that symbionts like lichens “blatantly challenge our belief in firm boundaries” (The 
Natural Alien 41, 38). “Is a lichen a plant? A co-operative?” he ponders (38). Beyond our 
differences, and surely because of them, Evernden urges that “we must all invest 
ourselves in the world,” to find in assemblage the capacity to “regard ourselves as ‘fields 
of care’ rather than as discrete objects in a neutral environment,” and this is ultimately, I 
think, the fruit of our reading Black Orchid.  
 On the final page of this graphic novel there is a single declarative sentence set in 
bold black type over a delicate silhouette of orchid seed pods: “There is no such thing as 
a black orchid.” In the novel’s waning scenes, the Orchid and Little Suzy make a 
momentous decision. They choose to leave the solitary sanctuary of the secret Amazon 
location where the Orchid’s seeds have begun to germinate a new crop of hybrid plants. 
They elect to return to a world of messy humanity, to rejoin an assembly whose 
capacities and dimensions they cannot anticipate. “Make a rhizome,” Deleuze urges us. 
“But you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you don’t know which 
subterranean stem is effectively going to make rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your 
desert. So experiment” (A Thousand Plateaus 251). If there is no such thing as a black 
orchid, perhaps there is something in the environmental imagination that pushes us 
beyond the single, urges us towards singularity. “Art might name the mechanism of 
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reindividuating at a different level,” Simon O’Sullivan suggests, “precisely the 
constitution of new composites, new assemblages” (29). There is no individual black 
orchid; there are iterations and reiterations, a Black Orchid multiplicity. In a provocative 
essay to which I will return in my Conclusion, Bruno Latour urges us to think beyond 
deconstructive critique, to think about reconstruction in terms of composition: 
Even though the word “composition” is a bit too long and windy, what is 
nice is that it underlines things that have to be put together (Latin 
componere) while retaining their heterogeneity. Also, it is connected with 
composure: it has clear roots in art, painting, music, theater, dance...it is 
not too far from “compromise” and “compromising,” retaining a certain 
diplomatic and prudential flavor. Speaking of flavor, it carries with it the 
pungent but ecologically correct smell of “compost,” itself due to the 
active “de-composition” of many invisible agents. (“An Attempt at a 
‘Compositionist Manifesto’” 473-474) 
 
Darwin concludes his The Origin of the Species recommending that we 
contemplate “a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing 
on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the 
damp earth,” that we engage in an act of environmental imagination that offers us the 
opportunity to see “that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other” 
are yet “dependent upon each other in so complex a manner” (507). The Orchid does not 
make her decision to invest herself in the world lightly; “I need something to do,” she 
avows, but then adds, “Perhaps our kind need death” (Gaiman 135). Composing a hybrid 
assemblage is both messy and risky—we truly do not know what a rhizome can do—but 
cultivating becoming also seduces us with the promise of something strange and 
wonderful. Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean plant that seed when, in the closing panels of 
Black Orchid, the Orchid and her iteration turn their faces to the sun, their arms 





1 The seeds of this chapter were first sown at the 2013 meeting of the Western Social 
Studies Association in Denver, CO, in my presentation, “Emerging Entanglements: 
Vegetable Voices in Saga of the Swamp Thing and Black Orchid.” 
 
2 DeLanda makes it clear that he considers species to be an assemblage while Deleuze 
does not; Deleuze distinguishes between the assemblage and the strata. The key to the 
distinction is that Deleuze understands heterogeneity as an absolute determination of 
assemblage, while DeLanda is willing to consider degrees of heterogeneity in his 
definition. Deleuze would consider an ecosystem to be an assemblage, “but not the 
species themselves, since natural selection tends to homogenize their gene pools” 
(DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society 11). DeLanda, on the other hand, considers both 
species and biological organisms as assemblages. In a further note, DeLanda explains that 
while Deleuze distinguishes between a system and an assemblage, he does not. I tend to 
agree with DeLanda’s assessment that the difference between them is one of degree 
rather than of kind. See New Philosophy of Society, n9 (121) and n21 (123-124).  
 
3 In his introduction to the first volume of Saga of the Swamp Thing, Ramsey Campbell 
also notes Swamp Thing’s conversation here  “with his own skull playing Yorick to his 
Hamlet.” 
 
4 Ecological complementarity also escapes the raging Cynodon dactylon (aka Bermuda 
grass, devil’s grass, or Deleuze’s couchgrass) that literally devours the world in Ward 
Moore’s 1947 science fiction horror novel, Greener Than You Think. Stimulated by the 
ultimate bio-restorative formula, “The Metamorphizer,” this rhizomatic symbol of the 
rampant spread of capitalism (another “green” assemblage, if you will) resists fire and 
nuclear attack and succeeds in both becoming and overcoming the globe. As to its 
ultimate fate in a world devoid of carbon-dioxide producing organisms, we are left in the 
dark. In this novel, the Green decidedly has the upper hand and the last word.  
 
5 And the saga has, indeed, continued. As part of its celebrated “The New 52” relaunch of 
many of its signature comics series, DC Comics published in 2012 the first volume of the 
latest Swamp Thing rhizome, Scott Snyder’s Raise Them Bones. Dismantling the 
extraordinary work that I find so compelling in Moore’s graphic novel, this version 
begins again with “the real man himself,” Alec Holland, whose body resurrects and 
rejects both his remembered exploits as the Swamp Thing and the call of “the Green” to 
surrender himself again to its greater good. The astonishing entanglement with a more 
than human ecology promised in Moore’s graphic novel is, I fear, undercut by what I can 
only read as a more anthropocentric rendering. Here, Holland chooses to serve “the 
Green,” but, as the back cover promises, not as a “protector...This Swamp Thing will be a 
conqueror.” Not an assemblage, but a super-persona, this representation bodes ill for an 
ecocritical reading that demands a more posthuman environmental imagination. 
 
6 Woodrue and Holland we encountered earlier in the Swamp Thing sagas; Batman 




detailed historical sources on comic book character histories, Wikipedia, Gaiman 
previously amended Isley’s origin story, explaining that she and Alec Holland studied 






MINERAL: DANCING LIKE A MOUNTAIN 
 
 
 Scott Slovic’s Editor’s Note in the Summer 2012 issue of ISLE begins with this 
provocative claim: “Material ecocriticism is really heating up” (443). Aprés significant 
theoretical developments like quantum theory and a troubling number of national and 
international “natural” disasters, ecocriticism is evolving beyond its initial concerns with 
representation and social construction to anticipate le déluge of new materialist critical 
and cultural theory. Material ecocriticism, then, is the discipline’s latest iteration, taking 
its cue from a range of theorists with a variety of points of view on what is, at bottom, 
“the dull stuff of matter” (Bennett, “A Vitalist” 49). From the thing-power of Jane 
Bennett’s vibrant matter to Karen Barad’s agentic realism to Graham Harman’s darkly 
withdrawn objects, a diverse group of philosophers, cultural and critical theorists, 
scientists and students of science studies are engaged in thinking and writing about matter 
and mattering, about things and our imbrication with them. Material ecocriticism now 
takes Laurence Buell’s claim about the consequences of  “how we image a thing” to a 
new level and with a new awareness; beyond considering the effects of our conduct 
(“nations as well as persons”) on what were previously represented as the essentially 
passive direct objects of our environmental grammar, the multiple species of new 
materialism demand that we also acknowledge the transitive and
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 transgressive material agencies vibrating in “the happenings of things” (Buell 
Environmental Imagination 3, Scott 27).  
 
The New Materialisms 
 
 In their introduction to the edited collection, New Materialisms, Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost clarify that “new materialist scholarship” represents not a unified theory 
but rather a diverse assortment of perspectives that they separate into three themes: (1) 
“an orientation that is posthumanist in the sense that it conceives of matter itself as lively 
or exhibiting agency;” (2) “consideration of a raft of biopolitical and bioethical issues 
concerning the status of life and of the human;” and (3) “a critical and nondogmatic 
reengagement with political economy, where the nature of, and relationship between, the 
material details of everyday life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic structures is 
being explored afresh” (“Introducing” 6-7). For my purposes, this provides a useful 
breakdown for a material ecocritical exploration of the distinctively different ways that 
contemporary comics and graphic novels are now evidencing their own materialist turn—
one that will suggest, in fact, that the very assumptions incorporated in these three 
schema have always already been present in the graphic environmental imagination. 
Grant Morrison certainly argues that thing-power was already an agential reality in 
comic’s Golden Age. There was “a radical enchantment of the mundane” present in those 
early comics where “any person, thing, or object could be drafted into service in the 
struggle against darkness and evil—remade as a weapon or a warrior or a superhero” 
(Supergods 48). Latour insists that “any thing that does modify a state of affairs by 
making a difference is an actor—or, if it has no figuration yet, an actant,” and we have 
already seen that graphic novels have no difficulty “imaging” weaponized animals, 
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combative plants and superheroic hybrids of protoplasmic pre- and posthumanity 
(Reassembling the Social 71, italics original). Both the postcolonial animal subalterns of 
Chapter 1 and the biopolitical vegetable assemblages of Chapter 2 can also be read as 
exemplars of one or more materialist perspectives. Matters of posthuman agency, 
bioethics, and environmental activism certainly represent a substratum of each of the 
graphic novels I have discussed so far, but as yet I have not asked, with Heidegger, 
“What is the thing itself?” and “What are we thinking of when we now have the thing in 
mind?” (Poetry, Language, Thought 165, 22). It’s time now to move resolutely in that 
direction—to consider the inanimate as the matter at hand. 
 
Those Mute Materials: Garfield Minus Garfield 
 
We are here to witness. There is nothing else to do with those mute materials                      
we do not need.                                                                                                                 
(Annie Dillard, Teaching a Stone to Talk 90) 
 
 Proponents of new materialism focus first on things that matter, on an encounter 
with the stuff of the world in its active, material efficacy in our everyday lives—a 
reengagement necessitated by the seemingly dematerializing effects of the discursive turn 
in critical and cultural theory. Second-wave ecocriticism mined nature-oriented texts to 
expose social and discursive constructions of nature that imagined a pristine and 
originary space, a cultured nature that tended to neglect (or to elide outright) nonmale 
nonwhite nonhuman actants. In their deconstructive zeal to demonstrate those sedimented 
hegemonic assumptions, some ecocritics inadvertently shifted their attention too much to 
a transcendent anthropocentric model of discursive (and therefore fully human) agency 
while undercutting the multiple and meaningful performances of nonhuman things and 
forces. Matter, agency, and posthumanism: such is the bedrock of a materialist 
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orientation on which new materialists, material feminists, and even object-oriented-
ontologists1 seem to stand before they diverge into distinctly different trajectories.  
 Traces of these same elements can be identified in comics theory; Scott McCloud 
nods to the ubiquitous and subliminal powers of things. “Our identities and awareness are 
invested in many inanimate objects every day,” he notes and then elaborates, “Our 
clothes, for example, can trigger numerous transformations in the way others see us and 
in the way we see ourselves” (38). We tend to overlook the power of things, subsuming 
their agency in our extended sense of our own, but it is precisely that triggering capacity 
that “new materialists emphasize” when they foreground “the productivity and resilience 
of matter” in their analyses (Coole and Frost, “Introducing” 7). New materialists (Bruno 
Latour, Jane Bennett, William E. Connolly, Elizabeth Grosz, for examples), and for that 
matter, even the “old” new materialists, like Spinoza, Bergson, Deleuze, and Heidegger 
among others, emphasize that matter makes things happen (to humans as well as for 
them) and that matter endures, matter remains. Bennett, in particular, ties her investment 
in a more material engagement with the world in which we live to concerns about our 
consumer society’s lasting impacts on the environment. “How,” she asks, “would patterns 
of consumption change if we faced not litter, rubbish, trash, or ‘the recycling,’ but an 
accumulating pile of lively and potentially dangerous matter?” (Vibrant Matter viii). It is 
also important to note that the matter that matters is not only naturematter but 
culturematter as well; when material feminist Stacy Alaimo argues that “if nature is to 
matter, we need more potent, more complex understandings of materiality,” she turns 
equally to naturally occurring substances, industrial pollution, and material/cultural 
practices like foodways, race, and class to illustrate her points (Bodily Natures 2). As 
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Coole and Frost emphasize, new materialists “can hardly ignore the role of social 
construction,” even as they “stubbornly insist on the generativity and resilience of 
material forms with which social actors interact” (“Introducing” 26, italics original). 
Instead, the new materialist reality recognizes the imbrication and interpenetration of 
what Félix Guattari described as “the three ecologies” in his 1989 text of the same title. 
In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, Guattari linked “three ecological registers...the 
environment, social relations and human subjectivity” and declared, “the only true 
response to the ecological crisis is on a global scale,” a response he characterized as “an 
authentic political, social and cultural revolution” (28).   
 Today, following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, financial market debacles manifesting in 2007 and rolling across the 
United States, the UK and Iceland, and 2012’s Superstorm Sandy, it is clear that there are 
multiple agencies vibrating within and across the global village we inhabit, and those 
“mute” materials are making themselves heard. Jane Bennett observes, “Humanity and 
nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance with each other...an interfolding 
network of humanity and nonhumanity” that is nowhere better imagined than in feminist 
physicist Karen Barad’s influential work, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Vibrant Matter 
31). Barad performs her own interfolding of the work of Niels Bohr, Andrew Pickering, 
and Judith Butler to produce a material-discursive concept of “agential realism.” Barad’s 
ambitious “entanglement” of quantum theory, science studies, and gender performativity 
provides a sort of ground zero for materialist feminists’ rethinking of agency. Her 
contribution to new materialist scholarship is to recover the concerns of earlier feminists 
about the discursive construction of subjectivity that might otherwise be lost in a purely 
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“materialist” theory, one that emphasizes a distributive agency allocating critical 
performance capacities among multiple “real” human and nonhuman actants (an “object 
lesson” that ignores the material consequences of cultural, social, and political forces that 
Barad also perceives as agentic). In Barad’s account, discursive performativity has 
material consequences for and on bodies, just as bodies have material efficacy in the 
world. In The Mangle of Practice, Pickering (whose focus is on science studies) suggests 
that rather than beginning with a traditional empiricist approach to science (one that 
founds its representations on “facts and observations”), we can instead begin with the 
notion that “the world is filled...with agency,” and that “much of everyday life...has this 
character of coping with material agency, agency that comes at us from outside the 
human realm and that cannot be reduced to anything within that realm” (6). So far, so 
straightforward...even Lucretius, expounding on Epicurean thought circa 50 BCE, tells us 
that “whatever exists, will either do/Something, or it is itself, by other things, done to” 
(The Nature of Things 15, italics original). Science practices are wholly caught up in an 
engagement with “a field of powers, capacities, and performances, situated in machinic 
captures of material agency”; in other words, science devises and depends upon 
experimental apparatuses in order to produce or to capture that which it observes and 
measures (Pickering Mangle of Practice 7). Bohr’s chief contribution to Barad’s thought 
lies in his assertion that scientific apparatuses not only measure results but also contribute 
to them: the apparatus of measuring has what Gregory Bateson would term a recursive 
effect, entering into and conditioning the very measurements it makes.2 Pickering focuses 
on something like self-reflexivity in his understanding of the “dance of agency” that takes 
place as scientists tune or recalibrate their experimental practices in response to the 
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expected and unexpected outcomes they achieve; Barad, relying on Bohr, moves in a 
dramatically more ontological direction (Pickering Mangle of Practice 21-22). Restyling 
Pickering’s dance of agency as “entanglement,” Barad posits that “to be entangled is not 
simply to be intertwined with another...but to lack an independent, self-contained 
existence. Existence is not an individual affair. Individuals do not preexist their 
interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled inter-
relating” (Meeting the Universe Halfway ix). Barad’s move both relies on Pickering and 
moves far beyond him, with astonishing implications for an agent/actant that appears to 
be not simply posthuman, but postaction. Barad, like Pickering, begins her materialist 
theory with the idea that rather than “an assemblage of agents,” what exists a priori is “an 
entangled state of agencies” (Meeting the Universe Halfway 23). Since individual agents 
do not, then, precede their entanglements, those activities cannot be between/inter 
separate agencies; instead, Barad proffers the neologism “intra-action” which “signifies 
the mutual constitution of entangled agencies,” which then “emerge through their intra-
action” (Meeting the Universe Halfway 33, italics original). The subjects/agents that 
emerge from Barad’s “agential realism” are therefore relational, situational, contingent, 
and yet material: they are not discrete, concrete, individuated subjects prior to their intra-
action, but they consequently have real, demonstrable effects on the world into which 
they emerge. Critically for Barad, and for the various material feminists who have 
extended her ideas well beyond scientific studies, agential realism “takes account of the 
fact that forces at work in the materialization of bodies are not only social, and the bodies 
produced are not all human” (Meeting the Universe Halfway 33-34). Material phenomena 
and discursive practices are entangled or mangled together (“mangled” is Pickering’s 
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term); these “entangled practices are productive, and who and what are excluded through 
these entangled practices matter; different intra-actions produce different phenomena” 
(Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway 58, italics original).  
 Another unexpected and yet illuminating result of Barad’s agential realism: 
because discursive practices and material phenomena (like the words and images of 
comics’ own representational entanglements) can combine in multiple ways with 
sometimes unexpected results, “re-membering and re-cognizing do not take care of, or 
satisfy, or in any other way reduce one’s responsibilities...The past is never finished” 
(Meeting the Universe Halfway ix). Recognizing that subject positions are emergent 
phenomena also opens up room for an affirmatively posthumanist ethic. Recall that in 
Chapter 2, Alan Moore’s Swamp Thing represented an always-evolving superhero whose 
identity was not confined to that of his previous iteration, and for whom re-cognizing 
himself as fully hybrid, rather than as simply an augmented human being, broadcast his 
responsibilities to a much larger world than that imagined by the first Swamp Thing. 
Barad and other material feminists, along with their new materialist colleagues, embrace 
an idea of posthumanism that expands our ideas of the “human” beyond the cyborg. 
“Posthumanism,” she contends, “is not calibrated to the human; on the contrary, it is 
about taking issue with human exceptionalism while being accountable for the role we 
play in the differential constitution and differential positioning of the human among other 
creatures (both living and nonliving) (Meeting the Universe Halfway 136). Introducing 
their edited collection of essays illustrating material feminisms, Stacy Alaimo and Susan 
Hekman emphasize not only that “nature is agentic,” but also that feminist material 
theory is too, “redefining our understanding of the relationships among the natural, the 
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human, and the nonhuman”—emphasizing the “myriad ‘intra-actions’...between 
phenomena that are material, discursive, human, more-than-human, corporeal, and 
technological” (“Emerging Models of Materiality in Feminist Theory” 5-7).3 Material 
feminism is overtly concerned with female bodies and with “the materiality they inhabit,” 
a “co-constitutive materiality of human corporeality and nonhuman natures” that aspires, 
according to editors Alaimo and Hekman, to “the formation of unexpected political 
coalitions and alliances” informed by our mutual materiality and our shared exposure to 
threats from environmental pollution, unstable weather patterns, rapidly diminishing 
polar icecaps, antibiotic-resistant bacteria, mutating viruses, diminishing fossil fuel 
resources, on-going issues with nuclear accidents and waste disposal, and all the other 
vicissitudes of our deeply entangled intra-actions (“Emerging Models of Materiality in 
Feminist Theory” 4, 9).  
 Yet even as many feminists herald the potential of a renewed interest in 
materiality’s inherent vitalism to reanimate the female body, others caution that “we have 
not overturned...a horror of the inert, the unproductive, and the radically different: that 
which cannot be comprehended, enlivened, rendered fertile or dynamic” (Colebrook 59). 
Claire Colebrook suggests that “the true politics of matter lies...in a matter that fails to 
come to life,” matter that stubbornly refuses either to perform or to conform to human 
expectations (59, emphasis added). Specifically, Colebrook points to the powerful 
recalcitrance of literary materiality: language as art/literature is that which is inert, which 
stands outside the quotidian flux of everyday life—and which therefore resists our desire 
to incorporate it into ourselves, to force it to “get a life” so we can move along, nothing to 
see here. Instead, the stubborn materiality of the text serves as a kind of stumbling block 
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to our unexamined becoming, forcing us to stop and think. “Literature, like all art, allows 
matter to stand alone and vibrate,” and Colebrook argues that the result of this encounter 
with positive difference will be to “allow us once again to think ethically” (76, 66).  
 That literature about matter matters solidly registered on Edward Abbey. He 
concluded his Introduction to Desert Solitaire with the following advice to readers: “This 
is not a travel guide but an elegy. A memorial. You’re holding a tombstone in your hands. 
A bloody rock. Don’t drop it on your foot—throw it at something big and glassy” (xiv).  
Material ecocriticism, which “comes from the idea that it is possible to merge our 
interpretive practices into these material expressions,” recognizes the text’s agential 
potential just as it also focuses on “matter as a text, as a site of narrativity, a storied 
matter, a corporeal palimpsest in which stories are inscribed” (Iovino and Oppermann 
451). Serenella Iovino, evaluating the efficacy of material ecocriticism as textual analysis, 
emphasizes both the narrative potential of matter-as-text and also makes it clear that 
“material ecocriticism is not committed to a specific literary genre” (459). Comics and 
graphic novels, where “storied matter” often steals the show from mere mortals, offer a 
richly entangled environment where texts do not always act the way we expect them to. 
What happens when text as corporeal palimpsest works backwards, putting a significant 
bit of its “storied matter” under erasure, as it were? What happens to the human in a story 
where things go missing?  
 That’s precisely the question that artist Dan Walsh posed in his Garfield Minus 
Garfield comics. In 2008, Walsh began posting cartoonist Jim Davis’s Garfield comic 
strips online with one significant alteration: he erased Garfield. His website, 
www.garfieldminusgarfield.net, is “a site dedicated to removing Garfield from the 
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Garfield comic strips in order to reveal the existential angst of a certain young Mr. Jon 
Arbuckle.” Walsh claims, in his Foreword to the published collection of Walsh-altered 
Jim Davis strips, that by removing Davis’s titular cat, his edited strips make clear what 
has always been the case...that “Jon has always been talking to himself” because Garfield 
never speaks: his commentary has always been represented as thought rather than as 
speech through the time-honored comics tradition of a cloud-like word balloon linked to 
the character via a series of empty circles that literally bubble up from the character into 
view. Thinking is thus visually rendered as mute speech—and Walsh’s premise suggests 
that language that is inaudible is also materially impotent. Walsh contends that without 
Garfield’s organizing commentary, Jon’s existential insufficiency is made visible to his 
readers (“Jon needs some help!); that in fact, Garfield is a humanist fable—it has always 
and only ever been about Jon (Walsh 6). What I would like to explore here, however, is 
not how “with Garfield there you’ve been getting distracted from the truth,” but rather to 
consider how this selectively evacuated cartoon makes things, their ineradicable thing-
power, and our desire for them, more visible, evoking a more materially posthuman take 
on the human condition.4 
  The materiality of things is made particularly visible on Walsh’s website, where 
his edited Garfield-absent cartoons are presented without the Garfield-present Davis 
originals (contra the book’s format). The website, I think, is more effective than the book 
precisely because the absence of Garfield’s (silent) running commentary is not restored 
by having the original strip run directly beneath it (a condition, I suspect, necessary for 
the publication of Walsh’s alteration of Davis’s copyrighted material—the book is, 
noticeably, published with Davis as author, while Walsh is credited with a Foreword). 
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Walsh’s argument seems to be that lacking the ability to speak into the panels of Davis’s 
cartoon, Garfield also lacks materiality; without a voice, his corporeal presence is simply 
a nonevent in Jon’s life—John is the poster boy for the postmodern condition, always 
already alone. Scott McCloud acknowledges both the necessity and the power of the 
ubiquitous speech balloon in comics’ narrative. Noting that Eisner called the word 
balloon a “desperation device,” McCloud literally illustrates the need for a graphic, 
versatile, and material device that could represent sound in an otherwise visual medium 
(McCloud 134). Thierry Groensteen is even more specific about “the functions of the 
verbal” in the system of comics, naming two: a function of dramatization (which 
McCloud also notes, that of adding pathos to images, to “invest them with a wealth of 
feelings and experiences” 135) and a realist function as well (127, italics original). 
Groensteen’s humanist bias is fully exposed here: this “reality effect...attaches to the 
verbal activity of the characters, for the simple reason that in life, people talk” (127, 
emphasis added). People talk, not cats or cups, dogs or desktops...their talk, even if “most 
of the time, nothing important is said, or at least nothing essential,” functions “to identify 
and to interpret the represented scene” (Groensteen 127-129). In Groensteen’s analysis, 
“the [comics] image does not often need a linguistic message to be anchored in a 
univocal signification”; images generally are “read” based on their “inscription in an 
iconic sequence” (130). Compare this to Barad’s claims that “existence is not an 
individual affair” and that “individuals do not precede their interactions”—in comics 
arthrology sequential images are entangled in one another, and their meaning is best 
understood as immanent within those articulations, emerging like agency only after those 
entangled intra-actions (Meeting the Universe Halfway ix). Yet Groensteen allows that 
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occasionally the image can sometimes only be understood via the interpretive anchoring 
of text, specifically on those occasions when “the view alone does not provide much 
information,” in those circumstances when we become aware that “our different senses 
are channels of complementary information” (130). Here again, Groensteen’s analysis of 
how comics work can be juxtaposed with Barad’s agential realism, with its reliance on 
the philosophy of Niels Bohr. Groensteen suggests that images can simply be 
supplemented with words for greater clarity when their immanent relations leave 
meaning ambiguous, while Bohr reads “complementary” circumstances as supplemental 
but mutually exclusive. Bohr’s insight suggests that we cannot read Garfield with 
Garfield and Garfield minus Garfield simultaneously: we must choose one way or the 
other, because “the nature of the observed phenomenon changes with corresponding 
changes in the apparatus”—there can be no “both/and” compromise (Barad, Meeting the 
Universe Halfway 106). To that end, let’s read Garfield Minus Garfield minus the 
original strips (as the original website intended). What happens when Jon is “really” 
alone in Davis’s panels? Without a relation to Garfield, who is Jon?    
 What immediately becomes more visible in this world without Garfield is that Jon 
continues to invest his energies and attention in a variety of other things, mute materials 
that he appears to need to speak to and through. Socks and slippers as hand puppets, a 
pillow with a face drawn on it...Jon craves relationships, with things as well as with a 
series of imaginary and/or always deferred girlfriends. Davis’ cartoons are always 
composed of three identically sized panels, two outside bordered panels bracketing an 
always borderless middle; all three are typically linked by a low horizontal line 
suggesting a common “floor” or “grounding”—in Garfield, we are always in the same 
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place. Beginning, middle, and end, with the beginning and end seemingly fixed by their 
rigid outlines, the middle a more fluid and somehow indefinite space, open at the top...if 
Jon is going to escape his existential moment, he can only do so here, in media res so to 
speak, but he never seems to look up and never seizes the only line of flight open to him. 
In most of these strips, the bracketing panels on either side wholly overdetermine the 
middle panel; Jon’s world feels more than a little claustrophobic. In one of the most 
arresting strips, both the left and right panels are empty, containing or imaging nothing 
(Davis 55). Only the middle panel offers us an image, Jon grasping a pillow, a pen behind 
his left ear suggesting that Jon is the source of the toothy grin and bulging eyes on the 
defaced (enfaced?) pillow. “I’m drawing faces on all the pillows!” his topless speech 
bubble proclaims, suggesting that his words could simply float away at any minute with 
no one the wiser, and with no apparent impact on the only panel that shows us anything at 
all. 
 “Do you grant agency to inanimate objects because you want to unburden 
yourself of responsibility? Or because you need to mark how overwhelmed you are by 
your material environment? Or is it simply because you’re lonely? Because, unlike a 
child, you don’t have a toy to talk with?” (Brown 12). In A Sense of Things, Bill Brown 
considers the interactions between humans and objects, particularly with an eye towards 
demonstrating the ways in which “things and thingness [are] used to think about the self” 
(18). Brown is unwilling to simply gloss the human/nonhuman intersection as little more 
than a metaphor for consumer culture’s obsession with appropriating material things; 
instead, he notes a troubling metamorphosis that is bidirectional—“the metamorphosis of 
one into the other” that can be read either way (13). Walsh’s panels seem to capture this 
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ambivalent moment while they eerily illustrate Barad’s claims: Jon does not precede his 
intra-action with the pillow, and “his” agency emerges only in the arbitrary agential cut 
performed by the panel framing (and it vanishes just as quickly). In Walsh’s distribution 
of the sensible, Jon is made visible and audible only with and through the two objects in 
the frame, and he comes into being for himself and for us as an auto-graph, verified here 
by his own ability to make a mark with an object on an object. In a sense, Jon is self-
discursive, self-constructed out of his own one-sided and precariously anchored 
language...but he (and we) can only know this through and against the materiality of the 
objects he is assembled with. 
 I am also particularly drawn to several different strips that picture Jon with and 
against sock/slipper puppets. In one, Jon appears to be utterly still across all three 
panels...the only moving object seems to be the sock puppet, whose movement in the first 
two panels is represented by the quick flicker of small curved lines interrupting the 
otherwise neutral and homogeneous background (Davis 60). Like Jon, we “see” the 
vitality of the sock puppet while ignoring the fact that Jon’s hand is the source of the 
sock’s animation. Likewise the “tail” of each of the speech balloons located above and to 
the right of Jon in the first two panels clearly indicates that HE is the speaker, although 
the content in each suggests that it is the ventriloquized puppet that speaks. “ Awww. 
Rough day, Jon?” “Cheer up, Jon!” Reading the first two panels, I realize that Jon is the 
object—the puppet is the agent/subject. Objects are often characterized by their stillness, 
their lack of mobility, and of course, by their lack of language...but here, the sock has the 
upper hand. This is a moment of what Jane Bennett describes as “enchantment...a 
surprising encounter, a meeting with something that you did not expect and are not fully 
  
158 
prepared to engage” (The Enchantment of Modern Life 5). It is likely that Jon and I both 
experience in this moment feelings of being “charmed by the novel” and yet “a more 
unheimlich (uncanny) feeling of being disrupted,” taken out of our normal sense of our 
selves, our sense of things (Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life 5). In an odd kind 
of reverse anthropomorphism, the sock attempts to engage Jon in what Brown identifies 
as “something like a social relation between human subject and inanimate object, which 
in modernity’s ontological distinction between human beings and nonhumans makes no 
sense,” a relation that can be “deeply affective—it involves desire, pleasure, frustration, a 
kind of pain” (Brown 29-30). It is not a long-lived experience...by the third panel, Jon 
and sock, object and subject, have metamorphosed into each other, back to roles that 
seem more normative, less adventurous. Jon addresses the now immobile and objectified 
sock. “At least you care,” he concludes, in a simultaneously mocking and self-mocking 
attempt to restore a more “natural” social order. The strip exemplifies Bennett’s idea of 
“crossing” as a kind of “self-morphing” which invites the terminally human subject to re-
image itself as simply an object among objects, or perhaps as an object subject to other 
objects. “Crossings bring new things into being,” she writes, new things that perhaps can 
help old things learn new tricks...like greater responsiveness and responsibility toward 
“cross-cultural and cross-species relations” (The Enchantment of Modern Life 31, 29).  
 This is not to say that Jon ever fully demonstrates a new ethical perspective 
toward the things that populate his apparently narrow existence. He does, however, seem 
to be at least momentarily (and frequently) called to a recognition that his own position as 
“human” is not the center of existence...or that if he positions himself in that fashion, that 
he is also forced to recognize that objects are in no way disposed toward him. In yet 
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another sock puppet strip, Jon appears in the first panel with a cloaked sock, smiling 
smugly on his upraised and mobile right hand (Davis 58). “It’s Socko the Superhero Sock 
Puppet!” he exclaims. A beat, as you negotiate the first panel’s hard right edge. In the 
second panel, his left hand flies upward from beneath the panel’s floor, covered with a 
fuzzy pink bedroom slipper (also marked with facial features). “And his trusty sidekick, 
Fuzzy Slipper Man!” Jon announces with a flourish. Another beat, as your eye registers 
the distinctive line of the third panel’s left edge. The third panel is all empty space above 
the image of Jon and his puppets. No word balloon, no interpretive text, although out of 
habit from the previous two panels you look for the words that will interpret the image 
for you. Jon stands somewhat sheepishly between Superhero and Sidekick. No one 
announces his identity—no one names him. He is an unmarked and unremarkable thing, 
in the empty space between two agents of mystery and magic, both of whom face away 
from him. Jon’s almost palpable desire for acknowledgement from the objects at hand, 
objects that refuse to look at him, recalls William Connolly’s summoning of 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty to his new materialist arguments. “Perception 
depends upon projection into experience of multiple perspectives you do not now have,” 
Connolly explains, and he emphasizes that Merleau-Ponty couples an explanation of 
depth perception to the idea that seeing things also “makes it seem that objects see you” 
(“Materialities of Experience” 186). What happens then, when objects refuse to play 
along? Connolly suggests that “the anticipation of being seen by the objects you see is 
shattered by...images that refuse to support that sense”; the result is disorienting, as we 
suddenly find ourselves in an uncanny moment that undoes our customary sense of 
“belonging to the world” (“Materialities of Experience” 192). Connolly sees this uncanny 
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moment of perceptual dissonance—like Jane Bennett’s crossings—as an opportunity, one 
that might challenge our habitual and underexamined enmeshment with things that matter. 
I am not sure that Jon is ready for the kind of tactics of the self that Connolly imagines as 
emerging from these uncanny crossings that invite us to “sense the surplus of life over the 
structure of our identities” (“Materialities of Experience” 196). Jon is, after all, just a 
thing among things, a cartoon. He is just a placeholder, a cipher between the real actors in 
this sequence of images. And he is looking directly at you. 
 Or is he? There are multiple moments across Walsh’s provocatively altered strips 
when Jon certainly seems to be looking at, or listening to, or even seeing something or 
someone missing from the panels. It is time, now, to bring Garfield back into the picture, 
or at least to consider how Garfield’s absent presence, his present absence, seems to 
haunt the proceedings. It is almost as if Garfield has not really left the building...like 
Elvis, he seems only to have withdrawn from the seen/scene, gone but not forgotten. 
Garfield (or maybe “Minus Garfield”?) is the near-perfect metaphor for object-oriented 
ontology. 
 As I noted in an earlier endnote, philosophers of object-oriented ontology (or 
OOO for a graphically correct signifier, as we shall presently see...or not...) carefully 
distinguish themselves from materialists, both new and feminist. Object-oriented 
ontology is a “philosophical study of existence” which “puts things at the center of being,” 
according to one of its current practitioners, Ian Bogost. In Alien Phenomenology, Bogost 
succinctly outlines the primary difference between its key figures, who call themselves 
“speculative realists,” and the new materialists I have been describing. OOO thinkers, 
originally Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, and 
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more recently, Levi Bryant, Bogost, and ecocritic Tim Morton, “share a common position 
less than they do a common enemy,” an ardent denial of “the tradition of human access” 
as the organizing center of and primary gateway to knowledge of the material world (4-5). 
In The Quadruple Object, Harman makes it clear that OOO is not just another perspective 
on materialism. Materialism, in his view, either (a) undermines the autonomous object 
(by reducing it to some smaller [in]different particle or monistic substance that is its true 
materiality), (b) overmines it (an opposite move, where the object is “reduced upward” 
such that its importance is correlated with its evental presencing to or impact on another 
object or mind), or (c) actually does both maneuvers simultaneously. The result is the 
same, as the singular autonomous object is displaced from the center of being. Harman 
emphatically states his position: “Materialism is the hereditary enemy of any object-
oriented philosophy” (7-13). Walsh’s erasure of Garfield from Davis’s strips reads as (c): 
a kind of super-undermining of Garfield, reducing him to the monistic and 
undifferentiated stuff of eraser crumbs AND an equally super-overmining; we cannot see 
Garfield, we can only dimly perceive him through Jon’s reactions and expressions. 
Garfield is no longer center-stage. 
 And then again, perhaps he is. In Guerilla Metaphysics, philosopher Graham 
Harman elaborated on the concepts he first approached in Tool-Being: Heidegger and the 
Metaphysics of Objects. “Object-oriented philosophy,” he states, “has a single basic tenet: 
the withdrawal of objects from all perceptual and causal relations” (17). Objects, on 
Harman’s account, lead two lives: one “secret inner life of tool-beings” that is what he 
later dubs the real object, and another “public life as well,” that sensual object which is 
its “colorful particularity” that we “know” through our senses (Guerilla Metaphysics 75, 
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83). Harman’s ontology is not a unified theory of being; instead, it posits an essential gap 
that is in things, not between them in the way that we ordinarily understand the modernist 
dualities like nature/culture, human/nonhuman. Real objects have real qualities (Harman 
will later describe these as notes), while sensual objects have sensual qualities. Sensual 
qualities are the “ether of sensual traits” that flood our experiences and that light up our 
senses in our relations with sensual objects as particular things; real qualities are that 
“plurality of notes,” that je ne sais quoi—which we quite literally cannot know because 
we cannot ever access it—that is the real object’s “irreducible unity” and that can never 
be exhausted by our encounter with some or other of its sensual traits (Guerilla 
Metaphysics 153, 83).  
 In a single strip, Walsh inadvertently captures precisely the dual nature of object 
relations (Davis 65). In the first panel, Jon sits right of center, an empty plate on the table 
in front of him; for no apparent reason, he is staring fixedly and with no little ire into the 
empty space that takes up exactly half of the panel. In the middle panel, noticeably 
lacking a lower border as well as the customary open top, he is (apparently 
unselfconsciously) asking, “Do you really expect me to believe that “invisible friend” 
stuff?” The third panel is pure OOO. On the left side, a word balloon anchored to the top 
of the panel but with no apparent speaker, emphasizes not sense but sensation: “BURP,” 
appears in emphatic bold type and a larger point-size, but the balloon’s tail emerges from 
an “empty space”—an absent object? Jon’s eyes widen in shock and surprise...he has 
clearly received a sensory impression, a sound (and surely an accompanying aroma), an 
ether of gustation and indigestion, suggesting a sensory object in some fashion 
responsible for the emptiness on the plate in front of him. That sensory object proceeds 
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ahead of the real object, one whose “actual reality...none of its manifestations can 
exhaust”—in other words, from Garfield, Garfield-the-Real-Object for whom gluttony is 
only one of many qualities Jon experiences despite Garfield’s always-withdrawing-
absence from Walsh’s edited strips...a Garfield whose unseen presence in the Walsh 
strips we never actually fail to intuit, a being we grasp as singular even as we only “know” 
him bit by bit (Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics 55).  
 The way in which we relate to other objects (and we are also objects, objects 
among objects) reflects this idea that we can never fully grasp or exhaust all of the real 
object. Instead, “our body reduces objects, simplifies them, as a target of its own aims, 
needs, and desires” (Bryant 93). Put another way, out of all their myriad sensual qualities, 
we perceive them as caricatures, as cartoons...as Levi Bryant puts it, “we draw 
distinctions in particular ways,” and when we do so, “certain [other] phenomena and 
causal factors become completely invisible” (203). Framing and simplification of 
complex images into efficient recognizable images: in the act of perception, we all 
function like comics artists. Those distinctions that we draw, carving out marked and 
unmarked spaces, operate along the same lines as Bohr’s notion of complementarity; 
once we foreground one thing, the other thing disappears into the background. “In 
addition to the unmarked space of a distinction, the distinction itself is a blind-spot”—as 
soon as we make a distinction (in comics terms, this is the breakdown: the artist decides 
where to cut the action and what to include in a panel, while everything else is left out, 
outside the frame), we no longer see it, “thus [creating] a reality effect where properties 
of the indicated seem to belong to the indicated itself rather than being effects of the 
distinction” (Bryant 21). Walsh makes a distinction when he erases Garfield and leaves 
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Jon “in the frame” as it were...and then naturalizes that very circumstance by claiming 
that Jon was really always alone. Bryant’s point is that distinctions foreclose options; 
Bennett’s point in advocating crossings is to trouble those marks by inviting us to re-
mark in new and surprising ways. By reading Walsh’s comics against the grain of his 
argument, we reopen the opportunities his argument shuts down.  
 Harman writes that “art differs from everyday life and speech by its attempt to 
reach what is inaccessible to all perception,” and that is why comics and graphic novels 
provide such a fertile ground for material ecocriticism’s efforts to engage more fully with 
the mute speech of things. Responding to articles by Harman and Tim Morton about what 
an object-oriented literary criticism might look like, Jane Bennett argues that OOO’s 
insistence that objects are not fully reducible to their relations or to their cultural elements 
fails to provide “an explicit account of the virtues or stakes of favoring mysterious 
objects over complex systems of relations” (“Systems and Things: A Response to 
Graham Harman and Timothy Morton” 226). Bennett’s own materialist scholarship is 
invested in what she perceives as “an affinity between thing-power materialism and 
ecological thinking,” and like other new materialists, she is committed to underscoring 
the entanglements between things and environments, to “the extent to which all things are 
spun together in a dense web” of relations (“The Force of Things” 354). New materialists 
are united in their vision that “material phenomena are increasingly being conceptualized 
not as discrete entities or closed systems but rather as open, complex systems with porous 
boundaries” (Coole and Frost, “Introducing” 15). OOO philosophers do not discredit the 
force of things manifested in those hybridizing relationships; Harmon specifically 
stresses that “when two objects enter into genuine relation, even if they do not 
  
165 
permanently fuse together, they generate a reality that has all the features that we require 
of an object” (Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics 85).5 Leaving aside the question of what a 
“genuine relation” might look like, it is important to note that Harman goes on to argue 
here that “the difference between objects and relations is not a difference between two 
specific types of things, but between two moments in each thing” (Guerilla Metaphysics 
90). OOO philosophers share, as I have pointed out, a commitment to maintaining the 
equality, autonomy, and agency of objects, objects which “need not be natural”—the 
unicorn and the combine harvester, the color red and methyl alcohol, quarks and 
corrugated iron, Amelia Earhart and dyspepsia, all are fair game, none’s more primary 
nor more original” (Harman, The Quadruple Object 19; Bogost, Alien Phenomenology 
11). Bogost makes it clear that while “all things equally exist...they do not exist equally”; 
encounters between objects are not reducible to each other, nor are they the same...but 
they each have their moment (11). What OOO philosophers seem to resist is any desire to 
push the object aside in favor of some presumed holism...instead, both Harman and 
Morton suggest that an object-oriented criticism would instead analyze how textual 
objects “resist internal holism by attempting various modifications of these texts and 
seeing what happens” (Harman, “The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer” 201-202). 
Harman suggests fooling around with editing Moby-Dick...but Garfield Minus Garfield 
works in much the same way. Two more examples should serve to further our 
appreciation of how an OOO ecocriticism, in Morton’s words, “forces us to acknowledge 
that we coexist with uncanny beings in a groundless yet vivid reality without a beyond” 
(“An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry” 222). 
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 In a strip that certainly recalls Bill Brown’s questions about why we grant agency 
to inanimate objects, we begin in panel one with Jon alone, pounding his fist on the table 
and declaring, “Nobody tells me what to do!” (Davis 94). In the middle panel, a still-
solitary Jon is pictured motionless and masterful...the portrait of humanism, the absolute 
center of being (and of the panel, indeed of the whole graphic environment). The third 
panel represents the dénouement, the collapse of the folly of humanism, the exposure of 
the hubris OOO tirelessly works against. Jon has literally and figuratively collapsed, face 
down on the table, in surrender and despair. “And I wish they would! I have no idea what 
I’m doing!” His desire is not for the false holism that being master of his domain might 
yield, but for coexistence with uncanny beings, co-acting that also implies 
coresponsibility. OOO comes to his rescue here: as Morton suggests, to the charge that 
the human-centric desire for mastery of the environment is bad, OOO counters “Not at 
all...everything else is doing the same thing” (“An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry” 
207). Notice that from the singular “nobody tells” Jon shifts to the plural “they.” Annie 
Dillard writes, “The Chinese say that we live in a world of the ten thousand things. Each 
of the ten thousand things cries out to us precisely nothing”—and it is those silent cries 
that Jon both acknowledges and longs for (Teaching a Stone to Talk 87). In another strip 
similarly themed, Jon sits alone in the first panel facing stage left and rhetorically asking, 
“You know what I could use?” (Davis 24). In the middle panel, he is still seated along the 
left edge of the panel, looking down with surprise at what we see only as an empty table. 
In the third panel, his expression both nonplussed and resigned, he answers himself 
ironically, “Some time alone.” The irony is that in the center panel, Jon finds himself in 
what Ian Bogost calls “the dense meanwhile of being,” a place where he apparently 
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cannot avoid the recognition that, as Jane Bennett champions, “I live not as a human 
subject who confronts natural and cultural objects but as one of many conative actants 
swarming and competing with each other” (Bogost 59; Bennett, Vibrant Matter 122). 
Morton reminds us, in the same vein that “objects are unique but not necessarily singular. 
A crowd is an object; so is a loner. OOO is not a form of individualism” (“An Object-
Oriented Defense of Poetry” 209). The only way Jon can use some time alone is to 
ponder his place in the democracy of objects. “I am a rock” can just as easily mean “I am 
an island,” the color gray, a heap of stones, or a gravel truck.    
 
A World of Fleshy Beings: Trans-corporeality in  
Chew: Taster’s Choice 
 
Indeed, thinking across bodies may catalyze the recognition that the environment, which 
is too often imagined as inert, empty space or as a resource for human use is in fact, 
 a world of fleshy beings with their own needs, claims, and actions.                                           
(Alaimo, Bodily Natures 2) 
 
 In Bodily Natures, ecofeminist Stacy Alaimo challenges the very logic of a claim 
to personal safe space like “I am a rock” by introducing the concept of “trans-
corporeality,” the idea that the human body is a more fragile, permeable space “always 
intermeshed with the more-than-human world” (2). Alaimo redirects ecocriticism’s focus 
on human intervention in an external environment “out there” to a more intensive 
recognition that “the substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from ‘the 
environment’” (Bodily Natures 2). We are living in—and intra-acting with—a material 
world, and trans-corporeal material ecocriticism “acknowledges the often unpredictable 
and unwanted actions of human bodies, nonhuman creatures, ecological systems, 
chemical agents, and other actors” (Bodily Natures 2). Indeed, today’s media headlines 
featuring genetically modified organisms, antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and global 
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pandemic emphasize that thinking across bodies is part of our everyday existence, and 
that those unwanted actions are proliferating across the local and global commons. 
 New materialists and material feminists alike identify food as one of the most 
visible of all trans-corporeal substances—visible, that is, until it is consumed and 
“disappears into the human body, which remains solidly bounded” (Alaimo, Bodily 
Natures 13). Food is both transformative and agential; Jane Bennett stresses this thing-
power of food: “Food will appear as actant inside and alongside intention-forming, 
morality-(dis)obeying, language-using...and culture-making human beings, and as an 
inducer of-product of salient, public effects” (Vibrant Matter 39).  Food, the conditions of 
its production and distribution, its consumption and its effects, is big business, 
economically, ethically, and ecocritically. In the Summer 2012 issue of ISLE, the 
Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment’s official journal—an issue 
devoted to material ecocriticism—four of the seven articles were either about or related 
to food. And, while it might seem odd that food-as-actant would appear in a medium 
more generally devoted to galactic superheroes and cataclysmic apocryphal events, 
comics and graphic novels once again demonstrate their engagement with topical 
environmental concerns. Without further ado, I invite you to pull up a chair and dig in to 
the gastronomical graphic imaginary of John Layman’s and Rob Guillory’s Chew.6 
 Volume One, Taster’s Choice, opens with a visual prologue clearly foregrounding 
food preparation and the trans-corporeal nature of restaurant culture: an anonymous hand 
prepping vegetables for “slow-simmered shredded chicken, vegetable, and three-bean 
soup” sustains a bloody cut while enthusiastically slicing and dicing with a large, 
gleaming Santoku...blood that drips onto the vegetables that are then added to the 
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steaming pot in a scene as cringe-worthy as the shower scene in Psycho. “End prologue,” 
reads the only other text on the opening page guttered in impenetrable black...this could 
be any restaurant, anywhere and anytime, and the ubiquity spills off the page and into 
your consciousness—“choice” will clearly be a contested term on this menu. 
Appropriately, the prologue is placed on the right-hand side of the fold, so the reader is 
forced to linger on this image of culinary malfeasance...an image that will return to 
discomfit us and Tony Chu, the main character. 
 We meet him as soon as we turn the page, an unprepossessing, height-challenged 
and urban Ichabod Crane, who “is almost always hungry, and almost never eats.” A 
metaphor for rapacious consumer society? A postmodern Bartleby? No. Chu (savor, for a 
moment, the intentional homonym) is a vice cop in New York City who suffers from a 
singular malady: he is “cibopathic,” Layman’s neologism for someone who literally 
suffers from the food he eats. Tony “can take a bite of an apple, and get a feeling in his 
head about what tree it grew from, what pesticides were used on the crop, and when it 
was harvested,” expository text that is pasted over a monochromatic image of bountiful 
harvest. The other side of cibopathy, however, is not so beatific: the explanatory text box 
goes on “or he could eat a hamburger, and flash onto something else entirely,” and 
Guillory serves up an almost identical sepia image—almost, except this time it is one of 
slaughterhouse butchery, complete with bloody streams directing our gaze to the point of 
impact between a sledge hammer and a cow’s head. That bloody stream immediately 
recalls the previous page’s bloody finger, deploying image-power and iconic solidarity to 
braid the two together in our minds. There will be blood, it seems...and Tony Chu’s 
ability/disability is going to give all of us indigestion. 
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 That this is and is not your average crime drama also becomes apparent quite 
quickly. Tony has a gung-ho macho partner and the story begins with the two of them on 
stakeout in front of a seemingly abandoned storefront. A suspect emerges, “carrying 
twenty five pounds or more. Uncooked.” It’s Chu’s brother, a local TV chef whose public 
“meltdown on air” cost him his job and landed him on the streets. So far, this is standard 
television cop fare, setting up the pursuit and capture of a law-breaker given greater 
affective depth because of his familial relationship to one of the “good guys.” But then 
the comic takes a dramatically unexpected shift that puts us in a not unfamiliar and yet 
radically alternate universe. In another black-guttered set of panels, we flash back to the 
night of Chu’s brother’s transgressive performance. His tirade is triggered by having to 
use Poult-Free® chicken substitute for real chicken in his recipe; we learn that following 
the outbreak of avian influenza, the U.S. Congress has ratified a constitutional 
amendment banning the use or sale of poultry products. Chu’s brother dismisses the 
whole thing as a hoax (“There was never any bird flu.... No disrespect to the people who 
died, but this was never about birds. The government has an agenda, and this bird flu 
hoax is at the heart of it”). The “twenty five pounds of uncooked” he’s carrying is 
CHICKEN, not heroin or crystal meth. Tony and his partner, vice cops-cum-food police, 
are concentrating on the rapid spread of an illegal “wingmeat business” but find their 
efforts stymied by deals cut between the local kingpin and the “feds”—in this case, the 
newly empowered Food and Drug Administration. 
 All of this elaborate exposition is accomplished through Layman’s skilled 
breakdown and use of dialogue intra-acting with Rob Guillory’s evocatively drawn 
artwork. In a scant six pages, we find ourselves in a messy casserole of leftover agencies 
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and narrative filler—deep in what Alaimo calls “the entangled territories of material and 
discursive, natural and cultural, biological and textual” (Bodily Natures 3). From here, the 
plot thickens. Chu and his partner, at the behest of the FDA, enter a “chicken speakeasy” 
(password: wishbone) where, despite his vulnerability, Chu orders the soup...“slow-
simmered shredded chicken, vegetable, and three-bean soup.” He raises his spoon, tastes, 
and we turn the page...to a full fold spread, a prominent soup-spoon-wielding Tony 
superimposed over a gridded background of 374 images in varying red and “flesh” tones. 
The majority of the squares depict the substance of Tony’s tasting experience: the panels 
from the prologue (now miniaturized and fragmented), blood splatters, the knife, stirred 
together with dimly perceived images we’ve not seen before, human mouths fixed in a 
rictus of horror that uncannily (and deliberately) recall the open mouth of the bovine 
victim in the instant of slaughter—Tony’s imagined sensual response to eating a 
hamburger. The repetition of tiny squares, like tiles in a manic mosaic, subtly suggest 
some sort of rapid metastasizing; the narrow, vein-like gutters between them are neither 
daylight white nor obscure black...they are a muddy, murky brownish-red, colored like 
the bloody splatters depicted in the squares (or cells?) themselves. These are gutters that 
can barely hold the shifting ingredients apart: spaces that the squares themselves could 
easily slide through and across...these boundaries are permeable, not impenetrable. There 
are also a few prominent green toned squares randomly scattered across this fragmented 
image of gustatory experience; each features a different perspective on the anonymous 
hand from the prologue, the cut finger dripping blood into the soup Tony has just put into 
his mouth. The color choices are deliberate: artists have a much older understanding of 
Bohr’s notion of complementarity, and Guillory manipulates the flickering of 
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complementary colors, red and green, to maximum effect here. Either you look at the 
primary thread of the action or you look at its more subtle implications; you cannot really 
follow both plot lines simultaneously, even as you perceive that they are clearly 
enmeshed. From the bottom of the far right side of the fold, in a word balloon bordered 
with the same nauseous green as the random squares, Tony and reader confront the 
critical question du jour: “How’s the soup taste?” 
 In her carefully researched examination of changing cultural attitudes towards 
human health and its relationship to the environment, Linda Nash suggests that there is a 
kind of ambivalence present in how we experience our bodies. “The body seems to exist 
in two kinds of time,” she writes, medically and culturally defined by the time we live in, 
and yet also in some key ways—“including birth, death, fatigue, and symptoms of 
illness”—transhistorically, connected “to those who came before us” (Nash 11). 
Literature would seem to bear out her arguments that the definition of health, as a socially 
defined category of human experience, has certainly shifted over time. There is 
something about Tony’s visible response to that paragon of healthy choices, chicken soup 
(and about our visceral response to Taster’s Choice’s collage of entangled elements), 
which calls to mind the fears of Tobias Smollett’s eighteenth century protagonist of 
Humphry Clinker. Matthew Bramble is reluctant to drink the reportedly healthful waters 
at an esteemed British spa. He suspects “that there is, or may be, some regurgitation from 
the bath into the cistern of the pump,” and that the famed waters may consist of “sweat 
and dirt, and dandriff; and the abominable discharges of various kinds, from twenty 
different diseased bodies” (55). Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn, serially 
published in 1799, similarly reflected an American concern for “discords and evil smells, 
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unsavoury food, unwholesome labour, and irksome companions,” which were, in the 
narrator’s opinion, “the unavoidable attendants of a city” (24). Both texts display 
decidedly period sentiments that are nonetheless oddly (and unfortunately) familiar in 
today’s increasingly intra-active urban society. Nash contends that this pre-nineteenth 
century view of the intermingling of human, animal, vegetable and mineral elements in 
an environmental broth of health and (un)wellness was supplanted by modernity’s focus 
on disease etiology and prevention. “For the modern body, ‘health’ came to connote 
primarily the absence of disease,” which Nash sees as paradoxically deemphasizing the 
idea of trans-corporeal intra-actions and restoring confidence in the body as a pristinely 
retentive space; “health became a quality possessed (or not) by an individual body rather 
than a dynamic relationship between a body and its environment” (Nash 12). Only 
recently, in the late 20th century, does Nash identify another shift, claiming, “in many 
ways the most radical notion to emerge from the modern environmental movement was 
the idea that people were inescapably part of a larger ecosystem” (1). Does Chew, with its 
grisly revelations and jumbled plotlines, its mélange of economic, environmental, and 
bioethical ingredients, simmered with a soupçon of governmentality and with more than a 
hint of cannibalism, provide material ecocriticism with ample food for thought? 
 Chu’s response to the seemingly simple question, “How’s the soup taste?” is to 
cibopathically identify multiple elements present, but not visible, in the various body 
crossings he reads in a soup tainted with “just one drop” of human blood. That blood 
belongs to an at-large serial killer who is guilty of cannibalizing his thirteen victims—
hence the gustatory miscegenation Tony tastes in a single spoonful. The remainder of the 
first chapter concerns Tony’s pursuit and apprehension of this criminal; the other four 
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chapters that make up Volume One of what is an ongoing series take Tony and his 
readers beyond the confines of New York City (and farther still beyond my critical 
comfort zone) to the edges of a plot to conceal the “true nature” of “what the government 
claimed was an avian flu.” For Tony, obtaining evidence requires repeated performances 
of “tasting” that Layman and Guillory relish providing; Chew devolves into a sordid 
smorgasbord of rotted flesh, human and nonhuman, which the FDA requires its new 
Agent Chu to sample in a series of increasingly violent, otherworldly and graphically 
rendered encounters. It seems that “good” taste must give way to “bad” in order to appeal 
to the jaded appetites of habitual comics consumers. 
 Yet Chew does offer some interesting tidbits for the discriminating ecocritical 
palate, particularly with regard to how biopolitics and bioethics intersect with a more 
materialist engagement with environmental discourse and practice. “Readers of 
Foucault...are well aware of the biopolitical interest the modern state has taken in 
managing the life, health, and death of its populations,” and material ecocriticism should 
certainly draw attention to the “incursions into the most intimate habits of daily existence” 
authorized by the state (Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms” 22-23). At 
the same time, bioethical concerns related to the everyday impacts and the potentially 
unpredictable and devastating consequences of those state practices also warrant our 
concerned critique. Catriona Sandilands points out that Foucault addresses both the 
disciplinary aspect of biopolitics and its pleasurable side; specifically, she suggests that 
institutional management of sexuality, diet, and group addiction are all examples of body 
politics which, while they have a distinctly regulatory effect on the subjects they produce, 
provide as well a space of performance in which those subjects also experience genuine 
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satisfaction as they participate in “practicing toward that normalized, controlled body” 
(18). Sandilands goes farther, citing authors Éric Darier, Tim Luke, and others who have 
identified “environmental governmentality” as a new kind of biopolitical power, in which 
“questions of human-nature relationship are increasingly organized by technologies of 
monitoring, prediction and regulation” (19). Chew, I think, allows its readers to 
experience for a moment the sense of discipline and pleasure implicit in contemporary 
issues about food choices and pandemic response that a focus on trans-corporeality 
makes material and meaningful.    
 In this text, food practices are clearly not presented through a solitary point of 
view or single ethical perspective. While you might want to use the opening scenes to 
support an argument for a vegan diet as a superior moral and ethical choice, the one least 
likely to have troubling trans-corporeal consequences—“the only food Tony Chu can eat 
and not get a psychic sensation from is beets”—Layman’s script resists that 
straightforward interpretation. He crafts a female love interest for Tony who does not 
serve to reinforce his beets-only diet; instead, she appeals directly to Tony’s ever-
unsatisfied desire for physical fulfillment. Tony can safely eat beets, but he does not 
really want to; cibopathy dictates his consumption choices and practices—his body 
enacts an agency his desire is denied. Amelia Mintz is a “saboscrivner,” another Layman 
neologism “that means she can write about food so accurately, so vividly and with such 
precision—people get the actual sensation of taste when reading about the meals she 
writes about.” For her “normal” readers with “healthy” appetites, Mintz’s coverage of “D” 
rated restaurants is nausea inducing; for Tony, her descriptions are magical. “Reading her 
work...it was like I was actually tasting things for the first time...eating. Without 
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everything that usually goes along with it for me—the aftertaste and undertaste of 
slaughter and death—and cages and dirt and feces and hormones and pesticides.” His 
appreciation here echoes again Alaimo’s entangled material and discursive; for Tony, 
reading provides the sensory stimulation his body craves. Tony wishes he could eat like 
the rest of us, be like the rest of us, oblivious to the material and moral entanglements 
concealed within the food we consume so unthinkingly. Tony’s special ability is truly a 
mixed blessing, one that is both gift and obligation and which also paradoxically mirrors 
our own. We all eat to live, but some of us live to eat; in the face of mounting evidence 
regarding the environmental impacts of the intra-actions between consumer demand and 
consumer choice, it seems that some of us need to get no satisfaction. Taster’s Choice 
never addresses the ecologically negative side of our proliferating desire for instant 
gratification and for diversity in satisfaction of taste, but it does make that desire, a 
sometimes undertheorized aspect of consumer behavior in ecocritical analysis, viscerally 
present. 
  Tony would prefer not to be a culinary material ecocritic, endlessly reminded that 
“the ethical space of trans-corporeality is never an elsewhere but is always already here, 
in whatever compromised, ever-catalyzing form” with every bite he takes (Alaimo, 
Bodily Natures 18). His desire to be protected from trans-corporeal awareness sounds a 
lot like the gastronomical equivalent of safe sex: Tony wants to have his cake and eat it, 
too...an all too contemporary desire for both instant gratification and instant 
indemnification. Questions about food practices and food choices make us uncomfortable, 
especially in a nation where obesity lags only behind tobacco use as a leading cause of 
preventable death; Alaimo is right when she claims that “ethical considerations and 
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practices must emerge from a more uncomfortable and perplexing place where the 
“human” is always already part of an active, often unpredictable, material world (Bodily 
Natures 16-17). Sandilands points to the ambivalent effects of an environmental 
disciplinarity that creates both guilt and pleasure in the emerging responsible 
environmental subject; greater awareness of our complicity with those responsible acts 
can reward us with the sense that we have joined a new group of confederates, while also 
prompting us to feel greater guilt about our failures to act responsibly all the time (19-20). 
Tony’s ambivalence is manifested not in terms of environmental guilty pleasures or 
reflection on the consequences of specific eating habits; instead, his ambivalence is tied 
to the morality of his need to “taste” the blood of various human and nonhuman body 
parts in order to “serve the greater good.” While cannibalism may represent the ultimate 
act of runaway consumption and, at the same time, the ultimate act of consumer 
inhibition through population control, it is never explicitly dealt with in Volume One’s 
plotline—a missed opportunity, I think.  
 Another significant point in Sandilands’s analysis inadequately developed in 
Taster’s Choice is the recognition that environmental governmentality’s “extension of 
disciplinary and managerial forms of power into the more-than-human realm” also 
“represents an increasingly dense web of scientized knowledge relations through which 
human activities are managed by states, apparently ‘for our own good’ but largely in the 
very particular interests of capital” (Sandilands 19). The government’s role in the Bird 
Flu pandemic is never made clear in this volume, but several of the stories plant 
intriguing seeds that bear out Chu’s brother’s contention that “this was never about birds.” 
Guillory cleverly inserts newspaper headlines like “Poultry Trade Protests Mar 
  
178 
President’s UK Visit” and newspaper advertisements for “Poult-Free® - The Legal 
Alternative” into his panel details, visual appetizers for the main course to come. A visit 
to a top-secret government-funded operation in the Arctic Circle also suggests that 
Congressional chicanery is bankrolling poultry prohibition, but any resolution of these 
intimations is deferred. Jane Bennett suggests that “a theory of vibrant matter,” with its 
recognition of multiple agents and actants, “presents individuals as simply incapable of 
bearing full responsibility for their effects”; her intent here is not to absolve humanity of 
responsibility but to expand the scope of our inquiries to include “Other” likely suspects, 
both institutional and nonhuman (Vibrant Matter 37).  
 In his 1998 essay “EcoThrillers: Environmental Cliffhangers,” Richard Kerridge 
pointed to Britain’s recent outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or 
“mad cow disease” as it was popularly referred to) and pondered why realist fiction had 
been relatively slow to feature environmental issues (243). Kerridge suggests that novels, 
with their “committed absorption in the details and cadences of individual perception,” 
are not able to adequately represent environmental issues that “ask us to take into account 
the possible long-term results of present action” and that hinge on “indeterminacy” rather 
than on speedy arrest and prosecution (243-244). He takes issue with detective fiction as 
well, noting that while these stories “usually start with simply ‘whodunnit’ questions 
which grow into threads of connection, revealing that apparently separate events and 
characters are interrelated,” at their conclusion they “tend to collapse that intricacy back 
into a single confrontation” (Kerridge 247). While Kerridge’s scathing criticism of the 
overmining plotlines of popular disaster films is, I think, both warranted and well 
supported, I believe that the serial nature of the graphic novel, its unfinished open-
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endedness, works especially well to counter his arguments. Volume One of Chew may 
not really satisfy my desire for a full meal of ecocritical themes, but it certainly does offer 
a buffet of entangled agencies at work in an environmental scenario that is not as 
straightforward as it might first appear—and while we may not want to take another 
spoonful, it seems we cannot stop at just one. Chew forcibly reminds us that in a fully 
entangled (and genetically modified) world, what we eat runs the risk of becoming “who” 
we eat, with some deeply disturbing implications for our responsibilities for those choices 
(or for our refusal to “face” the choices at all). The cassoulet of John Layman’s intricate 
plots and Rob Guillory’s strikingly memorable images does, I think, the same kind of 
work that pictures in cookbooks accomplish. It is one thing to read about a recipe—
another to actually see the finished product, to be inspired and seduced by a picture that 
says something to our mind’s eye that text alone seldom produces. In Chew’s temptingly 
graphic imaginary, we cannot ignore that we are all in the soup. 
 
Material Memoir and the Ecological Body:  
Paul Chadwick’s Concrete 
 
And the rocks themselves shall be moved...So the rocks shape life, and then life shapes 
life, and the rocks are moving. The completed picture needs one more element:  
life shapes the rocks.                                                                                                              
(Annie Dillard, Teaching a Stone to Talk 127) 
 
 An emphasis on “the material details of everyday life,” specifically as those 
details reflect and refract contemporary social and environmental political issues, 
characterizes the third dimension of new materialism (Coole and Frost, “Introducing New 
Materialisms” 7). Material ecocritics must also recognize that “no adequate political 
theory can ignore the importance of bodies,” entangled material bodies in all their messy, 
fleshy corporeality (Coole and Frost, “Introducing New Materialisms” 19). Comics and 
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graphic novels rely on bodies to activate their narratives, and so far we have traced 
materialist representations in bodies “animal” (the absent body of a cartoon cat) and 
“vegetable” (the simmering soup of beans and bodies)...but what about “mineral”? How 
could immovable, immutable, and inanimate stone serve as the heroic agent of a graphic 
novel, a political actant whose manifestly material everyday life could hold our attention 
longer than our short-lived affection for the infamous Pet Rock? Over a span of nearly 
twenty years, from 1986 to 2005, graphic novelist and artist Paul Chadwick accomplished 
the seemingly monumental task of doing precisely that...with “one hapless rock-coated 
fellow,” former political speech writer and self-styled adventure-hungry couch potato 
Ronald “Ron” Lithgow—rematerialized (literally and figuratively) as the mysterious 
Concrete (Concrete 1 - Depths 4).7 In his legendary Concrete series, Chadwick developed 
a character whose everyday response to finding himself in an alien (again, in both senses 
of the word) body leads ultimately to the emergence of an environmental subject. 
Chadwick’s long-running and legendary series is not simply another graphic novel; 
collectively, it represents the ecobiography of a man who becomes the contradiction 
Edward Abbey dreams of: “a hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self merges 
with a nonhuman world and yet somehow survives still intact, individual, separate. 
Paradox and bedrock” (6). Concrete’s story, to borrow Ian Bogost’s subtitle for Alien 
Phenomenology, pictures for us “what it’s like to be a thing.” 
 Certain episodes of the Concrete series also exemplify what Stacy Alaimo terms 
“the material memoir,” specific autobiographical works in which “ordinary citizens are 
compelled to take on scientific expertise and epidemiological projects in order to contend 
with the dangers of everyday life” (Bodily Natures 23). She reads the memoirs of women 
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tracing the multiple and entangled threads of their own critical illnesses—environmental 
exposure, genealogy and genetics, lifestyle choices, often mystifying scientific jargon—
and demonstrates the tropic similarities connecting them. These “strange, disturbing 
memoirs...dramatize life in risk society” and track the extent to which scientific discourse 
underwrites and shapes the way these women come to know themselves; in Alaimo’s 
words, “material memoirs forge new ways of knowing our bodies and our selves” (Bodily 
Natures 23, 87). She notes the affinity between her description of the material memoir 
and Cecelia Konchar Farr’s “ecobiography,” a term Konchar Farr coins to describe an 
autobiography in which “nature becomes an identifying canvas on which to write a self,” 
a particularly American genre in which “nature becomes us, and we begin to question 
who is constructing whom” (94-95). Alaimo distinguishes the material memoir from the 
ecobiography by referencing her analytical focus on the “emerging models of materiality” 
that shape these awakening trans-corporeal selves; in the material memoir, while 
environmental forces certainly demonstrate their own trans-corporeal effects, scientific 
discourse’s epistemological and ethical agency is equally her concern (n2, Bodily Natures 
165-166). Concrete is best read as a hybrid of material memoir and ecobiography. Like 
Terry Tempest Williams’s Refuge, Chip Ward’s Canaries on the Rim, and Ellen Meloy’s 
The Last Cheater’s Waltz, Concrete charts its protagonist’s struggles to acquire the 
scientific knowledge he needs to come to terms with his radically altered body...one that 
is the product of weird science in both the physical and the discursive senses. Like 
Edward Abbey’s Desert Solitaire, which Konchar Farr references in her essay, and like 
Aron Ralston’s Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Concrete the graphic novel also tells 
the story of Concrete’s “struggles to be born, to know himself,” and to “re-habituate, re-
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familiarize, and re-materialize the body in relation to others” (Konchar Farr 95; 
Sandilands 32). 
 Concrete, in his episodic narrative, is never far from his two closest associates, his 
hapless assistant, (USC English grad student) Larry Munro and Dr. Maureen Vonnegut, a 
research scientist “for whom I’m an ongoing research project” (Depths 14). Vonnegut 
runs continual experiments on Concrete’s alien body in an attempt to discover its secrets, 
monitors his life signs and corporeal well-being, offers encouragement and advice, and 
unwittingly (at least, initially) serves as Concrete’s fantasy lover. Concrete crafts his 
initial understanding of himself, his “condition,” and its likely effects both now and in the 
future, entirely from the speculative answers he receives from Maureen—speculative, not 
proven, although her pronouncements ring with scientific authority. Concrete emerging 
from an alien science experiment, Concrete 1.0 as it were, is not a material self...at his 
genesis he is just material, a specimen, an object of curiosity. His lack of identity, 
initially, is striking; to the scientists who first examine him, he is known only as “John 
Doe,” and his corporeal status is somewhere between present-at-hand (vorhanden) and 
ready-to-hand (zuhanden)—Heidegger’s categories of human relation to matter, the 
starting point for Graham Harman’s move to an object-oriented ontology (Harman, The 
Quadruple Object 35). In a visually striking panel, Maureen stands above a prone 
Concrete using a ruler to write on his body, marking his rocky corpus off in numbered 
gridded squares, recalling a map parceling out the lots in a subdivision or diagrams that 
illustrate which parts of a cow equate to which cuts of meat (Strange Armor 43). A few 
panels later, Concrete tries frantically to rub off those markings, evidence of his 
objectification and of his abjection—he is cast out of humanity because of a crusty 
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exterior he cannot avoid seeing, subject to a scientific institution that weighs and 
measures him but has no regard for the subjective self he once was. In order to reform the 
way he is perceived by others, he must first reimagine himself, a project that is the 
substance of the material memoir. If the material memoir reveals “how profoundly the 
sense of selfhood is transformed by the recognition that the very substance of the self is 
interconnected with vast biological, economic, and industrial systems that can never be 
entirely mapped or understood” (an aggregation I would augment to include 
environmental systems along with those biological), then Concrete shows us a material 
memoir that matters (Alaimo, Bodily Natures 95). 
 Chadwick provides us with two accounts of the genesis of this half-ton hero 
whose “very secret origin” would have a “very public impact” upon “emerging into the 
world” (Depths 4).8 The first, “A New Life,” originally issued in 1989 as a stand-alone 
issue, was rereleased in 2005’s Concrete 1 – Depths.  Chadwick also wrote a second 
version, “Strange Armor,” released in six comics issues in 1997 and 1998; after 
unsuccessfully attempting to bring Concrete to the screen, he recycled his unused scripts 
as a longer treatment of the story he first wrote and illustrated almost 10 years before. 
Chadwick claims, in his introduction to Concrete 6 – Strange Armor, that he thinks “the 
story’s better in this iteration,” and he also comments on his own improved artwork; like 
Concrete himself, it too has evolved.  
 “A New Life” is fittingly told through multiple frames, a literary device 
mimicking the graphic conventions of comics narrative. Chadwick economically and 
unobtrusively uses a limited third-person narrator to set up a story that is then told by 
Concrete to Larry Munro, belatedly supplying the details of  “his true origin.” The “true 
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story” then unfolds as a visual sequence of events from the past recounted and reviewed 
in the present tense, beginning with a camping trip planned by best friends Ron Lithgow 
and Michael Maynard. “What follows,” the anonymous narrator tells us, “isn’t exactly 
what Concrete tells Larry, but it is what happened...” (Depths 85). Ron and Michael 
stumble into an alien laboratory, hidden beneath a local mountain; they awaken to find 
that the aliens have transplanted their brains (and those of deer and a bear, other local 
fauna) into rock-like bodies that look like those of the aliens. The hapless captives create 
a diversion and overpower their guard, making a run for the surface. “Michael” falls 
behind; “Ron” escapes. He contacts his former employer, Senator Douglas, and turns 
himself in to The National Science Agency. After surviving a series of humiliating and 
invasive tests, Concrete is finally allowed to reenter public society, equipped with the 
cover story that he is an experiment gone wrong (a man-made cyborg rather than an alien 
science project, because “we’re counting on the alien thing being more unbelievable”) 
and constantly chaperoned by Dr. Maureen Vonnegut (Depths 137). Because of his 
connection to Senator Douglas, any connection to his “brain donor,” Ron Lithgow, must 
be erased for CIA-mandated security reasons; “Concrete” emerges as a public persona 
carefully crafted through a scripted media campaign. “You’ll do the talk shows and be an 
inarticulate clown...you’ll endorse the silliest products...be the inspiration for the cheapest 
toys,” Douglas’s staffer enthuses. “When we’re through, the public will be so wearied of 
you they’ll not even want to hear speculations on your origins or bodily secrets” (Depths 
138). In this Faustian bargain, Concrete is forced to “trade away [his] self-respect for 
freedom”—even his name is a label concocted by the PR liaison, but he is promised that 
he will “have the rest of [his] life to redeem [himself]” (Depths 138).9  
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 “A New Life” closes with Concrete and Larry saying goodnight and with a fairy 
tale’s traditional “THE END” pasted beneath the final panel. Framed and distanced 
through three layers of narrative (re)counting, this version of Concrete’s story reads like a 
novel, not an autobiography. We follow the plotline, we understand that Ron and Michael 
encounter aliens, but we do not empathize specifically with Concrete’s personal 
experience. Chadwick chose this specific technology of representation in order to set up a 
graphic body to serve his original concept for the series. A concept, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s account, is a philosophical response to a problem: “all concepts are connected 
to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only 
be isolated or understood as their solution emerges” (What is Philosophy? 16). Chadwick 
explicitly devised this hybrid man/material to allow him to respond to the question of 
“what might really happen to someone whose life was so changed,” to really consider 
what it might be like to be a thing in a world made for humans (Depths 4). “A New Life” 
performs specifically to set up a character whose pre-hybrid life is simultaneously 
illustrated and erased, in order to produce a new protagonist whose new body can be put 
through an endless sequence of everyday challenges and everyday struggles. This is the 
stuff of a material memoir, but not its materialization. The breakdown facilitates the 
sequential emphasis on “what happened next,” purposefully not rendering the “who 
happened next” that will become the subject matter for Chadwick’s whole series. 
Recognizing that it is precisely that affective, personal dimension that is elided in “A 
New Life,” Chadwick returned to Concrete’s origin story, but with a notable difference. 
The six original issues are the first in which Concrete is the narrator. “The time has come 
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to tell my own story,” he begins, “this is what it was like to become Concrete” (Strange 
Armor 9).  
 And with its next sentence, we realize that this is both material memoir and 
ecobiography, and that Concrete is rock and not rock, Ron and not Ron and yet not-not-
Ron either. “Understand first that I was always drawn to the wild places, even as a kid,” 
he begins (Strange Armor 9). Alaimo’s “self of the material memoir—a self that is 
coextensive with the environment, trans-corporeal, and posthumanist” (Bodily Natures 
89) is made doubly visible as this memoir opens with a splash page on which Concrete’s 
distinctive head rises above a mountain range, above an open book on which rests a 
singularly human hand, and beneath the book, we see the smaller figure of a young boy, 
his head resting on one hand as his other hand turns the pages of that same open book. 
Concrete’s autobiography begins biographically with a virtuoso display of graphic 
ekphrasis; Chadwick’s aesthetic choice deploys the remarkable ability that graphic novels 
have to visually and verbally represent (and re-present) verbal and visual representation, 
to turn subjects into objects, objects into subjects.  
 In his oft-referenced Ecology Without Nature, Tim Morton questions the 
functional effect of ekphrasis (which he most often parenthetically defines as “vivid 
description”) when it is used in environmental writing (44, 65, 93). Morton argues against 
what he calls “ecomimesis,” a rhetorical device nature writers use to create atmosphere, 
“to evoke a sense of the reality of nature”—to somehow write their way out of 
representation and into the “real”—a device that Morton claims actually has the opposite 
effect (Ecology Without Nature 30-31). Rather than inducing in the reader the sensory 
reality of the trees and the forest, Morton’s argument runs, this kind of strong ekphrasis 
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overflows the very experience it intends to create, becoming not “less artful, but...more so” 
(Ecology Without Nature 31). The reader’s attention is pulled apart, drawn at the same 
time to an appreciation of what is being described while also appreciating the craft and 
apparatus of that description; the result is that “the dualism of subject and object 
reproduces itself,” despite the writer’s intention, which is that “ekphrasis erases the trace 
of writing” through this “outpouring of language” (Ecology Without Nature 129).  
 Morton effectively argues and supports his claims about why rethinking 
environmental aesthetics requires a shift beyond ecomimesis, but I think his arguments 
about “literary” ekphrasis fail to recognize the alternatively transgressive potential 
inherent in a graphic ekphrasis that can be used to accomplish precisely the effect he 
categorizes as unintentional. Thinking visually, W. J. T. Mitchell notes that ekphrasis 
produces a disorienting and unheimlich “ambivalence about other people, regarded as 
subjects and objects in the field of verbal and visual representation” (Picture Theory 163). 
Ekphrasis expresses “our anxieties about merging with others”; Mitchell goes on to ask a 
question that I would argue is Concrete’s own: “What would it mean for the ekphrastic 
“object” to speak of and for itself in a former time, from the standpoint of a present in 
which it is no longer an object, but has become a subject?” (Picture Theory 163, 185). In 
panel after panel, tinged with memory’s darker register, Concrete recounts the hopes, 
dreams, and very human desires of Ron Lithgow, whose brain is now encased in this 
rock-like exterior. Deleuze and Guattari note “every concept always has a history,” and it 
also “has a becoming” that is characterized by its relationships with other concepts; 
Elizabeth Grosz writes that “life is the protraction of the past into the present, the 
suffusing of matter with memory” (What is Philosophy? 18; “Feminism” 153). Jane 
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Bennett asks whether “nonorganic bodies [can] also have a life,” whether “materiality 
itself [can] be vital”; Concrete asks us to embrace the possibility that life is memory and 
that matter has memory, that “no rock is ever finished, all stones are continually being 
remade, until they vanish from the face of the earth...even then, once reduced to 
windblown dust, they are reforming” (Vibrant Matter 53; Bass 97).  
 In Concrete, the intra-action of memory and matter recalls Barad’s agential 
realism as the bedrock on which Concrete stands. Mineralization has a re-forming effect 
on this pudgy dreamer who “could never truly picture [himself]” at home in the wild 
places he read and dreamed about; emerging out of the agential cut performed by alien 
apparatuses, Concrete discovers that his stony exterior is both nearly impenetrable and 
yet strangely unwieldy; he weighs in at nearly 1200 pounds, he lacks both a nose and 
genitalia, and he has almost no sense of touch but discovers a compensatory and greatly 
increased visual capacity. “Strange Armor” invites us to awaken with him, to discover 
through Concrete’s visual and aural capacities the astonishment of finding in oneself the 
unexpected, of coming literally and figuratively face to face with the strange stranger, 
that “something or someone whose existence we cannot anticipate” (Strange Armor 18; 
Morton, The Ecological Thought 42). It is an astonishing experience—astonishing in 
Charles Scott’s sense that “in astonishment or wonder” we experience a kind of 
perceptual dissonance in which we “perceive something not quite perceptible,” an 
experience that could only occur in intra-action, “I am before no meaningful thing at all 
at the same time that I am with meaningful things” (13).  Chadwick captures Bruno 
Latour’s advice to “start from the middle” by locating us inside Concrete’s becoming, 
using two rows of four identically sized small panels placed above a larger one-panel 
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third row (We Have Never Been Modern 81; Strange Armor 18). In the top two-thirds of 
the page, the panels’ identical size and narrow white guttering encourage us to read 
across them quickly and in order. In the first three, left to right, what appears to be a 
somewhat featureless rocky plane anchors the panels; above it, bold lettering repeats a 
harsh and inexplicable CRUNCH  CRUNCH  CRUNCH that is part of the background 
but manages nonetheless to dominate it, a sound Concrete’s narration describes as “like a 
mouth chewing bits of glass.” Speech balloons seem to emanate from the plane at the 
bottom of each panel, the voice of a confused Ron Lithgow. “Did I fall? I’m not working 
right. I can’t feel—.” “I can’t open my eyes!!” we read in the fourth panel, when, 
impossibly, an eye opens in what had seemed to be the solid rock at the bottom, an eye 
perfectly lined up beneath the narrative text box pasted over it: “Then I did,” Concrete 
narrates. The next row of four panels employs a series of rapid perspective shifts to 
emphasize Concrete’s disorientation as Ron’s brain tries to organize the scene in front of 
him. “I tried to look at my hand,” Concrete narrates in a textbox overlaying an image 
taken straight from an OOO nightmare. We see a real object, a human hand, hovering 
above its shadow (a sensual object or quality?), which is pierced by that lonely eye 
peering upward from a stony mask. “All I saw was a moonscape,” Concrete narrates, and 
the second panel contains a coruscated and corrugated surface that is unrecognizable and 
yet elaborately detailed. In the third panel, perspective shifts again, panning out to allow 
us to see not with Concrete’s eye but with our own, and we see what Ron cannot: a 
faceless alien shape peering at its extended humanoid hand, speaking with Ron’s voice. 
In the fourth panel we, like Ron’s brain, are back inside this alien body, seeing “a weird 
being with Michael’s voice” rocking back and forth, the source of the endless crunching 
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background noise directing us to “Look at the rest of you.” The bottom third of the page 
is a single, shocking image, shocking for Concrete, shocking for Ron, shocking for the 
eye/I that is all three of us: we see Concrete as Ron sees Concrete as Concrete 
experiences himself for the first time. The intra-actions of verbal text and visual image 
make the idea of a first-person narrative into a shockingly arresting pun; in a single page, 
we are folded into the material self, experiencing and performing trans-corporeality in 
nine astonishing panels. 
 This is, I believe, the strength that the graphic novel lends to Alaimo’s notion of 
the material memoir. It is her conviction that a more material ecocriticism, with its 
emphasis on the interactions between multiple bodies and their intra-actions with their 
always already entangled environments, will prompt us to recognize our own imbrication 
in the world we share with them and that that recognition “makes it imperative that we be 
accountable for our practices” (Bodily Natures 156). Concrete certainly models that 
recognition and that desire for accountability in his place in the local/global community. 
In Desert Solitaire, Edward Abbey may intone piously, “For my own part I seldom take 
rocks home, no matter where I might find them; in my opinion they are best enjoyed in 
situ” but he typically subverts his own moralizing by noting that rocks are far from 
stationary and that in situ simply means wherever God “so to speak” or Nature “have 
seen fit to deposit them” (61). As the intelligent designer of the Concrete universe, 
Chadwick deposits Concrete first in Los Angeles and later moves him to suburban Eagle 
Rock, California, deliberately staging a messy mesh of persons and practices that the 
evolving Concrete persona must adapt to. Almost from the beginning of his story, 
Concrete is forcefully made aware that his new and alien body has an enormous impact 
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on his environment, in the most mundane and everyday sense. He needs a custom chair 
built of concrete blocks because his weight is more than most made-for-mankind 
furniture can bear; he needs a pickup truck with power and a wide bed because he cannot 
readily fit his oversized body into a normal passenger vehicle. The environmental adage 
to “tread lightly” is massively difficult for this monumental character, and yet 
paradoxically because his carbon footprint is so outsized, he is hyper-concerned with 
environmental issues. In the short story “Objects of Value,” Concrete tries to connect his 
alien diet (he does not need traditional food but must consume an inorganic diet of rock 
and metal in order to replenish his rocky exterior) to a personal recycling commitment 
(Think Like a Mountain 157-164). He wonders if he can simply ingest the waste lying 
around that is not suitable for recycling...but then realizes that toxic substances like heavy 
metals would simply precipitate into his crust, which he continually sheds back into the 
environment (Think Like a Mountain 158). Even his seemingly impenetrable body is less 
fortified than you might think; trans-corporeality is a material reality for Concrete’s body 
like any other. “Fragile Creature” opens with Concrete’s frustration as he copes with the 
rising costs of trying to convert his home to solar power; economic pressures make 
individual environmental compliance hard for Concrete and for all of us (Fragile 
Creature). “A New Life” and “Strange Armor” may represent two iterations of 
Concrete’s emerging material self, but there are other stories that serve more specifically 
to document Concrete’s maturing environmental consciousness as well. Think Like a 
Mountain is Chadwick’s most sustained effort to show us Concrete’s struggle to 
reinscribe his material body as the subject and the substance of an ecological body. 
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 Think Like a Mountain first appeared in 1996 in comics format, in six issues 
sequentially numbered and titled “Green Fire,” “Hidden Graveyard,” “Arms and Boxes,” 
“Weight of the World,” “Nightwork,” and “Charismatic Megafauna.” The series was 
republished in 1997 as a square-bound single-volume graphic novel, without pagination 
or the individual episode titles, and rereleased again in 2006 as Concrete 5 – Think Like A 
Mountain. Think Like a Mountain reflects Chadwick’s own environmental sensibility 
even as it documents Concrete’s political radicalization, a trans-corporeal dance of art 
and life, author and text (just as Grant Morrison writes his own concerns about animal 
cruelty into the texts of Animal Man and We3). Chadwick introduces the 1997 graphic 
novel with an essay, “The Sea Around Us,” recalling his childhood summers spent on 
Puget Sound and sharing some insights about the intermingling bodies and practices of 
the marine ecology he first encountered there...and which return, visually, in this text. His 
introduction to the rereleased collected volume, dated February 2006 from his home in 
Friday Harbor, Washington, betrays a darker, less holistically hopeful sensibility. “There 
are many injustices, gathering threats, and ongoing atrocities in our wounded world,” he 
writes, and goes on to claim “If humanity endures (I’d say global climate change and the 
famine it threatens are its greatest threat), it will be in an ever-more-ragged world, with 
fewer organisms sharing it, more deserts, more social breakdown, a vast catalogue of loss” 
(Think Like a Mountain 4). In Think Like a Mountain, Chadwick illustrates the evolution 
of a rematerialized environmental activist out of the elemental matter that Catriona 
Sandilands locates in the “ecologically docile body of modern environmentalism” (20). 
 Sandilands begins, as I noted in my discussion of Chew, by expanding Foucault’s 
biopolitics to a consideration of how environmental rhetoric produces what she identifies 
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as ecologically docile bodies, “a new subject-body cultivated by environmentally-
oriented disciplines,” one that “reduces, reuses, and recycles as acts of personal, not only 
planetary, salvation” (20). If, as Vladimir Vernadsky claims, “We are walking, talking 
minerals” because of our trans-corporeal entanglement with the material world (qtd. in 
Bennett, Vibrant Matter 60), then our mineralized ecological bodies “walk to work, now, 
with the taste of ethics in our mouths” (Sandilands 20). This modern environmental self 
is not simply molded by the disciplinary constraints of trying to live more sustainably in a 
rapidly expanding global village; its docility in the face of sometimes stringent 
restrictions on personal behavior is also motivated by the rewarding and pleasurable 
sense of becoming a member of “an ecological body politic” (Sandilands 20). Sandilands 
fears that a dormant discourse of normativity is buried beneath this rhetoric of 
environmental governmentality; writing from the perspective of queer theory, she calls on 
“critical ecological thinkers [to] focus on the “queer” question of the modes by which 
bodies are materialized in the midst of conflicting ecological desires,” to resist the ways 
that “dominant environmental discourses continue to produce ideally bounded bodies in 
the midst of the increasingly obvious reality of their leakiness and vulnerability” (30).10 
What I propose here is to examine how Concrete’s materialization in the 1997 full-color 
Think Like a Mountain is both normative and queer, materializing and rematerializing, in 
ways that explore the potential in becoming an ecological body while resisting a 
normative ideal. 
 Concrete’s ecobiography begins with our hero at home alone, sitting in front of 
his television set, watching a fictional show set in the afterlife; tonight’s episode is about 
environmental civil disobedience, and an activist’s tale of how he died using his body to 
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halt a munitions train. “Nothing boosts a movement like a martyr,” the dead activist 
concludes. “So damn smug,” thinks Concrete. In a succession of panels, Concrete 
rationalizes the personal, local, and global effects of environmental damage against its 
costs. “Everybody compromises,” he thinks, “you just have to live.” Evoking Aldo 
Leopold’s Sand County Almanac, the canonical environmental text in which Leopold 
famously proposes his land ethic—“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, 
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”—
Chadwick deftly renders the normative simplicity of Leopold’s earnest statement 
pragmatically and morally complicated (Leopold 224-225). “Wish I could bury myself,” 
Concrete’s thought balloons drift away on the night air. “Be part of this hill, aloof...See 
the pain of the world as transitory, trivial...Just lie here, thinking mountain thoughts.” 
After all, he thinks, “the aliens buried me, my brain, in this stone body.” His physical 
immobility is replicated here with a further artistic flourish; Concrete’s head breaks the 
wall of the panel, indicating that, perhaps, he thinks too much. “I am,” he muses further, 
“drawn to the earth,” a pun that disrupts the deepening mood of futility just as Concrete 
remembers that he has places to go, people to see. His loneliness and alienation are 
deeply etched in the opening of this novel—setting the stage for his slow seduction and 
incorporation by a group of environmental activists who approach him to join them in 
protest against a massive logging operation in northern Washington State. Ambivalent 
about the effectiveness of environmental rhetoric and tactics, Concrete’s skepticism first 
leads to his rejection by the group; Chadwick uses text and image to make it clear that 
Concrete feels this both ideologically and corporeally—he is rejected for his intellectual 
attitude and quickly sinks into a catatonic state. He maps his rejection onto his alien 
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immobile body, but he also realizes that this same body could be instrumentalized, 
gaining him acceptance into this “activist family.” On the facing page, we see that this is 
the case: against a bright white background, Concrete is now buried under human bodies, 
part of the group instead of opposed to it. Sandilands certainly recognizes the pleasure of 
belonging, of being incorporated into “the environmental body”; her concern is what she 
outlines as the price of this belonging: a willing submission to a set of doctrinal and 
disciplinary codes and intrusive behaviors in order to sustain membership (20-21). She 
argues that “we thus become ecological bodies in return for a certain sense of security, a 
bourgeois wellbeing produced the by knowledge that we have made the ‘right’ corporeal 
choices,” and initially I would agree that Concrete certainly seems to have traded one set 
of rhetorical discourses (scientific and technical) for another (the activist rhetoric of a 
group that describes itself as the radical Other of Earth First!). 
 Much of Concrete’s initial enlistment by these four young activists consists in his 
steadfast refusal to do more than observe and record their activities; he questions the 
negative effects of their “extremism and tactics,” and wants to indemnify himself against 
the public and legal consequences of their “monkeywrenching.” Concrete finds himself 
backed up against his own wall, protesting precisely the rhetoric he must take on if he is 
to be one with them. “If I was so much as associated with you, I’d be typed as a radical 
environmentalist. I’m not. I’m a moderate environmentalist, one who hates confrontation” 
he emphasizes. His tendency to watch events rather than participate in them has been 
well established over the course of the series; his collection of large nudes frequently 
serves as the backdrop for his daily living—a collection he somewhat defensively 
justifies by pointing out that “the graceful, nude female form will always represent for me 
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the ideal of perfect beauty (perhaps because of sheer oppositeness to my gross 
unloveliness” (The Human Dilemma 29) —and, as I noted, this ecobiography begins with 
Concrete cemented to his version of a recliner in front of the TV. In the first fourteen 
pages of this issue, Chadwick depicts Concrete either sitting (in poses deliberately 
reminiscent of Rodin’s “Thinker” and the Buddha) or lying down over two dozen times, 
rising and reseating himself each time his mind changes. 
 Yet ultimately, he knows that his body will be the price of admission to this 
activist assemblage (and we have come to know this as well...looking back to the warm 
scene of Concrete surrounded by supportive activists, we notice that one of them is 
saying, “Night vision! Man, what you could do...”). “A choice isn’t real when it’s merely 
in your mind,” he realizes. “Your body makes it real. An action.” He commits to 
participating in an act of outright sabotage, destroying logging equipment, and goes on to 
“star” in an act of creative ecomythology. Concrete becomes Sasquatch, disguising his 
own alien body with a fabulous one, complete with furry genitalia to misdirect the 
skeptical media gaze this stunt is designed to attract...but then Chadwick’s story takes a 
sobering and cautionary turn. Precisely as foreshadowed in the opening pages of this 
graphic novel, one of the activists is killed; his martyrdom accomplishes the goal of 
prompting permanent protection for the endangered forest. The leaders attribute 
Concrete’s actions to their fallen comrade; he sits concealed by the trees his actions 
helped to protect, alone again, watching the public memorial service and pointing out the 
distortions, as well as the strengths, of the rhetoric he hears in the distance. The final page 
of Think Like a Mountain shows us Concrete seated again, at home with his books and 
with Maureen and Larry, chatting on the phone with one of the surviving activists. In the 
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concluding panel, he rises again, wholly in silhouette...an anonymous body but not a 
docile one; refusing to join an offshore whaling protest, he closes this ecobiography with 
clear and convincing commitment. “If you get something going, land-based...and you 
think I could make a difference...call me.” It is a moment that suggests that bodies truly 
are the foundation of activist work, not individual bodies but an amalgam of singular 
bodies working together. Concrete’s indistinctly rendered figure rises here to suggest a 
readiness to exercise its capacity in the future, a capacity that is everyone’s and anyone’s. 
It is a moment that solidifies Chadwick’s identification of the more-than-normative 
interpretation of Leopold’s familiar phrase. “Thinking like a mountain,” he concludes, in 
a rare postlude to the graphic novel, “suggests we take the long view.” For Concrete, that 
long view includes looking beyond “my gross unloveliness” to see instead that difference 
can make a difference (The Human Dilemma 29). 
 Sandilands concludes her essay by proposing a vision for an alternative to an 
ecological body turned inward and made docile by fear: fear of the very trans-
corporeality that material memoirs understand as both transformative and productive. She 
suggests that the diversity valorized by both expanded posthumanist materialism and 
queer performance theory might encourage the imagination of a less inflexibly drawn 
ecological body. “Not only do we bear the traces of the other in our bodily rituals of 
repetition,” she suggests, “but we can expand phenomenal experience by taking in and 
taking on the other, an intentional and ethical act of opening to its possibility” 
(Sandilands 26). Sandilands’s essay is underscored by her participation in and 
appreciation of the principles of Japanese Butoh dance. “Dance,” she writes, “is the 
animated tension of the body held between external and internal influences. The dancer 
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doesn’t perform an image, say, as an act of willful mimesis; he practices taking it in and 
taking it on” (Sandilands 34). Comics, recall, is also a dance, a dance of words and 
images animated by a hybrid tension deep in its center that both says something and does 
something at the same time. For me, the capacity of the graphic novel to invite its readers 
to enter and perform with and as the characters whose perceptions we share in the intra-
actions between panel and panel, panel and page, holds much the same promise. In 
“Fiber,” his heartfelt plea for protection of the forests of Montana’s Yaak Valley, writer 
and activist Rick Bass queries, “Who knows what’s inside anything? More and more I’m 
trying not to look back at who I was, or even who I am, but at the land itself. I’m trying to 
let the land tell me who and what I am” (127). At a moment of deep frustration over 
whether or not to become a performer on the environmental stage, Concrete asks himself, 
“Why can’t my mind catch up with what my body has become?” Chadwick concluded 
the 1997 graphic novel edition of Think Like a Mountain with six pages of text, the 
aggregate of his Author’s Forums from the start of each of the original comics issues. In 
“Background,” he traces the history of Earth First! and its similarities and differences 
with the more radical Earth Liberation Front. He quotes from popular ecobiographies like 
Edward Abbey’s The Monkey Wrench Gang and Dave Foreman’s Confessions of an Eco-
Warrior (Foreman was one of four cofounders of Earth First!). He includes photographs 
of seven different sources for information about environmental activism and the various 
organizations that have emerged from it, along with commenting generously about his 
own uneasy feelings about the range of rhetoric and tactics these groups employ. He 
emphasizes that he spent five years researching the story behind his story, and he stresses, 
“It educated me mightily.” In Concrete, I think Chadwick shows us that becoming an 
  
199 
ecological body clearly also requires that we bring our minds and hearts to the task, along 
with our multiple and various bodies. We take on and take in the Other, not leaving our 
material selves behind but opening our docile bodies to their contradictory, animating 
energies. 
  Greg Garrard responds to Catriona Sandilands’s essay with a well-argued concern 
that linking rhetoric about pollution to normative discourse that demonizes other-than-
heterodox bodies could inadvertently “be toxic to environmentalism itself;” he concludes 
his essay suggesting that “if environmental critics don’t enact an ecocentric bias, who 
will?” (512). Concrete, I submit, illustrates one of the most provocative and productive 
claims of material ecocritics: that nothing is set in stone, and that there are no normative 
bodies, really...just silhouettes of trans-corporeal intersections (and inter-sex-ions?) with 
astonishing capacities for commitment to our radically more-than-human existence. His 
ecobiographical material memoir firmly demonstrates that when Concrete finally 
(be)comes into his own, his material ecological self emerges from the tensions immanent 
in those intra-actions, between mind and body, human and Other. What could such an 




















1 Philosophers of object-oriented-ontology (OOO) carefully distinguish themselves from 
materialists by calling themselves “speculative realists” and by disavowing materialist 
interests in monism, vitalism, or what is sometimes considered “process theory.” 
Nevertheless, like materialists, speculative realists place the being of objects at the center 
of their ontology, displacing the human from the center at the same time. Clearly OOO 
shares new materialism’s focus on matter and material feminism’s interest in posthuman 
agency...but there are significant differences as well. I will delay those explanations until 
later in this chapter.  
 
2 In Chapter 3 of Meeting the Universe Halfway, “Niels Bohr’s Philosophy-Physics,” 
Barad expands Bohr’s questions about the accuracy and adequacy of experimental 
practices and their relationship to scientific knowledge production to support her own 
theory of agential realism. To oversimplify, Bohr’s claim that measurements designed to 
determine whether light manifests either wave-like or particle-like qualities are in a sense 
tainted by their own purposiveness and that both behaviors “are exhibited under 
complementary—that is, mutually exclusive—circumstances” (106). It is a bit like 
Latour’s arguments that a hybrid ought not to be analyzed in terms of either one or the 
other of its constituent parts; the same complementarity will lead to one part being under-
analyzed as a result of its incompatibility with the terms of the other. For Barad, Bohr’s 
critical insight is that “concepts are defined by the circumstances required for their 
measurement,” that experimental apparatuses construct the results they obtain (109). In 
Mind and Nature, biologist, psychologist, and cybernetics pioneer Gregory Bateson used 
this same notion of recursiveness to forecast the effects of “calibration and feedback” in a 
“world of adaptive action,” where outcomes are potentially (and sometimes dangerously) 
affected by the unintended consequences of amplifying relays of trial and error (188). 
Barad’s interest in Bohr’s contribution is that it provides a material dimension for 
something like social construction—that “in Bohr’s proto-performative 
account...theorizing must be understood as an embodied practice” (54); Bateson’s 
concern is that our learn-by-doing approach to environmental problems is problematic in 
itself. “We are not outside the ecology for which we plan,” he cautions, “we are always 
and inevitably a part of it” (Steps to an Ecology of Mind 512).   
   
3 Alaimo and Hekman make it clear that while “new materialism” and “material 
feminism” overlap, “materialist” feminism is distinctly different. Closely aligned with the 
projects of Marxist feminism, “materialist feminism” is keenly concerned with issues of 
“race, sexuality, imperialism and colonialism, and anthropocentrism” while also sharing 
Marxist feminism’s focus on issues of class. See note 3, pp. 17-18, for a detailed 
discussion of these subtle distinctions. 
 
4 Artistic erasure and its connection to the invisible desired is not limited to Walsh’s 
imaginary. One of my husband’s junior high classmates was infamous for bringing his 
younger brother’s coloring book to school and displaying typical black and white pages 




the female pilgrims’ clothing. Once only their “embodied” outlines remained, he 
creatively filled them back in with those desired but previously invisible assets...a 
distribution of the sensible that still renders my husband helpless with laughter when he 
recounts the story. 
 
5 Emphasis on the reality of object assemblages animates much of Timothy Morton’s turn 
to OOO; in fact, it is his focus on what he calls “hyperobjects” (vast objects like climate 
change and superstorms) that Bennett finds most provocative and that I will return to in 
my concluding chapter. See Jane Bennett, “Systems and Things,” 229-230 for her 
response to Morton’s argument. 
 
6 Tony Poulson recommended the Chew series to me, for which I am appropriately 
grateful. 
 
7 I am indebted to Walter Biggins for suggesting Chadwick’s Concrete series as a site of 
the graphic novel’s engagement with the “mineral.” 
 
8 In 2005 and 2006, Dark Horse Books began rereleasing Paul Chadwick’s Concrete in 
seven collected volumes. Each volume begins with one of Chadwick’s six-issue series 
and typically, although not always, also bears the title of that first series (Vol. 1, Depths, 
is an exception: 1987’s Concrete #1 was titled “A Stone Among Stones,” which is the 
first story in the collected volume). These rereleased collections contain black and white 
versions of the original color issues (sometimes identified as chapters), followed by some 
of the many graphic short stories that Chadwick also produced. The collections are 
arranged thematically rather than chronologically, and they are paginated, unlike the 
originals. My reading will rely on both the rereleased collections and the original issues 
where I have been able to obtain them, and I will distinguish between them as necessary. 
 
9 Never able to resist his own puns, Chadwick finally does provide Concrete with a 
chance to redeem himself in Strange Armor. Embracing this new persona as the necessary 
condition of his freedom, Concrete deems himself in this second iteration of his origin 
story. “I’m...Concrete,” he announces to a large public gathering. The expository text box 
that follows notes, “That pretty much cemented the name” (Strange Armor 75). 
  
10 For a thoughtful analysis and response to Sandilands, see Greg Garrard, “Nature 
Cures? or How to Police Analogies of Personal and Ecological Health,” in ISLE 19.3 
(2012): 494-514. Countering Sandilands’s concerns about the normative effects of 
pollution or immune discourse, Garrard hazards that “it does not seem impossible that we 
might be able to depathologize and destigmatize queer bodies without having to 
(rhetorically) detoxify pollution” (512). I think this is precisely what Chadwick attempts 
in Concrete. 
  
CONCLUSION: MAKING ECOCRITICISM MATTER 
 
 
 Don’t picture this: portions of the Cook Islands disappear entirely during a 
catastrophic storm in January. More storms decimate major Atlantic shipping lanes. Oil 
platforms off the coast of California erupt into flames following a seismic event and burn 
out of control continuously. Underwater marine geography off the North American coast 
is inexplicably and irrevocably altered; in North Africa, there is a wholesale die-off of 
Bluefin tuna, and whales have vanished from sanctuaries in the southern oceans. Changes 
in weather patterns have caused wind farms in China to cease production. “Landslides, 
oil spills, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis” have become commonplace 
planetary events, “exploding the global economy, killing untold millions, and 
destabilizing first- and third-world governments alike” (Wood, Black Pacific). Don’t 
think about those spectacular Hollywood blockbusters like The Road and The Day After 
Tomorrow, inviting you to witness the dramatic end of the world. This is not, as Jamais 
Cascio notes in his introduction to Black Pacific, “a disaster movie”—it is “a true 
disaster,” one in which “millions have died, in dirty, tragic, and decidedly noncinematic 
ways.” I am asking you not to visualize that true disaster, not to take time to smell the 
schadenfreude that lingers in the aftermath of a catastrophic event when you and yours 
escape unharmed; instead, I want you to picture the painstakingly slow iterations of what 




 if not demonstrably causally, connected. You are not safely outside those events—you 
are inside their viscous immediacy, intimately implicated in their materiality. You are at 
some time in the future present, location 55.153766, 167.827148 or 54.521081, 
170.793457 or Gromsvötn, Iceland, or Firenze, Italy, or New York City.  
 This is the world of The Massive, Brian Wood’s recently launched comic series 
about that disorienting (un)imaginable postevental life. Tim Morton would call this the 
time of the hyperobjects. It is also Ulrich Beck’s risk society, “a catastrophic society” in 
which “the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm” (Risk Society 24). In his 
evolving theory of world risk society, Beck ponders how pluralistic communities of fate 
that cohere in anticipation of global risks (and in the aftermath of their materially 
consequential manifestation as catastrophic events) might evolve politically and socially. 
Material ecocriticism, resonating between the Deleuzean discourse of the new 
materialists (Jane Bennett, William Connolly, and Rosi Braidotti, for example) and 
Morton’s object-oriented ontological engagement with hyperobjects, analyzes how the 
environmental imagination copes with an ecological present that is increasingly 
contingent not only on past practices but on the lengthening shadow of a conditional 
future. “In risk society,” Beck suggests, “the past loses the power to determine the 
present. Its place is taken by the future...we become active today in order to prevent, 
alleviate, or take precautions against the problems and crises of tomorrow and the day 
after tomorrow” (Risk Society 34). Morton similarly speculates that hyperobjects, “things 
that are massively distributed in time and space relative to humans,” like global warming, 
radiation, and air pollution, are “messages in bottles from the future” (Hyperobjects 1, 




elide the past in this necessary apprehension of future consequences.1 Citing William 
Faulkner’s pronouncement in 1951’s Requiem for a Nun that “the past is never dead. It’s 
not even past,” Nixon rightly argues that ecocritical attention must comprehend the 
temporal magnitude of ecological risks along with their massive spatial scale (Slow 
Violence 8). In Chapter 1, I noted Nixon’s emphasis on the need for representational 
strategies to make visible the environmental imperceptible; in Beck’s proposed world risk 
society, representation is just as critical. He emphasizes that it is “only by imagining and 
staging world risk” that a future event can be made real (thus encouraging us to act upon 
it) before its actual occurrence (World at Risk 10). “Because this constant danger shapes 
our expectations, lodges in our heads and guides our actions, it becomes a political force 
that transforms the world”; because representation of risk shapes our perception of it, 
representation has material and affective power as well (Beck, World at Risk 10). 
“Sometimes it happens,” John Berger argues, “that a question is for a moment more 
pertinent than answers or explanations” (Hold Everything Dear 113). Ecocriticism reads 
the intersections and intra-actions of objects human and nonhuman in contexts local and 
global, and it queries the particular (and political) distributions of the sensible that 
structure how specific texts image the thing. Its analysis of the aesthetic technologies of 
graphic novels and comics—the horizontal (as well as vertical) movement of storylines, 
the distinctively concentric enmeshment (from panel to page to storyworld) of a medium 
that is both local and global, and the commitment to closure it both solicits and resists—
dramatically challenges the strengths and weaknesses of image+texts in the time of 




questions and because it challenges those representations; in the process, I believe, it 
moves us to do so as well. 
 
Performing Ecocriticism After the Narrative is Over:  
Chasing The Massive 
 
The only question is: How do we deal with nature after it ends? 
(Ulrich Beck, World at Risk 90) 
 
 What does it mean to live on after the end of nature, after the end of the world? 
Who is this “we” that coheres after the risk hits the fan? These are the questions lying just 
beneath the surface of the contemporary comics series, The Massive, from which my 
opening paragraph draws its graphic content. In twelve issues to date, collected into two 
volumes (Black Pacific and Subcontinental), author Brian Wood and an assemblage of 
artists reconstruct (and subsequently deconstruct) what Beck calls “enforced 
cosmopolitanism,” a radically plural community of survivors “lost and adrift in the chaos” 
of “a post-war, post Crash, post-disaster, post-everything world” (The Massive #1).2 Beck 
posits that “an incomprehensible community emerges corresponding to the 
incomprehensibility of the problem,” a disparate collection of bodies defined more by 
their need for survival than by the desire for equality that united the proletariat, 
modernity’s first plural political subject (Risk Society 49). This community-to-come of 
what we might then call the political subjects of risk society results from what Beck 
describes as enforced cosmopolitanism. “Global risks activate and connect actors across 
borders who otherwise don’t want to have anything to do with one another,” he suggests 
(World at Risk 61). Beck wonders whether such an inconvenient troop, “trapped in a 
shared global space of threats,” largely assembled by shared anxieties, shared fears, and 




Risk Society 49). He hypothesizes that “the tendency is towards the emergence of 
individualized forms and conditions of existence, which compel people—for the sake of 
their own material survival—to make themselves the center of their own planning and 
conduct of life” (Risk Society 88). An attentive reading of this passage suggests that Beck 
is not dismissing this tendency as a conservative refusal to explore new possibilities 
while nostalgically preserving the habits of a life that ended with the familiar world. 
Instead, Beck emphasizes the productive potential of an emergent subjectivity that is 
responsively and recursively interpellated by equally emergent—and radically 
unfamiliar—clear and (future) present dangers. Speculative political theorist William 
Connolly, whose writing is frequently affiliated with that of contemporary new 
materialists, has also dedicated much of his recent work to crafting an image of this 
“world of becoming,” which he anticipates as “a world in which changes in some systems 
periodically make a difference to the efficacy and direction of others” (World of 
Becoming 27). “A predicament,” he argues, “is a situation lived and felt from the inside. 
It is also something you seek strategies to ameliorate or rise above” (World of Becoming 
97).  
 Certainly the crew of the conservationist ship Kapital, the communal risk subject 
of Brian Wood’s The Massive, provides us with a heterogeneous yet singular subject for 
material ecocritical consideration. A divergent group of nomadic maritime eco-activists 
find themselves trapped at sea in their relatively smaller craft, cut off from their larger 
sister ship, The Massive, because of the proliferating series of ecocatastrophes I asked 
you not to picture as this chapter opened. The first panels represent an oddly static scene 




inside an approximate location, and inside the close quarters of the Kapital’s bridge. We 
are abruptly entangled with an assortment of unidentified individuals whose attention is 
focused outward, on a weak radio signal that could be from The Massive...or not; they 
cannot be sure because The Massive is always withdrawn, an object that beckons from 
the past and from the future simultaneously, like the swarm of risks that have already 
conditioned the ecology of this text (although we, as readers, do not even know that yet). 
Knowledge comes to us in fragments, dispersed across the panels on a “need to know” 
basis, suggestive again of the immediacy of this situation, and confirming another of 
Beck’s speculations: in risk society, there is a widening gap between “those afflicted by 
risks and those who profit from them,” so knowledge becomes a key commodity (Risk 
Society 46). What we need, as Beck suggests, are “ideas and theories that will allow us to 
conceive the new which is rolling over us in a new way,” but for the moment we do not 
know who these people are and we do not know if we want to know them (Risk Society 
12). The Massive’s imaginative confluence of image and text stages the problematic 
assembling of strange strangers emerging after our familiar world ends, “after the 
narrative is over,” in the new world risk society (Beck, Risk Society 12). An ecocritical 
reading of its image+text confluence must consider how and why it conceives the new as 
it does. 
 Specifically acknowledging the work of Beck and other risk theorists, ecocritic 
Ursula Heise argues the need for a crucial expansion of contemporary “ecological 
awareness and environmental ethics” in a world that is increasingly global in its social, 
economic, and environmental experiences (Sense of Place 55). “The challenge for 




of place to a less territorial and more systemic sense of planet” (Sense of Place 56). With 
particular emphasis on the largely local, place-based rhetoric that characterized U.S. 
environmentalism (particularly in the latter half of the 20th century), Heise proposes a 
turn towards a more deterritorialized “eco-cosmopolitan subject,” specifically relying on 
an anthropological and sociological use of the term deterritorialization to highlight “the 
detachment of social and cultural practices from their ties to place that have been 
described in detail in theories of modernization and postmodernization,” especially in 
conjunction with analyses of the interpenetration of the local by the global that circulate 
within theories of world risk (Sense of Place 51). In her thoughtful critique, Heise applies 
deterritorialization beyond the mobile, diasporic, nomadic subject increasingly distanced 
from some home base or territory; she also uses sociologist John Tomlinson’s work to 
highlight “the paradigmatic experience of global modernity for most people,” which is 
“that of staying in one place but experiencing the ‘dis-placement’ that global modernity 
brings to them” (Tomlinson qtd. in Heise, Sense of Place 52). The various issues of The 
Massive irregularly but frequently interrupt brief exchanges of dialogue with stark 
depictions of the material effects of multiple catastrophic events on familiar places, 
indigenous peoples, and an array of animate and inanimate objects. Heavy use of a 
didactic, impersonal third person narrative emphasizes the global scale of the storyline 
and tends to obscure the rare use of local dialects at specific sites of encounter. Character 
development is episodic and insufficient. The Massive’s protagonists are doubly 
deterritorialized—they are literally and nomadically at sea, repeatedly encountering 
radically altered environments that should be familiar but are not, and their origin stories 




The Massive, has vanished, location unknown. Kristian Donaldson illustrates the primary 
storyline, but J. P. Leon provides chapter art; the noticeable differences in their styles 
support this contradictory overlapping sense of familiar and unfamiliar territory. The 
artists represent location using decimal degrees, an expression of latitude and longitude in 
decimal fractions used to accurately identify locations in GPS devices and in web 
mapping applications like Google maps. The story opens at 55.153766, 167.827148, 
“near Kamchatka Peninsula.” We can, with some accuracy, pinpoint where the action is 
taking place, but in most instances, what is familiarly local about those locations has been 
utterly displaced by the environmental catastrophes of the preceding year. 
 Other technologies of graphic representation further enhance The Massive’s sense 
of random and inscrutable threats that continually destabilize the familiar. Voiced 
impersonally, in a flatly omniscient narrative using clearly machinic type in blue boxes 
superimposed over three thinly separated monochromatic sepia panels, disparate 
locations are metonymically conflated, vertically and horizontally. All have been affected 
in some fashion by this series of catastrophic events; boats, fish, water, Third World 
indigenes, factory, wind turbine, First World environmentalists, glaciers—Donaldson 
shows us not the event but the flat ontology of its affects. Flat ontology is a term that 
OOO philosopher Levi Bryant borrows from Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory; 
asserting that “flat ontology argues that all entities are on equal ontological footing,” 
Bryant stresses that “the broader strategic import of the concept of flat ontology is to 
diminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective, and the cultural” in order to 
“cultivate a greater appreciation for nonhuman actors such as animate and inanimate 




two claims for flat ontology that seem largely consistent with new materialism’s interest 
in posthuman agency: “humans are not at the center of being, but are among beings,” and 
“objects are not a pole opposing a subject, but exist in their own right, regardless of 
whether any other object or human relates to them” (Democracy of Objects 249, italics 
original). Donaldson’s artistic choices achieve precisely this sense of the democracy of 
beings that Bryant wants to convey in his object-oriented arguments and that Beck also 
claims for risk society in his often-quoted phrase, “poverty is hierarchic, smog is 
democratic” (Risk Society 36, italics original). Beck argues that in the face of  
“modernization risks,” an emerging risk society displays little class stratification. Instead, 
“social differences and limits are relativized. Objectively, risks display an equalizing 
effect within their scope and among those affected by them” (Risk Society 36, italics 
original). In the graphic risk society of The Massive, catastrophe clearly does not 
discriminate in its spatially and temporally dispersed effects—animal, vegetable, mineral, 
and machine, city and citizenry, air, land, and sea, all feel its strange embrace. Later on in 
this chapter, I will examine Beck’s assertion about risk’s equalizing effect more closely. 
For now, however, I want to focus on the confluence of aesthetics and experience and of 
representation and risk that Tim Morton’s extensive engagement with hyperobjects 
makes visible. Do the emerging risk subjects we follow in the pages of The Massive 
display democratic equality because risk’s ontologically inherent flatness affects them 
equally?  
 Jacques Rancière grounds his topographical analysis on mapping those moments 
when representation confers visibility on the previously unseen, when we experience an 




ontologically and politically entropic time. Equality in Rancièrian terms is distributed 
unequally. Displacement, in the time of hyperobjects, describes how the emergent 
subject/object of risk society experiences this asymmetrical encounter with an inscrutable 
and always withdrawn other, with what Tim Morton calls the strange stranger. In the 
opening scene of Black Pacific, the experience of the just-out-of-range, barely audible 
signal that may or may not be The Massive conveys that destabilizing uncertainty that 
displacement induces. “Is it The Massive?” asks one character, “Give me your gut 
feeling.” “It feels the same as last time...I think it’s them again,” responds another. “The 
overall aesthetic ‘feel’ of the time of hyperobjects is a sense of asymmetry between the 
infinite powers of cognition and the infinite being of things,” Morton argues, and his 
explication of these massively distributed objects, of their sensual qualities, their 
appearance-for others, and their resistance to anything like total or complete 
comprehension must inform any ecocritical reading of The Massive (Hyperobjects 22). 
While acknowledging that “humans have been aware of enormous entities—some real, 
some imagined—for as long as they have existed,” Morton clarifies that by hyperobjects 
he is specifically exploring those large entities (like climate) that have only recently 
drawn our attention, entities that “cause us to reflect on our very place on Earth and in the 
cosmos”—those very things that Beck’s modernization risk apprehends (Hyperobjects 
15). Beck insists that “risk is not a thing” and that “risks do not exist independently, like 
things,” but I suspect he protests too much (World at Risk 140, 195). As I noted earlier, 
he certainly acknowledges risk’s agency, its power to shape reaction and response. 
Morton is less inclined to disentangle hyperobjects from the risks they pose, and he is 




that accomplish “what Sigmund Freud considered the great humiliation of the human” 
(Hyperobjects 16). Hyperobjects accomplish a kind of “double displacement,” radically 
preempting humans from their perceived centrality in the signifying world and also 
denying them the ability to take up a position outside it; in the Age of Asymmetry, 
Morton contends, “we are always inside an object” (Hyperobjects 17). This gives 
hyperobjects a kind of sticky, viscous quality—“like faces pressed against a window, 
they leer at me menacingly: their very nearness is what menaces” (Morton, Hyperobjects 
27). The cramped quarters of the Kapital are filled with too many unidentified characters, 
crowding into panels that abruptly shift perspectives; faces are suddenly too close, staring 
directly at us and invading our personal space. Hyperobjects subject us to an uncanny and 
uncomfortable aesthetic, a redistribution of the sensible that makes visible an enforced 
intimacy: “objects thrust themselves towards us in a cramped or claustrophobic pictorial 
space”; hyperobjects make it “clearer with every passing day that ‘distance’ is only a 
psychic and ideological construct designed to protect me from the nearness of things” 
(Morton, Hyperobjects 76, 27). We want distance, therefore we create it, by 
unconsciously deploying something like comics’ breakdown to produce a little space (the 
gutter!) between our panel and theirs. To repartition Scott McCloud’s description of 
comics, it’s a way of seeing and a way of drawing: drawing distinctions between us and 
those other objects whose nearness we would rather not acknowledge (31). Morton uses 
the hyperobject global warming to illustrate other aspects of hyperobjects, qualities he 
identifies as nonlocality and temporal undulation. Local manifestations of global 
warming are simply “false immediacies,” the hyperobject’s appearance-for some other 




many things are distributed pieces” (Hyperobjects 48). Snow in Florida, no snow in 
Utah—these physical symptoms are ontologically aesthetic effects, a meteorological 
distribution of the sensible [qualities] of a real object that is always, in an object-oriented 
ontological sense, withdrawn from us. So withdrawn, in fact, that we experience a kind of 
temporal backwash in the gap between us and the hyperobject as well—in Morton’s 
terms, “time is not a neutral container in which objects float, but is instead an emission of 
objects themselves” (Hyperobjects 67). Global warming has a kind of nonteleological 
vectoral effect, he argues, noting “plant and animal life events have gone out of sync” as 
a result, but our apprehension of these kinds of effects is only partial—“we can only see 
pieces of hyperobjects at a time,” never the whole (Hyperobjects 67, 70). He likens this 
“strange mereology” to a kind of indexical metonymy—just as a weathervane is an 
indexical sign that is not the same thing as that which it indicates (it is not the wind, it is 
the wind-driven sign of the wind), so too the various effects of global warming that we 
experience (altered weather patterns, rapid glacial melting) are indicators of it, not the 
whole of it (Hyperobjects 77). Hyperobjects, therefore, make us hyperconscious of what 
Morton describes as the mesh, his graphic metaphor for “the strange interconnectedness 
of things, an interconnectedness that does not allow for perfect, lossless transmission of 
information, but is instead full of gaps and absences” (Hyperobjects 83). In The Massive, 
the braiding of images, gutters, and narrative text that jumps abruptly through space and 
time convey this strangely disconnected connectivity in its graphic mesh. 
  In Black Pacific, we experience again and again the strange intimacies and 
repeated displacements that characterize this Age of Asymmetry. Separated at sea from 




Kapital makes for Hong Kong, hard hit by massive seas and financial devastation, but 
which “at a distance appeared to be a viable alternative. The only alternative at this point.” 
When they arrive, however, that distance gives way to the intimate viscosity of the time 
of hyperobjects. “Where’s the port?” “There is no port. It’s all the port” (Black Rain). 
This is a strangely contradictory and claustrophobic environment; ten stories of Hong 
Kong are now fully submerged. “This is probably the greenest and yet the most toxic 
project I’ve ever seen. Everything is locally sourced and recycled,” Mary notes, to which 
Callum replies, “But a million tons of garbage floating in the ocean is still a million tons 
of garbage floating in the ocean.” This interlude, rendered in monochromatic sepia tones 
to indicate we have slipped backwards in time, gives way to color pages filled with 
actions that take place in Kamchatka “now,” which are interrupted by a sideways shift to 
monochromatic representations of environmental events in Greenland, Manitoba, and 
Port Said (here and here and here, but not now), back to the future in a (still sepia) Hong 
Kong, where other actions have transpired and then forward to the present (but still in 
Kamchatka). The effect is dizzying, disorienting, strangely familiar, and yet familiarly 
strange. Defying the typical linear storytelling characteristic of most action comics, 
Wood’s fragmented narrative and Donaldson’s use of color subject us to that vertiginous 
temporal metonymy and piecemeal now-you-see-me-now-you-don’t that is so 
characteristic of hyperobjects. We cannot seem to get out of this place, whether we move 
forward, backwards, or sideways. We cannot get a handle on the events or the characters 
because neither Wood nor Donaldson ever reveals the whole story to us; we only get 
fragments of information, delivered out of sequence and often nearly concealed in the 




know that the crew includes “Mary b. unknown,” “Mag Nagendra b. 1974, Sri Lanka,” 
“Callum Israel b. 1966, Bangladesh”—but we do not know the present year—“now” is 
just the negative of the positive images of the past. The lack of a specific time signature 
conveys, I think, that sense of nonlocality that Morton suggests. Past, present, and future 
are familiar technologies that produce a temporal and ethical breakdown—we can 
distance ourselves from present day concerns if we can nostalgically imagine a more 
perfect past (those golden days of yesteryear, untrammelled by current disasters) or if we 
locate their consequences in the future (for our children, for our children’s children). The 
Massive stages that inescapable viscosity of the time of hyperobjects that Bill McKibben 
conveys in the opening chapter of Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet. He 
alternately argues that the planet we inhabit is no longer “our cozy, taken-for-granted 
earth” and that global warming, the hyperobject in the room, cannot be rhetorically 
converted into “a future threat” (1, 11). Instead, it is an imminent and immanent future 
present we are inside of and implicated in: “Hasta la vista, grandchildren!” (McKibben 
12). In The Massive, we are assaulted by time’s arrival in uneven episodic bursts that 
seem to precede something lurking just outside the panel, just beyond the turn of the page, 
a menacing absent actant that troubles any straightforward reading. The Massive is not an 
easy comic to stay with; I find myself longing for the simplicity of a linear action 
narrative that begins somewhere and that has some particular place to go. Instead, I am 
adrift in enforced intimacy with “a multitude of entangled strange strangers” (Morton, 
The Ecological Thought 15), buffeted by a series of what Beck describes as “conflict 
scenarios” in which as he points out, “in the storm of threats, ‘we are all in the same boat’” 




 So how does the Kapital’s enforced cosmopolitan risk community cohere out of 
the conflict scenarios that motivate this graphic series? Over the course of the extant 
twelve issues of this unfinished series, we come to identify some but not all of the crew 
of the Kapital. The captain, Callum Israel, is a former mercenary turned ecowarrior, the 
founder of the Ninth Wave Conservationist Force, a marine environmental group 
“fighting since 2001” (Black Pacific). His first mate, Mag Nagendra, once a Sri Lankan 
Tamil Tiger child soldier, is also ex-mercenary. Mary, a student activist from Harare, was 
a member of the original activist group made over by Israel into Ninth Wave; Ryan, a 
student activist from Vermont, is its newest member. In his environmentally aware 1882 
drama, An Enemy of the People, Henrik Ibsen presciently suggests that community is not 
about location. “We are a community,” the unctuous Mayor of a small town pontificates, 
“We have a common interest that makes us one” (11). Prior to economic and 
environmental events referred to here as the crash, the assembled and motley crew of The 
Massive illustrated “the pluralistic structure of interest group organizations” that Beck 
imagines will be rendered incomprehensible by “the commonality of dangers” that arrive 
with the actualization of risk (Risk Society 46). This is not a randomly collected group 
subject; each of the members chose to join Israel in what he insists is a pacifist 
organization dedicated to the conservation of marine habitats. “But in this new world...” 
the narrative cautions us as we turn a page that captures Israel at prayer (Muslim prayer, 
despite his surname), only to reveal a blindfolded Israel kidnapped by extremists “...Who 
can truly be certain of anything?” (Black Pacific). Beck speculates at length on how “the 
quality of community begins to change” in the emergence of risk society. “Its normative 




that “the commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need” (Risk 
Society 49, italics original). In the collected volumes of The Massive, Beck’s questions—
“To what extent can anxiety communities withstand stress?,” “What motives and forces 
for action do they set in motion?,” “How capable of compromise are anxiety-producing 
communities of danger?”—become a kind of subtext for a material ecocritical analysis 
(Risk Society 49). Israel wants to act affirmatively in the face of multiple risks and rolling 
disasters. “This is a new world. Reinvent yourself,” he admonishes an old enemy (Black 
Pacific). Yet his actions seem to contradict that intention. He jettisons the Kapital’s 
environmental mission for one that is equally conservative, though ideologically quite 
different. He tasks the crew with finding The Massive. “No side missions, no distractions. 
Just stay on signal, no matter what,” he repeats over and over again (Subcontinental). It 
seems that for Israel, anxiety translates into the desire to preserve social and cultural 
identifications, to preserve the group against its disintegration.  
 Each crewmember’s response illustrates Beck’s intuition about the risk 
community’s tendency to produce distinctly individual performances. Mag is clearly 
motivated by safety concerns, as evidenced by his almost immediate recourse to weapons 
and to violent defensive tactics, in direct contravention of Israel’s nonviolent stance. 
“You know what I am, Callum,” he uncompromisingly states (Black Pacific). “I really 
didn’t sign up for this,” Ryan confesses to Mary, “It’s not fair” (Black Pacific). Survival 
trumps ideology for this American student, and she repeatedly denies her nationality in 
the face of growing global antipathy towards an America that has basically closed its 
doors to all other affected nations and groups. Mary, who free dives and swims with 




precarious biography. She knows, the narrator informs us, “the sea still had a use for her.” 
“This planet’s dying, Ryan. Nothing’s fair. What makes you think you’re so special?” 
(Black Pacific). What was once a cohesive collection of environmentalists is becoming, 
in the face of the crash, Beck’s incomprehensible community. I am reminded of 
Rancière’s distaste for the notion of the collection, an aesthetic assemblage of otherwise 
heterogeneous objects under some common rubric designed to produce the impression of 
consensus: a particular distribution of the sensible that he described as the univocal death 
of politics, a contrived equality that uses inclusion to suppress difference and to conceal 
its own exclusionary tactics (“Contemporary Art” 46). Instead of a collection, I would 
argue that The Massive stages the emergence of what Levi Bryant describes as a 
collective, “an entanglement of human and nonhuman actors or objects...in a network or 
mesh” (Democracy of Objects 271). Man, woman, ship, shark...The Massive imagines the 
ecological thought of Tim Morton’s 2010 book so titled. “The ecological thought,” he 
explains, “consists in intimacy with the strange stranger,” those intimate other objects 
thrust at us and next to us in the claustrophobic space and time of the hyperobjects (The 
Ecological Thought 46). “This isn’t a democracy,” Israel responds to Mag’s demand for 
an equal say in the Kapital’s affairs, echoing Morton’s assertion that “democracy is based 
on reciprocity—mutual recognition,” a degree of knowing that is never possible with the 
strange stranger who “is not my mirror” (Subcontinental, The Ecological Thought 80-81). 
The collective figures the interconnectedness of the mesh, boundaries shot through with 
gaps and crammed with other beings who “the more intimately we know them, the 




 Feminist scholar Rosi Braidotti founds her affirmative (and decidedly Deleuzean) 
notion of “nomadic subjectivity” in her oft-repeated claim, “that ‘we’ are in this 
together”; she goes on to stress that her use of the first-person plural is intended to be a 
“non-anthropocentric construct” that includes “nonhuman agents...animals...and the earth 
as a bio-sphere as a whole” and that by her emphatic this she “refers to a commonly 
shared territory or habitat” (“Affirming the Affirmative” par. 28). While I find her 
posthumanist inclusiveness appealing, her positive assertion of a heterogeneous and 
nonunitary subject moves too quickly to presume a consensual response to global 
trauma—like Rancière, I am uncomfortable with the erasure of difference that consensus 
accomplishes (“Affirming the Affirmative” par. 27). Beck also appreciates the ubiquity 
of difference, acknowledging that “risk positions create dependencies which are unknown 
in class situations” (Risk Society 53). “We” might be in “this” together, but our 
assemblage does not erase the fact that we bring different skills (and different 
knowledges) to the table. Earlier I noted that both Beck and Connolly imagine that out of 
risky predicaments, “new communities and alternative communities arise, whose world 
views, norms and certainties are grouped around the center of invisible threats” (Beck, 
Risk Society 74). Risk societies might begin by collecting a multitude of strange strangers 
in the time of hyperobjects, but Beck’s more nuanced reading is that the individual at risk 
might find it necessary to elect “which group or subculture one wants to be identified 
with,” to “choose and change one’s social identity,” and “to take risks in doing so” (Risk 
Society 88). Marry this to Jane Bennett’s assertion that the turn to vital materiality “tends 
to horizontalize the relations between humans, biota, and abiota,” and we are reminded 




expanded notion “forms a key part of the newish self that needs to emerge, the self of a 
new self-interest” (Vibrant Matter 112-113).  
 This is a more satisfactory vision of a nonunitary yet polyvocal subject—a 
posthuman assemblage that expands Beck’s emergent individualized form while still 
retaining something of Rancière’s dissensus. It is also a fair approximation of the risk 
collective that coheres across the pages of The Massive. Modernization risks may 
“possess an inherent tendency towards globalization,” but the responses to them remain 
more individualized; despite their overtly nomadic and eco-cosmopolitan collective, the 
Kapital’s crewmembers “have to make their own decisions” (Beck, World at Risk 54). By 
the second volume of this series, there is an evident fissuring within this deterritorialized 
community. “There is a feeling growing amongst the crew that The Massive is lost for 
good, and that Ninth Wave is powerless...that the greater good can be best served in their 
home countries, helping to rebuild”; more narrative points out that “there are nearly 
twenty-two separate nationalities aboard the Kapital, and within that number, ten ethnic 
groups represented” (Subcontinental). Ostensibly politically neutral, the Ninth Wave 
volunteers begin to weigh local loyalties against their commitment to global 
environmental issues. Whether their next decisions will include seizing the opportunity to 
remake the world in a new image is left open in this comic series. Global risk and the 
shared experience of vulnerability, of our fragility in the face of potentially catastrophic 
events, can forge unexpected allegiances across racial, national, religious, and species 
boundaries. Beck argues that “global risks open up a moral and political space that can 
give rise to a civil culture of responsibility that transcends borders and conflicts,” but The 




an assemblage of “political refugees, engineers, and roughnecks [who] commandeer a 
mobile drilling rig and declare themselves a sovereign body,” a “rig nation” in the middle 
of the Indian Ocean. Conceived as a social utopia, “pacifist, politically neutral, and 
green,” the crew of the Kapital discover that Moksha Station is more a fascist police state 
than Beck’s imagined community. The Director claims that it is a place of peace, “open 
to all,” but then attempts to conscript the Kapital and its crew; as Mag wryly notes, “what 
it feels like is a crappy, industrial port town before the crash, except that it’s not. It’s 
some utopian fantasy on top of six miles of ocean with a shitload of stolen hardware.” 
Moksha Station is no culture of responsibility; it harbors not refugees but a nuclear 
submarine. Clearly, nation building in the new post-crash world is tainted with the 
imperialist overtones of nation building from the past, which Wood stages in the 
Director’s rhetorical response, “What is a utopia without a guarantee it stays that way?” 
The Kapital ultimately escapes this failed experiment in world risk society governance, 
but the storyline does not. We are visually reminded of the potential proliferation of these 
kinds of repressive risk responses—a white page on which the graphic outlines of yet 
another embryonic rig nation appear is the icon signaling major storyline breaks.   
 This use of image repetition also supports Wood’s narrative in another way. It is 
notable that Wood never uses the phrase “global warming” to either identify or to connect 
the series of environmental and financial crises that comprise what his storyline refers to 
simply as the crash—instead, he lets closure, the “phenomenon of observing the parts but 
perceiving the whole,” do that work (McCloud 63, italics original). We make the 
connection that the catastrophic events periodically interrupting The Massive’s narrative 




prevalent in the issues collected as Black Pacific, these three-panel pages typically 
conflate natural and economic disaster, often including images of either animals or 
indigenous persons to suggest that the scope of this catastrophic fallout reaches far 
beyond its immediate perpetrators. Wood and his artists also use closure “to produce 
suspense or to challenge audiences” (McCloud 63, italics original). Each section of Black 
Pacific comes to a close with a double page spread, the left page on which the images and 
narrative come to a close, and the right page that contains only a grayscale sketch of the 
Kapital on an otherwise empty white background. The tiny ship is positioned in the lower 
left corner, angled slightly downward and to the right; it appears to be moving, about to 
sail beyond the page’s borders and into empty space. Closure invites us to supply the 
sense of linear progress that the narrative’s random iteration seems to lack, to assume that 
this small ship is moving purposefully somewhere, to make those connections across the 
panels and pages. Yet at the same time, The Massive also resists our efforts to supply 
those links that would suture over the gaps in the mesh: that small ship always seems 
frozen, becalmed in the same place, and it is difficult for us to find a pattern in decimal 
degrees and in the seemingly random events that are sometimes environmental, 
sometimes financial.  
 “Global risk,” Beck asserts, “has the power to confuse the mechanisms of 
organized irresponsibility and even to open them up for political action” (World at Risk 
59). In The Massive, the fictional crew of the Kapital engages in no political action; their 
encounters with strange strangers are usually precipitated by the need for resources, for 
essentials like food and fuel. The series itself is unfinished; Subcontinental ends on an 




which Mary prevents. “It doesn’t end here,” she tells him, and although he tries to 
achieve some kind of closure by telling her his whole story, she, like the narrative, 
refuses his gesture. “It doesn’t matter now,” we are told and we find ourselves at another 
impasse, a white page with the outline of an oilrig platform that punctuates the gaps in 
the mesh that is Subcontinental. There is also, for me, something notably absent from The 
Massive, a text littered with the detritus of a world in which the agential power of objects 
continues to manifest itself in multiple locations throughout a truly global imaginary. 
Concerned by OOO’s emphasis on the “apartness of objects,” Jane Bennett claims “the 
frame of subjects and objects is unfriendly to the intensified ecological awareness that we 
need if we are to respond intelligently to signs of the breakdown of the earth’s carrying 
capacity for human life”  (“Systems and Things” 225, 231). Bennett, like many other new 
materialists (Braidotti among them), is concerned with how “the turn to things in 
contemporary theory...might help us to live more sustainably, with less violence toward a 
variety of bodies,” bodies that include the animate nonhuman (“Systems and Things” 
232). In the surging crowd of man-made objects and massive hyperobjects that populate 
The Massive’s claustrophobic narrative space, only one Subcontinental episode, “Polaris: 
‘Megalodon’,” gestures beyond human survival concerns towards the environmental 
damage to marine ecosystems that was arguably Ninth Wave’s mission. It imagines an 
unprecedented accumulation of Great White sharks not in some exotic waters, but just off 
the coast of California. The narrative records the impact of human-caused noise pollution 
on a marine species that is a model of evolutionary adaptation and survival; the 
accompanying illustration juxtaposes the massive mythical Megalodon against Mary’s 




matter...human-caused damage seriously threatens the survival of multiple natural, social, 
and economic systems. I hope that this episode signals that Wood and company will 
begin to demonstrate a greater ecological awareness in the forthcoming issues of this 
promising series. Until then, ecocritically, “The Massive refuses to be lost...Or be found” 
(Subcontinental).  
 
Something Darker: Practicing Dissensus in Dark Rain 
 
We took weather to be real. But in an age of global warming we see it as an accident, a 
simulation of something darker, more withdrawn—climate.                                        
(Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects 102) 
 
 To illustrate more specifically what he calls the emerging “cosmopolitan moment” 
of world risk society, Ulrich Beck turns to a discussion of a real world local 
catastrophe—the same “horrifying act of nature” that provides both foreground and 
background for Mat Johnson’s graphic novel, Dark Rain: A New Orleans Story (World at 
Risk 57). In World at Risk, Beck identifies six “conceptual components” that subtend this 
cosmopolitan moment, among them “enforced enlightenment, communication across all 
divides and boundaries, the political power of catharsis, enforced cosmopolitanism, risks 
as a wake-up call in the face of the failure of governments, and the possibility of 
alternative forms of governance” (55-56). August 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, while not an 
exemplar of every aspect of this cosmopolitan moment, certainly made visible human 
fragility in the face of climatic agency, as well as the insufficiency of state and national 
resources to respond to that agency. Communication issues were a frequent theme of the 
national and international media coverage that also endowed Katrina with what Beck 
describes as “an involuntary and unintended enlightening function,” showing the world 




sole remaining superpower” (World at Risk 57). Despite his earlier claims that, viewed 
objectively, modernization risks like global warming affect rich and poor alike, Beck’s 
emphatic position here—that “the risk of catastrophe haunts the poor”—reflects more 
clearly Rob Nixon’s flat statement that “discrimination predates disaster” (World at Risk 
58; Slow Violence 59). Nixon’s concerns for environmental justice, and his plea that the 
insights of postcolonial studies not be submerged in the current wave of “the more 
ambitious, more contemporary-sounding global studies,” emphasize that representation of 
the local effects of globally nonlocal hyperobjects deserves ecocritical consideration 
(Slow Violence 38). Nixon’s Rancièrian assertion that “by laying claim to the mobile 
rhetoric of environmental justice, the dispossessed may enhance their prospects of 
becoming visible, audible agents of globalization from below” reiterates representation’s 
capacity for bringing ecological awareness back to the surface (Slow Violence 37). Mat 
Johnson’s Dark Rain attempts to resuscitate the story of Katrina’s impact on the Crescent 
City, graphically rendered in a murky bluish-gray palette that is neither black nor white 
but somewhere in the middle, in order to illustrate a viscous hybrid ethics permeating that 
visibly imperfect storm. 
 “Not so long ago,” Naomi Klein suggests, “disasters were periods of social 
leveling, rare moments when atomized communities put divisions aside and pulled 
together” (522). Not so today, she argues, in The Shock Doctrine, her extensively 
researched exploration of neoliberal capitalism’s exploitation of catastrophic events. 
Instead, “increasingly disasters are the opposite: they provide windows into a cruel and 
ruthlessly divided future in which money and race buy survival,” a conflation of 




Orleans (522). Despite Morton’s hope that “the effect of the climate disruption crisis is 
not upgraded capitalism but a long hard look at why we’re alive and what we want to do 
about it, together,” OOO’s rather resolutely anti process and quite literally object-
oriented focus does not serve me well here (The Ecological Thought 102). Instead, I want 
to draw on new materialism’s emphasis on process and relationships, particularly its 
engagement with multiple and diverse assemblages, to inform a material ecocritical 
reading of Dark Rain: A New Orleans Story. 
 The first page of Johnson’s narrative and Simon Gane’s atmospheric artwork 
illustrates the confluence of race, class, global capital, and local circumstance that will 
flow across this tale of two cities that are really one and the same. It is 2003, and we are 
quickly introduced to our unlikely protagonists, Dabny Arceneaux and Emmit Jack. 
Gane’s breakdown puts the two protagonists on equal, if not identical, footing: the upper 
three panels show us Dabny in Houston, an African American customs officer with child 
support problems and a tempting offer to make a fast buck; the lower three depict Emmit 
in New Orleans, a Cajun assistant bank clerk with a thirty minute lunch break and access 
to the bank’s safety deposit boxes. Dabny, a decorated military veteran, and Emmit, a 
chronically disenfranchised New Orleans native, end up in prison—Dabny for accepting 
a bribe, Emmit for alleged theft of property. Gane’s careful attention to panel size 
equivalence and minimal guttering combine with Johnson’s balanced use of narrative 
boxes and speech bubbles to give Dabny and Emmit parallel tracks to a shared present—
they wind up roommates at a Texas halfway house two years later, embarking on what 
the justice system optimistically describes as a “second chance.” Neither one can find 




grumbles, “if this is a second chance, it ain’t a very good one,” Hurricane Katrina is 
forming in the Gulf. “Hurricanes don’t follow any rules. Just like everything else that can 
hurt you in life,” Dabny muses. “You never know if it’s come for you ‘til it lands.”  
 In her thoughtful article, “Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina,” Nancy Tuana 
bends a new materialist ecocritical perspective around the events of August 2005. She 
notes “the urgency of embracing an ontology that rematerializes the social and takes 
seriously the agency of the natural” in order to “better understand the rich interactions 
between beings through which subjects are constituted out of relationality” (188). 
“Viscous porosity,” her metaphor for what she elsewhere defines as “an interactionist 
attention to the processes of becoming” that emphasizes the “emergent interplay” (think 
Karen Barad’s intra-action) between biological and social processes and out of which 
things (think Latour’s actants) are precipitated (188-190). “Viscosity,” she goes on to 
reiterate, “is neither fluid nor solid, but intermediate between them...[it] retains an 
emphasis on resistance to changing form,” while “the porosity of interactions helps to 
undermine the notion” that there is something natural and unbreachable about some kinds 
of social boundaries (193-194). To me, Tuana describes something more vividly affective 
than the viscous materiality that Morton attributes to hyperobjects; the ontological ethics 
of dwelling in and with the risks that haunt our material world have a viscous porosity 
that overflows the higher ground we sometimes believe we occupy. In Come Hell or 
High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster, Michael Dyson considers how 
the narrative that accompanied much of the national media coverage of Katrina’s 
aftermath performed precisely the kinds of aesthetic partitioning that Rancière is 




and international papers, Dyson notes that “the captions say it all: the young black man 
loots his groceries, the white youth find theirs...the identical character of their experience 
is shattered by the language, which casts their actions in contrasting lights” (164-165). 
What Dark Rain actively stages, I think, is what William Connolly has elsewhere 
described as “the shape and quality of desire in its individual and institutional 
manifestations” (World of Becoming 121). In Dark Rain, everybody wants something and 
everybody needs something...what emerges out of the interplay between them is the story 
that follows. 
    Dabny wants a small business loan; Emmit wants his own bank, “for the people. 
Micro-lending.” Sarah, a pregnant single resident of the Lower Ninth Ward does not 
“have enough money to buy a bus ticket” out of the hurricane’s path “even if I wanted to.” 
Emmit’s former employer, the African American manager of the Ninth Ward Banque de 
Congo, wants to safeguard his clients’ assets and his own interests; Colonel Driggs, 
Dabny’s former military commander and current head of the privately owned Dark Rain 
Security, wants to seize the “opportunity” that deployment to Katrina’s state of 
emergency provides for “compensation.” Each of these characters is entangled in the 
viscosity of this hyperobject and in the muddy ethical waters that flood its normative 
levees. Gane’s nuanced illustrations and Johnson’s detailed characterization render the 
cast of Dark Rain as believable types, not reductive stereotypes; the intention here is to 
suggest a multiplicity of perspectives that unwork some of the erasure that the AP 
captions produced. Unlike The Massive, Dark Rain relies far more on dialogue to convey 
its largely local storyline. There are no one-dimensional protagonists in this story, and 




American discourse during the events that followed Katrina. Dabny is an articulate Iraq 
war veteran whose marriage failed because of his deployment overseas; his child support 
payments fell into arrears because no jobs awaited our “war heroes” on their return—
Johnson ironically emphasizes that Dabny’s military service is “honored” by the lightness 
of his sentencing and by the “awarding” of his parole. Emmit’s character and motives are 
less neatly drawn; his version of his conviction veers from unconvincingly proclaiming 
his innocence—Emmit is the prototypical crimeless victim—to assuring Dabny that 
liberating the contents of long-forgotten safety deposit boxes would amount to “a 
victimless crime.”  Emmit is the embodiment of social Darwinism’s opportunistic 
underdog in this ambivalent ecology. “Most folks, they only get a few opportunities in 
life. But guys like us get one. I know when my one chance comes knocking, that I’m 
gonna answer.” Emmit claims his only regret is not taking from the rich to give to the 
poor (himself included). Here, Johnson’s narrative echoes Dyson’s claims regarding the 
reported looting that took place during the days following the levee failures. “Desperate 
people do in desperation what capitalist and political and cultural looters do daily—steal 
and give little thought to its moral consequences” (168). Emmit voices white-collar 
crime’s most frequent justification. “They deserved it,” he insists, claiming the bank’s 
management has always allowed unsavory and potentially criminal clients to hide their 
ill-gotten gains in the bank’s vaults—and that management’s off-book borrowing 
motivated his arrest just before he was able to dip into the till himself.  
 The Banque de Congo’s manager, M. Ardoin, whose family may indeed have 
treated their clients’ assets as their own private venture capital fund, is an equally 




residents who were trapped by rising floodwaters after the levees failed. “The 
Superdome? Of course not. Mother, did you raise me to be a welfare cow, sucking on 
the government teat? I don’t rely on the State...” In the next panel, Johnson again 
demonstrates how the aesthetic distribution of the sensible can cut both ways, staging 
neoliberal dismissal of big government on one hand while invoking necessary big 
government in the next. Informed that the levees have broken, Ardoin visibly changes his 
tune, assuming that federal troops and aid will be shortly dispersed to protect taxpayers’ 
property rights (even though the narrative repeatedly suggests that no taxes have ever 
been paid on the hidden assets in Banque de Congo’s vault). Another African American 
character, Flash, makes his way to the New Orleans Convention Center, joining Emmit 
and the nearly 100,000 people who fled to the Superdome and the Convention Center 
pending their unconscionably delayed evacuation (Dyson 66). Johnson and Gane 
combine narrative development and pictorial representation of iconic scenes (familiar 
from news coverage of the disaster) to make visible and audible the inhumanity and 
incomprehensibility of enforced cosmopolitanism. Money has no currency in the anxious 
present of this community of fate; the most valuable commodity at the Convention Center 
on August 31, 2005, is water. Flash and Emmit eye a group of young black men, 
whispering in the shadows in their baggy athletic shorts, with that mixture of contempt 
and distrust that is often directed at society’s Others. “Hood rats. Animals. Like they just 
got out of their cages,” Emmit sneers. “I’m not trying to be a racist or anything, but some 
folks just ain’t civilized.” Flash concurs, demonstrating that while risk can interpellate a 
community, it can also recall the exclusive partitioning off of some from others, whether 




panel and our perspective, one of the young men approaches. “Can I help you?” Gane 
places this exchange at the bottom of the page, so we are forced to pause here before we 
turn to see what happens next. The young man wears a baseball cap turned backwards 
over the ubiquitous do-rag that identifies urban Southern youth—and not in a good way. 
His muscular frame is clearly visible under his sleeveless tank top, in pointed contrast to 
Emmit’s unkempt lankiness or Flash’s manifestly overweight paunch and dapper button-
down safari shirt. His question reads like a confrontation: conventionally, such a demand 
translates into “What do you want,” and the expectation is that what you may receive will 
not be what you anticipated (and again, not in a good way.) Closure’s viscous action 
actively resists any interpretation other than the obvious: nothing good can come of this. 
 Yet surprisingly, when we turn the page we find that astonishingly, something can. 
What these young men are offering really is help, material, measurable help in the form 
of “water, bottles of soda, a bunch of stuff” intended to ameliorate the shared misery of 
their circumstances. William Connolly devotes a considerable portion of 2011’s A World 
of Becoming to considering how, in this risky time of environmental and economic 
asymmetry, we can “negotiate life, without hubris or existential resentment, in a world 
that is neither providential nor susceptible to consummate mastery” (98). Replacing what 
he deplores as the negative “existential resentment” that he sees in contemporary 
“practices of capitalist greed...authoritarian strategies, sexual narrowness, and military 
aggression” (and to which I would add the increasingly bellicose conversations about first 
and second amendment rights percolating through our national discourse) with something 
he calls “existential affirmation,” Connolly calls for an intimate and immanent 




necessary change of orientation, “the cultural distribution of existential orientations to the 
future” (World of Becoming 66, 98-99). This turn to the future unworks the past without 
undoing it: Connolly argues that “the inheritance of fate can also be worked upon so that 
you modify not it but the effect it has on your future actions” (World of Becoming 113). 
He supplants the question of “can I help you” with something more along the lines of 
“what can I become?” “To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to 
work ‘to become who you are,’ so that the word ‘becoming’ now modifies ‘are’ more 
than the other way around” (Connolly, World of Becoming 114). In Dark Rain, I would 
argue, Johnson tries to imagine what becoming after Katrina might look like. 
 Sarah may not be barefoot, but she is pregnant and at the mercy of both her past 
and present circumstances. She is also realistic, and clearly concerned with finding a 
positive solution to her chronic poverty. To Dabny’s suggestion that she go to a shelter, 
she retorts, “Eventually, you got to leave. And you got to have money to eat, get a place. 
How do you get a job when you’re living in a shelter? How do you get there?” Dabny too 
is overtly concerned with taking responsibility for his bad choices while opening up some 
kind of space for alternative ones in the future. “I’m not good at risks. I tried to break the 
rules one time, look where that got me. Never have known when to double down and 
when to fold,” he admits, but like Sarah, he recognizes that for either of them to escape 
the material-semiotic slow violence of racial discrimination and environmental neglect 
that characterizes this cosmopolitan moment, “we have to get the hell out of here.” Nancy 
Tuana uses Donna Haraway’s concept of the material-semiotic to point to how “material 
agency in its heterogeneous forms, including irreducibly diverse forms of distinctively 




“emblematic of the viscous porosity between humans and our environment, between 
social practices and natural phenomena,” a complex systemic interaction that culminated 
in material levees that failed to protect the environmentally, economically, and socially 
disadvantaged lower wards (Tuana 192). The storm’s manifest materiality resonated with 
poverty and racism’s culturally constructed social environments, meaning that one 
system perturbed or irritated the other (Bryant, Democracy of Objects 222).3 Tuana 
argues that “Katrina interacted with poverty in relatively predictable ways,” like the 
inability of the poor to evacuate the city, their lack of financial resources both before and 
especially after the catastrophic event, and the consequent limiting of their future options 
so clearly illustrated in Dark Rain (205). There is however, I would interject, both a 
double bind and a double blindness at work here that Johnson and Gane make more 
visible than does Tuana’s thoughtful analysis. Thinking strictly from an OOO perspective, 
Levi Bryant argues that “individuals or psychic systems” possess a viscous internal 
consistency, a “regime of attraction” that can seriously “limit or impede their capacity for 
action” (Democracy of Objects 221). A subject trapped in a low-paying job that he cannot 
quit because he cannot survive without it, even while it keeps him mired at a subsistence 
level he desperately wants to escape, is the example he suggests (and which is embodied 
in so many of Johnson’s characters). Bryant relates this to “how people are dragging their 
feet with respect to responding to the growing environmental crisis,” noting 
Here we are trapped between an awful knowledge that the environment is 
changing in ways that might very well affect human existence in a radical 
way and a social structure that is organized in such a way that nearly 
everything required for mere existence carries a significant carbon 





Environmental damage and social discrimination irritate and perturb one another, but as 
Bryant makes clear, “while substances can enter into exo-relations with other substances, 
they only do so on their own terms and with respect to their own organization” 
(Democracy of Objects 147). In post-Katrina New Orleans and in the pages of Dark Rain, 
we see system failures that are largely blind to those other systems that trouble their 
internal waters. Connolly’s suggestion, that “one key response to the human predicament 
becomes the nobility to make reflective wagers when the future is uncertain,” surely 
recalls the sort of double down that Dabny hesitates over in his own moment of becoming 
(World of Becoming 112). Part of that wager, for Connolly, centers on the question of 
“how to fashion a positive frugality of material desire,” a question that haunts the various 
protagonists of Dark Rain (World of Becoming 121). In almost every case, these diverse 
individuals echo neoliberal strategist Milton Friedman’s observation “in his Wall Street 
Journal op-ed [that Katrina was] ‘also an opportunity’”(qtd. in Klein, The Shock Doctrine 
518). Beck notes that risks are not just threats; they “are also market opportunities,” and 
Klein’s abiding concern is to parse through “disaster capitalism,” neoliberalism’s 
“orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined 
with the treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities” (6). Driggs and Emmit 
plainly see Katrina’s devastation as an opportunity to be exploited. Driggs plans to use 
his position as a private security contractor as a cover for robbing the Banque de 
Congo—the fictional “Dark Rain Security” is a thinly veiled allusion to the infamous 
Blackwater Security team “hired to protect FEMA employees from looters” (Klein 519). 
Johnson and Gane include an episode in which Driggs seizes control of a drugstore, 




supplies from injured local residents in order to take care of his own people—because for 
Driggs, charity begins and ends at home. Michael Dyson’s insight that “what is needed 
are structures of justice that perpetuate the goodwill intended in charity,” not short-lived 
handouts that fail to address deeper structural inequities (203), counters Emmit’s 
imagined identity as the Ninth Ward’s Robin Hood.  “I could be like a savior,” he argues, 
defending his misguided vision of redistributing the bank’s assets that he can only access 
by theft. “It’s the only way,” he insists to Dabny, “I tried changing things the right 
way...if you get their money, that’s how you really hurt them.” It is significant that 
Driggs and Emmit die in their explosive attempt to rob the Banque de Congo, crushed by 
the collapse of the financial edifice that symbolizes the limits of their imagined identities.  
 Only Dabny seems to want to embody something like Connolly’s affirmative 
becoming that turns toward the future in a positive way. “We can do the wrong thing. But 
at least we can try and do it for the right reasons.” He escapes with his life and a bag full 
of confederate money, “the antique money of a failed government,” which he sells to a 
collector for $17,000, enough to make a down payment on a boat—a subtle reminder that 
much of New Orleans was built on the archetypal edifice of racial discrimination, slavery, 
and its clearly counterfeit profits. The novel ends on a positive note, but not, I think, with 
the new beginning or alternative future that either Connolly or Beck envision in the world 
of becoming that world risk society could usher in. In Risk Society, first published in 
1986, Beck predicted that “traditional and institutional forms of coping with fear and 
insecurity,” like “the family, marriage, sex roles, and class consciousness” would “lose 
meaning” in the face of global risk, and that alternative social and political forms would 




risk’s wake-up call in the wake of government failures is the “refutation of the neoliberal 
conception of the minimal state” (63). Both Klein and Dyson document the abysmal 
failures of local, state, and federal responses to Katrina’s devastation, which they 
attribute to program cuts, poor communications, and inadequate staffing resulting from 
several years of increasing privatization and reduced government. Yet Dark Rain’s 
concluding panels present us with the triumph of the nuclear family (albeit a 
nontraditional family composed of Dabny, his daughter from his first marriage, Sarah and 
her baby) and of equal access to the market. Dabny’s final words celebrate the 
mythological power of the one thing neoliberalism offers to bind us all: free-market 
capitalism. “This boat is mine from now on,” he asserts from the helm. “I can salvage on 
this, for now. Try to get some charter jobs as time goes by. Some fishing. Diversify.” 
Naomi Klein quotes Adolph Reed Jr., a political scientist and native of New Orleans, as 
arguing that Katrina’s ravages “exposed the consequences of neoliberalism’s lies and 
mystifications, in a single locale and all at once,” but I fear that is not illustrated here (qtd. 
in Klein, The Shock Doctrine 516). Dark Rain closes with Dabny and company sailing 
blissfully off into the sunset on the newly christened “Second Chance” atop a pristine sea 
untouched by the environmental devastation that continues to haunt the Gulf Coast. “Start 
again,” are his final words; ecocritically, while I am deeply sympathetic to Johnson and 
Gane’s socially imaginative staging of the material-semiotic affects of racial and class 
discrimination, “End again” would be mine.4 “Denial is a powerful force,” Tuana writes, 
and her plea for an interactionist approach critically notes its power to “speak of the 
biological aspects of phenomena without importing the mistaken notion that this 




environments” (209-210). I wish that Johnson and Gane had managed to overcome that 
kind of systemic blindness that tends to obtain even between systems that constantly 
intra-act with each other. I want to see graphic interactionism at work in an image+text 
that represents the multiple perspectives of its affective aspects.  
 
Coda: Looking Ahead, or I Need a Superhero 
 
 Just at the point when the battle between Swamp Thing and Jason Woodrue’s 
Floronic Man in Alan Moore’s Saga of the Swamp Thing reaches its crisis, Moore 
interrupts his storyline for a word from the Justice League, that ever-shifting community 
of superheroes from the DC Comics universe: “There is a house above the world,” a 
narrative voice intones, “where the over-people gather” (Moore, Saga of the Swamp 
Thing 82). Superman, Firestorm (the Nuclear Man), Wonder Woman, the Flash and 
assorted other caped crusaders look down in dismay as they realize that while “it looks 
like he’s controlling the world’s vegetation,” this is not your garden variety of threat. 
“No! That we could handle...But the world’s vegetation is controlling him!” (Moore, 
Saga of the Swamp Thing 84). The Superheroes find themselves incapacitated by this 
unprecedented (“Our planet has declared war on us”) and unanticipated (“We were 
watching out for New York, for Metropolis, for Atlantis...But who was watching out for 
Lacroix, Louisiana?) problem—this “super wicked problem, a problem for which time is 
running out” (Moore, Saga of the Swamp Thing 84; Morton Hyperobjects 135, italics 
original). Tim Morton argues that “the time of hyperobjects is a time of hypocrisy, 
weakness, and lameness,” and it would seem that even Superheroes are not exempt—flat 
ontology, it seems, has penetrated even the other world of the over-people (Hyperobjects 




the hyperobject coming—we can only see bits and pieces of its local manifestation, but 
they never simply add up to the whole of which they are sensual parts. In the face of 
hyperobjects’ sheer massiveness and withdrawn nonlocality, even superpersons must 
acknowledge their own weakness. As for lameness, all our purposiveness, our sense of 
identity and mission, simply drains away—powerlessness is part of that viscosity from 
which none of us are exempt (Morton, Hyperobjects 153-157). In the time of 
hyperobjects, superheroes simply will not cut it anymore; “Nobody was ever going to 
come from the sky to save us,” Grant Morrison accurately predicts. “No Justice League; 
Just Us League” (Supergods 397). The Just Us League captures the idea that we are all in 
this together; no one and no thing escapes the time of the hyperobject. “Art in the Age of 
Asymmetry,” Morton argues, “must thus be a tuning to the object,” consciously listening 
to what things have to tell us, recalibrating the concepts of subject and object and 
recomposing what those things might look and sound like (Hyperobjects 174, italics 
original). “Hyperobjects profoundly change how we think about any object,” changes that 
I believe are already rippling through contemporary comics and graphic novels. If 
ecocriticism is to be attuned to these new texts, it too needs to change its ways of seeing, 
its ways of drawing distinctions, drawing on hyperobjects in order to draw from them 
(Morton Hyperobjects 201).  
 My own wish for ecocriticism is something like what I would call, borrowing 
explicitly from Bruno Latour, compositionist ecocriticism. In “An Attempt at a 
“Compositionist Manifesto’,” Latour proposes what he labels compositionism, which he 
illustrates by way of a series of comparisons (“Compositionist Manifesto” 474). Broadly 




constructive assembling that begins with the bits and pieces on hand and then puts them 
together “while retaining their heterogeneity” (“Compositionist Manifesto” 473). His 
instincts here seem to me to be fully consistent with his arguments about hybridity, which 
I discussed in my Introduction. The component parts of a hybrid also retain their 
differences; it is important to resist the inclination to analyze either part solely in terms of 
the other; instead, composition and ecocriticism must begin in the middle...as Latour says 
here, “it is all about immanence” (“Compositionist Manifesto” 475). For my purposes, 
then, ecocriticism would take up the bits of postcolonial theory, economic and critical 
race theory, new materialism, and OOO, and reassemble them with the ready-to-hand 
pieces of popular culture and more traditional environmental texts—sort of a carpentry of 
texts, if you will (an ecocritical version of Graham Harman’s “carpentry of things”), 
which is what I have tried to perform here (Guerilla Metaphysics 254). We need not 
jettison the insights that have helped ecocriticism evolve to this point; instead, we should 
be realistic about the kinds of blindness that self-organizing systems are heirs to. William 
Connolly defines self-organization as “a process by which, say, a simple organism 
restlessly seeks a new resting point upon encountering a shock or disturbance. Such 
activity may periodically help to bring something new into the world” (The Fragility of 
Things 8).5 Objects and systems, as we have seen, tend to translate one another in their 
own terms and for their own purposes, often to their detriment (and to ours). Latour is 
sensitive to this tendency, I think, and his assertion that “for a compositionist, nothing is 
beyond dispute” registers the need for intellectual disturbance even if ultimately, “closure 
has to be achieved...achieved only by the slow process of composition and compromise” 




 Out of that slow process, however, it is possible for something new to arrive, and 
that, I would argue, is what a compositionist ecocriticism can open itself to by combining 
political, cultural, environmental, and economic theory with a far more open assortment 
of textual resources. Latour is much taken with the notion not of progress but of the 
“prospect: the shape of things to come,” and his manifesto turns to a consideration of 
what he describes as a kind of outmoded Modern hero (“Compositionist Manifesto” 486). 
“The ecological crisis is nothing but the sudden turning around of someone who had 
actually never before looked into the future, so busy was He extricating Himself from a 
horrible past,” a description that draws on Beck’s distinction between those risks that 
characterized early modernity from those modernization risks that now cast their long 
shadows in the time of hyperobjects (“Compositionist Manifesto” 486). This tragic hero 
is not headed back to the future; he is backing into the future, so he never sees it coming. 
What Latour wants—and what ecocriticism should also look for, and what the graphic 
novel needs—is a new hero: a hero who can “finally look ahead” (“Compositionist 
Manifesto” 487), one suffused with “a positive frugality of material desire” (Connolly, 
World of Becoming 121) and a “thirst for the Common World” (Latour, “Compositionist 
Manifesto” 488).  
  Our hero need not meet Judge Learned Hand’s 1952 ruling on the definition of a 
Superhero: our hero need not be heroic, possessed of superpowers, a codename, an iconic 
costume or a dual identity (Coogan 77). In the Age of Asymmetry, “weakness ends the 
search for ultimate men and supermen”; hyperobjects put the “super” in “superhero” 
under erasure (superhero) (Morton, “Ecologocentrism” 77).6 Our hero also cannot be 




late—that it is precisely His flight that has created the destruction He was trying to avoid 
in the first place” (“Compositionist Manifesto” 486). Denying his past will not change 
our hero’s future, crowded with objects and hyperobjects, nor will it be possible for us 
“to demonstrate that man is equal or superior to his conflict” (Meeker 157). In 1972, 
Joseph Meeker delightfully compared the tragic view of life with the comic view, coming 
to the conclusion that an ecological view of life must also be a comic one (168). 
“Comedy demonstrates that man is durable even though he may be weak, stupid and 
undignified,” he argues, and “as the tragic hero suffers or dies for his ideals, the comic 
hero survives without them” (158). “Modest and unheroic,” the comic hero’s “victories 
are all small, but he lives in a world where only small victories are possible” (168, 159). 
Here I would suggest that while Callum Israel’s tragic turn in The Massive renders him 
ineligible for the new hero, Mary’s far more adaptable durability suggests that her role 
deserves greater attention.  
 Meeker’s analysis reflects the common prejudices and ecological beliefs of his 
time—he presumes a male, human hero, and his argument is predicated on a belief in the 
kind of steady state ecological holism that has since been discarded. But I am still drawn 
to his insights because I want to think about the roles that heroes have played in our 
environmental imagination thus far and to consider how that role might be seen and 
drawn in the comics to come. “We engage life in the middle of things,” Connolly writes, 
and he tries to illustrate the role that an affirmative micropolitics of the self might play in 
his affirmative world of becoming (Fragility of Things 192). “A role is neither reducible 
entirely to the individuals who inhabit it nor thoroughly assimilable to the larger 




with how this resonates with the mutable iterations of Swamp Thing and Black Orchid 
(World of Becoming 143-144). Peter Coogan argues that “the characteristics of mission, 
powers, and identity are central” to the superhero definition Learned Hand adjudicated 
and which depends on a certain unambiguity of thought to sustain: a superhero has a 
mission, to which he dedicates himself and from which he never swerves (77).  Both 
Swamp Thing and Black Orchid demonstrate a wide range of perspectives and their 
identities are as adaptive as the trans-corporeal vegetable matter entangled with their 
human DNA. Connolly’s description not only refuses to contain the notion of role, he 
expands its range; a role is “the site of strategic ambiguity, periodically susceptible for 
that reason to creative political deployment” (World of Becoming 144). Role play has 
political potential; it allows actants to perform their own distribution of the sensible, to 
make themselves audible and visible in ways that recall Rancière’s examples of workers 
made suddenly visible because they performed in unexpected and out-of-the-ordinary 
ways, celebrated in 1981’s La nuit des prolétaires (most recently published in English as 
Proletarian Nights). Both the Elephantmen in Wounded Animals and the engineered 
biorgs of We3 act out in ways that draw them into visibility, even if only fleetingly. 
Connolly notes that social and cultural expectations about appropriate and available roles 
“tend to express and support the priorities of an established regime,” enacting that sort of 
aesthetic erasure or disappearance that is at the heart of Rancière’s arguments (Fragility 
of Things 184). “Role experimentation,” Connolly suggests, “can disrupt and redirect the 
flow of authority, habit, institutional regularity, and future projection. It can also 
encourage others to look more closely at their own performances in this or that domain” 




may not ultimately make a difference in a world where consumerist desire underwrites 
much of the environmental crisis we face today, but it at least stages an interruption in 
habitual performances and institutional interpellations—the staging of economic equality, 
even for a moment, does help to make the slow violence of poverty and racial 
discrimination visible, and to encourage us to look again at our prejudices and at our own 
habitual (and unexamined) actions. The iconic characters of comics and graphic novels 
invite readers to engage in acts of environmental and performative imagination; “minor 
moments,” Connolly admits, “but,” as he goes on to insist, “an accumulation of minor 
moments can jostle settled habits of perception” (Fragility of Things 186). For Ronald 
Lithgow, erstwhile couch potato and environmental Walter Mitty, finding himself in 
Concrete’s shoes meant overcoming the resentment that comes with discovering yourself 
a stone among stones, an object inside an object. Alternatively, Concrete’s becoming 
accomplishes, for me, more than any other protagonist—animal, vegetable, (hu)man or 
mineral—we have encountered this far. Truly dwelling in the middle of things, at the 
confluence of image and text, Concrete epitomizes that minor moment ecocriticism must 
be tuned to. “We inhabit an entangled world,” Connolly contemplates, “in which the best 
hope is to extend and broaden our identities, interests, and ethos of interconnectedness as 
we multiply the sites of political action” (Fragility of Things 193-194). A compositionist 













1 My use of “apprehend” here intentionally echoes Rob Nixon’s use of the term. Nixon 
describes it as “a crossover term that draws together the domains of perception, emotion, 
and action,” a particularly valuable concept for use in my arguments. See his Introduction 
to Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, p. 14. 
 
2 The quotes here are from the inside front cover of the first issue of this comic book 
series, The Massive #1: Landfall “Kamchatka,” first released in June 2012. Most of my 
references will come from the collected square-bound volumes of The Massive, Black 
Pacific (reprints The Massive #1 - #6) and more recently, Subcontinental (reprints The 
Massive #7 - #12), published in March and December 2013.  Neither the original comic 
issues or the graphic collections are paginated; as a result, I will indicate sources 
parenthetically with volume names or issue numbers for clarity. 
 
3 For a compelling argument that also considers the material-semiotic valence of race, see 
Michael Hames-Garcia’s thoughtful article, “How Real is Race,” in Material Feminisms, 
eds. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, pp. 308-339. Hames-Garcia’s suggestion that 
“what is needed now is creative experimentation with racial identities, rather than their 
abandonment,” resonates strongly with William Connolly’s consideration of what might 
be called the role of role experimentation, which I address in the concluding section of 
this chapter (308). 
 
4 This is not Mat Johnson’s first graphic novel that deals with the material-semiotic of 
raced bodies and racism in America. His 2006 Incognegro, art by Warren Pleece, is a 
remarkable text that demands a close reading on its own. 
 
5 Connolly specifically attends to how self-organizing systems (he includes “hurricanes, 
organisms, the Earth’s biosphere, species evolution, and economic markets” in this 
description), in constant interaction with other self-organizing systems operating at 
variable scales, speeds and intensities have the potential to “support, amplify, or 
destabilize one another.” His insights about the destabilizing effects of the interaction 
between neoliberal capitalism and global climate change have critical implications for 
contemporary ecocritical analysis, but they extend far beyond the scope of this 
conclusion. For now, those considerations must be left, “to be continued” in a later 
reading (The Fragility of Things 82, 25).  
 
6 Morton, in the style of Heidegger and Derrida, puts the term “animism” under erasure in 
“Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals,” which I reference in Chapter 1. Here, I am 
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